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Political Science Quarterly

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From the Editor:

In this issue. . .

RICHARD NED LEBOW takes issue, on the one hand, with American assessments of Soviet strategic capacity and intentions and, on the other, with the American strategic response.

PEARL T. ROBINSON considers the future of blacks in the Republican party. Looking at black partisan attachments from Reconstruction to the present, she contends that the principle of reciprocity is the only basis for making inroads into the black vote.

MILTON J. ESMAN examines the process by which Canada's political elites have experimented with language policies to help manage potentially dangerous and divisive conflicts between Canada's two major language communities.

THEDA SKOCPOL and KENNETH FINEGOLD look at the attempts of the early New Deal (1933–35) to regulate prices and production and compare the historically developed administrative and planning capacities of different parts of the U.S. federal government. Their focus on state capacities contrasts with the explanatory emphases on social groups or economic conditions that are common to arguments based on pluralist or Marxian theoretical premises.

ROGER G. BROWN discusses the role of political parties in the appointment of top-level political executives. He argues that although party organizations have been little involved institutionally in the president's staffing of the bureaucracy, the preponderance of appointees nevertheless share their president's party affiliation.

MICHAEL H. FRISCH argues that Progressive Era urban theory was only superfically about cities and that, rather, its roots lay in the institutional and intellectual emergence of academic political science.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

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Misconceptions in American Strategic Assessment

RICHARD NED LEBOW

> [Aping an adversary's strategic capability] suggests to observers, not determination, but rather the lack of assurance of the frontier tenderfoot in the Western movie who carries two oversized guns to town to demonstrate his readiness for "high noon."
>
> General Maxwell D. Taylor

Recent changes in American strategic doctrine not only have prompted shifts in the measures of strategic sufficiency but have also led to a heightened perception of these measures. Conceptions of the strategic balance currently in vogue are all based on estimates of relative residual military capability following a nuclear exchange. Informed views differ about how such estimates should be made. However, those of the two key institutions most concerned in generating such assessments—the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Department of Defense (DOD)—employ approaches that divorce military conflict from the political context in which such conflict would occur. These approaches are, as a result, inaccurate, misleading, and even detrimental to the maintenance of peace.

Strategic forces mean nothing in the abstract. They must be assessed in terms of the mission they are expected to perform. For the United States this mission has always been deterrence, although deterrence of what has never been altogether clear. From time to time, officials from various administrations have spoken of extended deterrence, supposing that American strategic forces could

RICHARD NED LEBOW is professor of strategy at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Bologna Center. His most recent book is *Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis*. He is currently working on a study of Soviet and American misconceptions of nuclear war.

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prevent, or at least discourage, any kind of military action by the Soviet Union against the United States and its allies. At other times, these factors have been described as having the more circumscribed task of deterring a nuclear attack on the United States. Former Defense Secretary Harold Brown's statements in his annual report of 1981 illustrate the fuzziness that surrounds the Defense Department's conception of deterrence. Twice in this document he declares: "Despite some initial illusions, most of us have recognized for many years that strategic nuclear capabilities alone could only deter a narrow range of contingencies." These he defines "as nuclear attacks on the United States, our forces overseas and on our friends and allies." On the same page where this statement appears the second time, however, he states that "nuclear forces also contribute to some degree, through fear of escalation, to deterrence of non-nuclear attacks." Sandwiched in between these two iterations is yet another pronouncement on deterrence that extends its scope even further. The secretary declares that it is capable not only of "discouraging reckless action in a crisis" but of "minimizing aggressive behavior over the longterm."[1]

To be fair to Harold Brown, it must be acknowledged that his lack of precision about the political utility of strategic forces is but a reflection of the general ambiguity on this subject in government, media, and academia. In part this is due to the nature of deterrence; it is very difficult to know just what impact a state's strategic arsenal has on its friends or adversaries. But such ambiguity also reflects the failure to develop adequate theory about the psychological relationship between threat and response and between force and will. In the absence of good theory, efforts to determine the utility of deterrence often verge on being tautological. It is frequently claimed that "deterrence has worked because the Russians have not invaded Western Europe." Even more sophisticated attempts to assess deterrence generally fail to delineate either the psycho-political mechanisms by which it is supposed to operate or the levels at which it is assumed to be effective.[2]

These studies fail to provide a logic for formulating strategic missions or designing force structures. Successive administrations have instead succumbed to the temptation of devising strategic doctrine in accordance with the capabilities of their weapons, which is a complete reversal of Clausewitz's dictum that military capability should reflect the political objectives it is designed to achieve. Nothing illustrates this point better than Presidential Directive 59. The Carter administration's new doctrine was little more than a recognition of the ways in which a series of incremental technological changes transformed the capabilities of American strategic forces. Each increment of change was the result of an innovation that improved the performance characteristics of some

[1] United States Department of Defense, *Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1981* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980), pp. 5, 63, and 65.

[2] This criticism has also been made by Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice.* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974); and Robert Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited," *World Politics* 31 (January 1979): 289-394.

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component of those forces. Collectively, these improvements enhanced the United States's capability to carry out a wide range of sophisticated counterforce options. The military, which had pushed for these improvements, gradually incorporated more counterforce targets into the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP)—the nuclear targeting options open to the president. Doctrine was belatedly developed and promulgated by the Defense Department and the White House to take these changes into account. It was made public at a time the Carter administration hoped to impress the American people with its toughness toward the Soviet Union.[3]

Measures of the Strategic Balance

Even though successive administrations have not really been clear about what it is they hope to deter, they have not hesitated to redefine the force requirements thought necessary to do it. In the early 1960s, when Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara decreed that the ability to destroy the Soviet Union as a twentieth-century nation was sufficient to guarantee deterrence, strategic sufficiency was measured in terms of the capability to wipe out an arbitrarily determined number of Soviet cities. Since the Soviets possessed no real capability throughout most of this period to attack the continental United States, Americans gave little thought to the credibility of their commitment to use nuclear weapons in retaliation. American strategic planners were also confident about the United States's ability to attain its stipulated operational objectives because the Soviet Union lacked the means to defend itself against U.S. bombers, and later, nuclear submarines and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The ability of the bombers to penetrate Soviet air defenses was the only question that aroused enduring concern. But this was partially allayed by the redundancy of American delivery systems and for a while the relative invulnerability of ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).

The adoption of "essential equivalence," an outgrowth of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) process, led to a corresponding shift in the standards used to determine strategic sufficiency. As a doctrine, essential equivalence divorced the purpose of strategic forces from the wartime missions these forces might be called upon to perform. Instead of using military mission as a yardstick, as McNamara had, the Nixon and Ford administrations sought to assess strategic sufficiency by comparing American forces to present and projected Soviet force levels. A number of static indicators of force comparison were devised for this purpose, among them numbers of missiles, launchers, and deliverable warheads, as well as equivalent megatonnage (EMT).[4]

[3] On Presidential Directive 59, see Richard Burt's articles in the *New York Times*, 5, 11, and 12 August 1980.

[4] Concise treatments of the evolution of strategic doctrine from the Kennedy to Carter administration are provided by McGeorge Bundy, "Maintaining Stable Deterrence," *International Security* 3 (Winter 1978): 5–16; Francis P. Hoeber, "How Little is Enough"? ibid., pp. 53–73; and Walter Slocombe, "The Countervailing Strategy," *International Security* 5 (Spring 1981): 18–27.

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Static indicators proved to be inescapably murky measures of strategic sufficiency. They ignored the reality that both the Soviet Union and the United States had developed their forces in response to different political needs and that they had exploited different levels of technology in their design and developed different doctrines for their employment. Soviet and American strategic forces reflect the idiosyncratic expression of two different societies, each with its own political-military tradition, distinctive world view, and means of evaluating its security. Direct force comparisons, regardless of the particular measures used, are largely meaningless. As the SALT debate revealed, they also have the disadvantage of being politically very charged.

For these reasons the U.S. intelligence community, the Department of Defense, and the Carter White House became disenchanted with both the doctrine of essential equivalence and static indicators. In January 1979, Harold Brown summed up this consensus in the introduction to his annual report: "In designing our strategic nuclear forces, what we need for deterrence and stability cannot be dictated by any simple comparison with the forces of the Soviet Union, even though we must take those forces into account in our planning."[5] In the place of static indicators, defense planners and intelligence analysts developed more dynamic measures of the strategic balance, measures that attempted to take into account the performance characteristics of the forces on both sides. This "dynamic analysis" attempted to calculate the results of both sides allocating strategic forces against specific target sets. It used the outcomes of these theoretical exchanges to describe the existing state of the strategic balance and offered them as benchmarks against which to formulate strategic needs.

The appeal of dynamic measures of strategic sufficiency has been enhanced by recent changes in doctrine. The "countervailing strategy" is based on the premise that deterrence requires the United States to possess the capability to deny the Soviet Union any possible relative advantage that it may derive from a nuclear war, limited or all-out. The doctrine emphasizes the targeting of Soviet missile sites, command and control centers, and other military assets. Static indicators of the strategic balance are incapable of shedding any light on the extent to which the United States possess the capability to destroy these targets. Qualitative asymmetries in the strategic forces of the two superpowers also mean that static indicators are useless as a means of determining their relative capability to destroy given target sets. Dynamic analysis seeks answers to both these questions through the mechanism of theoretical force exchanges. It attempts to assess absolute capability in terms of the damage each side can inflict upon the strategic, military, and economic assets of the other. It measures relative capability as a function of the destructive potential each side retains after absorbing a first strike.

Dynamic measures have been made the cornerstone of the most recent efforts

[5] United States Department of Defense, *Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1980* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1979), p. 12.

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by the Central Intelligence Agency, the Studies and Gaming Agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the RAND Corporation to determine the relative strategic capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union. The CIA, which pioneered the use of dynamic analysis, has employed it in its National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) of Soviet strategic capabilities (NIE 11-3-78 and NIE 11-3-81). In these estimates, agency analysts calculate the potential of each side's ICBMs to attack the retaliatory forces of the other and then model such attacks in order to determine residual destructive potential. Residual destructive potential is defined as the gross number of missile reentry vehicles (RVs) and bomber weapons that each side could be expected to retain after having been attacked. These remaining weapons are then compared on the basis of their lethal area potential (LAP) and hard-target potential (HTP), that is, in terms of their utility against both area and point targets. These estimates are calculated under conditions of surprise and preemption—surprise refers to a "bolt from the blue" attack that is launched when both sides are in a day-to-day condition of readiness; preemption refers to an attack that arises out of a crisis situation in which both sides have generated forces (that is, forces brought to a high state of readiness).[6]

The National Intelligence Estimates that incorporate this analysis do not pretend that it reflects the outcome of an acutal nuclear exchange. The estimates acknowledge several ways in which the analysis is "artificial." First, there are the kinds of forces used. Only ICBMs and SLBMs—and bombers for the Americans—are employed in the initial strike, and they are all targeted against the other's missile silos, bomber bases, and submarine pens in order to reduce as much as possible the opponent's retaliatory capability. In a real attack, both sides, but especially the United States, could make use of other kinds of forces. The United States has significant strategic assets in Europe and the Far East, on land and at sea, that could be used to augment a strike against the Soviet Union.

Most strategists also expect that both superpowers would attack a wider range of targets than missile pads and bomber and submarine bases. Soviet and American doctrines explicitly call for the destruction of each other's military assets, in particular their command and control facilities and conventional force capabilities. The NIEs also use admittedly arbitrary targeting doctrine: two-on-one ICBM attacks on silos and one-on-one attacks against the projected Missile Experimental (MX) shelters. As in the choice of targets, this is a reflection of the damage-limiting objective assumed for the purposes of the analysis to motivate both sides. For the same reason, the estimates assume that the side

[6] The general approach and results of the CIA's analysis are described in the Department of Defense, *Annual Report, 1981*, pp. 123-26. NIE 11-3-78, its results and methods, has been discussed by Michael Getler, "Soviet's Power Sparks Intelligence Rift," *Washington Post*, 9 May 1980; Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "The Strategic Imbalance," *Washington Post*, 3 December 1980; and Richard K. Betts, "Strategic Intelligence Estimates: Let's Make Them Useful," *Parameters* 10 (December 1980): 20-26. Also see the testimony of Richard Pipes and Douglas Garthoff before U.S., Congress, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, *Hearings on Soviet Strategic Forces* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980), pp. 2-34.

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that is attacked first would launch no weapons until its adversary had completed its attack. In a real exchange it seems more likely that both sides would attempt to launch out from underneath an attack. The Soviets actually espouse a "launch on warning doctrine" and have made considerable strides in the last few years toward developing the capability to do this. Finally, the estimates make no attempt to calculate the reliability and accuracy of systems or of command and control networks in real wartime conditions. The figures used reflect peacetime performance and are based on the results of tests that both sides carry out under relatively ideal conditions.

CIA versus DOD: How They Differ, Where They Agree

For some or all of the reasons noted above many strategists are dissatisfied with the results of the CIA's strategic analyses. Liberal critics charge that the agency's admittedly unrealistic assumption of a damage-limiting strategy for both sides has the effect of exaggerating American vulnerabilities to a Soviet first strike. Conservative critics, including Defense Intelligence Agency officials and senior intelligence officers of the military services, allege that the CIA model minimizes the Soviet threat by failing to take into account more realistic and advanced Soviet preparations to fight a nuclear war.

The CIA defends its dynamic analysis in terms of its contribution to the assessment of the efficacy of the American deterrent. The key requirement for deterrence, as defined by successive secretaries of defense, is the capability of the United States to absorb a first strike and still retain sufficient forces to destroy a broad mix of Soviet targets. The CIA argues that residual destructive potential, calculated in both absolute and relative terms, is the most direct measure of this capability and that trends with respect to it are an appropriate indicator of the overall strategic balance. Put another way, deterrence is above all a psychological phenomenon, a state of mind that results from the belief on the part of Soviet and American leaders that they have everything to lose and nothing to gain from a nuclear war. The assumption made by the CIA is that leaders' perceptions of the outcome of a nuclear exchange do not derive from any detailed understanding of what might really happen in such a conflict but rather depend upon some abstract and relatively simple conception of the strategic balance. To the charge that its analysis is artificial, the agency could reply that its purpose is not to stimulate an actual exchange but to derive numbers for an idealized measure of strategic balance—residual destructive potential—that itself has more symbolic than operational significance.

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the three services with strategic missions insist that only the analysis of a comprehensive two-sided exchange, modeled on more realistic assumptions about doctrine and performance, can convey valid impressions about the relative strategic capabilities of the superpowers. This may be true, but such an approach is entirely dependent on detailed accounts of projected courses of action. In addition to knowing which na-

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tion launches the first strike and whether one or both adversaries have their forces generated or on day-to-day alert, such an approach requires detailed knowledge of their attack and response strategies, as well as accurate information about the actual wartime performance of their weapons systems and command and control networks. There is no consensus in the strategic community about how the Soviet Union or the United States would acutally fight a nuclear war and even less agreement about how to go about estimating the outcome of such a conflict. The problem is compounded by the fact that a nuclear war fought in the late 1980s would involve weapon systems that have not yet been deployed, or even tested in some instances, by either side. Nevertheless, the choice of attack strategy and the assigned performance characteristics of the weapons used determine the results of any simulation.

The idiosyncracy and uncertainty associated with efforts to model realistically a "comprehensive" exchange of forces deprive such estimates of much of their analytical value. Analysts can come up with almost any outcome they want if they choose the appropriate doctrine, rules of engagement, or indices of operational performance. The nature of this problem is readily apparent in the reaction within the strategic community to efforts carried out under Defense Department auspices to model a nuclear conflict. Briefings on these exercises often degenerate into heated confrontations about the methods and numbers used to build and test the model. If American strategists are unable to agree among themselves about how to simulate a nuclear war, it is reasonable to suppose that whatever consensus the intelligence community eventually reaches will bear only a chance resemblance to the conclusions of their Soviet counterparts who would approach the problem with their own doctrinal assumptions and data bases. The entire purpose of assessment, however, is to analyze relative strategic capabilities through Soviet eyes in order to gauge the health of the American deterrent. When confronted with this dilemma, the artificiality of the CIA anaylsis, singled out as its major drawback, may fairly be described as its greatest virtue.

On one level the conflict between the CIA and the Department of Defense is a struggle over turf: the services contend that the agency's dynamic analysis represents a "net assessment," a prerogative of the Defense Department. But the conflict is also a clash of two different intellectual approaches to deterrence. The CIA approach stresses the importance of the psychological roots of deterrence. Agency analysts have accordingly constructed stylized scenarios for force exchanges that are keyed to this conception. The DIA and the military services conceive of deterrence in more operational terms. They accordingly want to calculate, as realistically as possible, the likely outcome of a nuclear exchange. For them, the most important indicator of deterrence is the military balance that would prevail after the mushroom clouds dissipate, measured not just in terms of total forces but in the relative capability of each side to use those forces in a coordinated and intelligent manner.

Proponents of both approaches justify their choice by asserting that it more

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closely approximates the way in which the Soviets assess relative strategic capabilities. The U.S. military and its supporters focus on Soviet adherence to a war-fighting doctrine and the preparations the Soviets have allegedly made actually to fight a nuclear conflict. CIA analysts who favor more abstract measures of strategic capability stress the deterrent objective of this war-fighting doctrine. In point of fact, Soviet intentions and, even more so, their judgement about American capabilities and intentions, remain sufficiently obscure to permit analysts to make a case for either point of view. This leeway tends to make strategic assessments theological exercises carried out to advance the parochial interests of the institutions the analysts represent. Even when this is not the case, assessments still tend to reflect ingrained institutional ways of looking at the world. Put crudely, the services are socialized into judging everything in terms of military capabilities, while analysts at CIA, depending upon their particular office, display varying degrees of sensitivity to the political side of things. Individual analysts in each of these institutions are on the whole more sensitive to information that suggests that the Soviets see the world in the same way that their particular subunits of the bureaucracy do.

Thus far this investigation has focused on the ways in which the CIA and the Defense Department conceptions of assessment differ. But there are also important underlying similarities between them. Both assess deterrence as principally a military relationship. Both use relative residual military capability, albeit calculated in different ways, as their measure of deterrence. Both assume that this approach to deterrence reflects the Soviet way of thinking. The approaches really differ only in their technical details, in the kinds of residual capability that are considered important and the ways in which they are to be measured.

The psychological assumptions that the two approaches share are rarely if ever articulated, let alone critically evaluated, by those who use them. The reason for this is probably the lack of controversy associated with these assumptions within the intelligence and policymaking communities. By contrast, the kinds of residual military capability that are important and the means of determining them have been the subject of extensive analysis because of the controversy that surrounds them. The nature and validity of these psychological assumptions are nevertheless the more important issues. For the choice of assumptions has more bearing on the outcome of assessment than the choice of means used to operationalize them.

The Political Naiveté of American Strategic Analysis

The psychological assumptions common to the CIA and DOD approaches to strategic analysis do not stand up under scrutiny. Take for a start the use both make of residual military capability. There is nothing wrong with residuals per se; they indicate something about the military balance that might prevail in the aftermath of a strategic exchange. However, both approaches go far beyond this by attempting to employ residual capability as a measure of will.

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Nuclear deterrence depends on the adversary's belief that an opponent, if attacked, will carry out its threat to use nuclear weapons. Both the CIA and its critics in the Defense Department assume that the best indicator of the probability of that response is the relative strategic capability of the adversaries. The costlier the response, the less likely it becomes. Both sets of analysts believe that deterrence will no longer be credible if the relative cost of reprisal is very great. In such a situation they conceive of the deterrer as being deterred from retaliation by virtue of the superior strategic power of the adversary. This is the principle on which Paul Nitze and others have conjured up their scenarios of a disarming Soviet first strike. They worry that if the Soviets could destroy the Minutemen missile force, and with them the American counterforce capability, the president would be compelled to accept their attack as a fait accompli because retaliation against Soviet cities, the only real option as they describe it, would elicit equal if not more destructive retaliation in return.[7]

While cost is certainly one component of will, it is wrong to assume that it is the only component or even the most important one. The measurement of will in terms of cost reflects a narrow game-theory formulation of the decision-making process. It rests on the assumption that people, national leaders in this instance, maximize their "utility" regardless of the stress or uncertainty associated with a decision and its possible outcomes. It further assumes—and this is quintessentially American in approach—that utility can be equated with material and physical well-being. This disregards a host of other values, emotional, intangible, unquantifiable things, that history reveals to be at least as important for most people, including Americans. Would the South, for example, have rebelled if material well-being and physical comfort were the primary concern of its leaders and people? Why did the Confederacy continue the struggle at tremendous human and economic cost long after leaders and soldiers alike recognized it to be a lost cause? Any number of other instances can be cited where a people wittingly fought a determined struggle against great or even impossible odds. From Massada to the Irish Easter Rising, from Thermopylae to the resistance of the beleaguered Finns in 1940, history records countless stories of peoples who waged costly struggles with little or no expectation of success. Honor, anger, or national self-respect proved more compelling motives for action than pragmatic calculations of material loss and gain were reasons for acquiescence. At the same time the French experience in Algeria and that of the American debacle in Vietnam reveal, if ever proof was needed, that superior, even vastly superior, military capability is no sure indicator of resolve.[8]

[7] Paul Nitze, "Deterring Our Deterrent," *Foreign Policy* 25 (Winter 1976–77): 195–210; idem, "Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Detente," *Foreign Affairs* 54 (January 1976): 207–32; idem, "A Plea for Action," *New York Times Magazine*, 7 May 1978. For a critique of Nitze's view, see Alan Tonelson, "Nitze's World," *Foreign Policy* 35 (Summer 1979): 74–90; and John Steinbruner and Thomas M. Garwin, "The Balance Between Prudence and Paranoia," *International Security* 1 (Summer 1976): 138–81.

[8] Robert Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited," pp. 314–22, and idem, "Why Nuclear Superiority

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National will is a social amalgam of many components. Among the most important of these are probably the nature of the adversary, what people believe is at stake, the cohesiveness of the society, its historical traditions, and the character of its leadership. Depending on the circumstances, any of these considerations can be more influential in determining national will than calculations of relative military capability. Several examples will illustrate this point. In 1882, the British fleet subdued Egypt by firing a few cannon balls at the Khedive's palace in Alexandria. In 1956, following the massive and successful Suez invasion, the British and French withdrew from Egypt because they were forced to recognize that their armies were relatively useless weapons against aroused nationalist opinion. In 1940, France was defeated rapidly because Hitler's rise to power had aggravated the deep and bitter cleavages within French society, cleavages that came close to paralyzing its army and government. Britain, by contrast, became a more cohesive society in response to the Nazi threat. Even if Germany had successfully invaded the British Isles it is likely that the British would have continued to resist domination. The Czechs and the Poles also provide contrasting examples of national will, in this case perhaps attributable to different national traditions. Twice in recent memory, in 1938–1939 and in 1968, Czechoslovakia capitulated without a fight. In 1938 at least, Prague had the military means to resist, and of possibly forcing France and Britain to come to its aid. The Poles waged fierce and futile struggles against foreign domination in 1831, 1843, 1868, 1939, and 1944–1945. The expectation that they will do so again has probably prompted Soviet leaders to exercise more caution in the current crisis than might have otherwise been the case.

These examples should make it apparent that there is at best only a marginal association between military capability and national will. It is therefore quite erroneous to use a measure of relative military capability to determine whether or not the United States would respond to a Soviet attack. It is also farfetched to assume that the Soviets would calculate American intentions in this way; that in the aftermath of a Soviet nuclear strike they would expect an American president to tote up the residual megatonnage or RVs of both sides and to sue for peace or even surrender if his side came up short. If the Soviets behaved this way they would have rolled over and played dead in 1941 following the initially devastating results of Hitler's onslaught against them.

By dint of their own national experience, Russians, more than most people, might be expected to understand the role of leadership and morale—what they refer to in their writings as "moral forces"—in determining the resolve of an army or people. Soviet leaders are likely to ask themselves just how much the American people would be prepared to sacrifice in order to preserve their influence in Europe, the independence of their closest allies, or their own domestic

Doesn't Matter," *Political Science Quarterly* 94 (Winter 1979–80): 617–34, makes a similar point. He distinguishes between a "balance of resolve" and a "balance of military power," arguing that it is the former that counts.

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integrity. What about the administration's mettle? Is the president the kind of person to recoil in horror from using America's nuclear arsenal regardless of the circumstances or would the chief executive have the courage or insanity—take your pick—to give the launch order in response to a Soviet attack or even confirmed preparations for an attack? Given the incredibly stressful context in which such a decision would be made, the character and personality of the president is almost certain to be a more decisive factor in influencing the decision to launch a counterattack than any arcane calculations of relative military advantage offered by a military adviser. To the extent that Soviet leaders take such considerations into account, or at least recognize their importance, their analysis of resolve is more in accord with the realities of human behavior than is the narrowly technical approach of their American counterparts.

How Should Deterrence Be Assessed?

The preceding discussion indicates that most of the really important components of resolve are dependent on particular scenarios of probable actions. This leads to the second important criticism of the use of residuals as a measure of deterrence: they measure the results of war in terms of the means by which war is waged instead of the ends it seeks to achieve. This divorces military conflict from the political context in which it occurs and from which it derives meaning.

Wars rarely start because one side believes that it has a military advantage. They occur when leaders become convinced that force is necessary to achieve important goals. War, as Clausewitz observed—and the Soviets proclaim—is an extension of politics by other means. Its scope, strategy, and timing are determined, or ought to be, by the political objectives for which the war is fought. It follows from this that any assessment of deterrence must be predicated upon some notion of the objectives the Soviet Union would resort to war to achieve. Only then can American leaders attempt to determine what must be done to deny the Soviets these objectives and thereby deprive them of whatever incentives they may have for going to war.

Soviet objectives are an extremely contentious question and perhaps the reason why analysts have shied away from this approach. Paul Nitze, Richard Pipes, and others who reflect the thinking of the Committee on the Present Danger, assert that the Soviets are out to conquer the world and are willing to pay whatever price is necessary to do it. Most analysts take a more moderate view; they argue that Moscow would only resort to war to protect its vital interests. There is no agreement among even these analysts, however, about the nature of these interests or the ways in which a war might come about.

One way around this problem might be to recognize that the "bottom line" for the Soviet Union, indeed for any country, in a nuclear war must remain the preservation of its political system and territorial integrity. This would be the primary objective in a defensive war and the obvious precondition for the at-

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tainment of any objectives in an offensive war. Recognition of this reality has important implications for deterrence because the preservation of a state's political system and territorial integrity is likely to be a much more difficult task in a nuclear war than in a conventional one.

A nuclear war between the superpowers is almost certain to equal and probably far surpass the most ferocious conventional war in its destructiveness. Even a "limited" nuclear war between the superpowers consisting only of strictly counterforce exchange can be expected to leave perhaps twenty million dead on each side in its wake. A more general exchange could kill more than one-hundred million people in each country and deprive the survivors of the means of restoring their standard of living within their own lifetimes. To the physical destruction of nuclear war, whether limited or general, must be added the psychological incapacitation of the survivors. This is a phenomenon as yet little understood but nevertheless likely to have a serious retarding effect on a society's ability to reconstitute itself.

There are no data on the social consequences of a massive nuclear strike. Hiroshima and Nagasaki, humans' only experience with nuclear warfare, were mere pinpricks in comparison to the death and destruction that would result from even a limited nuclear exchange between the superpowers. Because of a lack of knowledge about the social and psychological repercussions of nuclear war—and perhaps for fear of what one would discover—the American strategic community has largely ignored this aspect of the problem. Instead, strategists have based their calculations, as well as their doctrine, on technical phenomena about which they feel more confident. Residual weaponry, circular errors of probability (CEP), and blast overpressure have made the bedrock of American strategic analysis. Such an engineering approach to the subject has blinded analysts to some important social truths about nuclear war.

The first of these pertains to the disruptive effects of nuclear war on society: these are certain to be greater than is recognized by the official or quasi-official literature on the subject. As it is, these estimates of damage have been criticized for minimizing fire and radiation fatalities and also for disregarding deaths arising from secondary causes such as the disruption or even breakdown of law and order, and sanitary, medical, and food distribution facilities. Some recent studies suggest that postattack deaths may not peak until a week or more after the attack. Yet, most official casualty projections calculate only first-week fatalities. Most, if not all, of these estimates also ignore the psychosocial cost of a nuclear holocaust, the price paid not by the victims but by the survivors.[9]

[9] See, for example, U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Effects of Limited Nuclear Warfare*, and *Briefing on Counterforce Attacks*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975); U.S., Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, *The Effects of Nuclear Warfare* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975); Sidney Drell and Frank von Hippel, "Limited Nuclear War," *Scientific American* 235 (November 1976): 27-37; Kevin N. Lewis, "The Prompt and Delayed Effects of Nuclear War," *Scientific American* 241 (July 1979): 35-47, and Arthur M. Katz, *Life After Nuclear War: The Economic and Social Consequences of Nuclear Attacks on the United States* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1981).

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Robert Jay Lifton, who studied the survivors of Hiroshima, identified what he called the "death in life" syndrome: "a grotesque, absurd, collective, unacceptable, and unabsorbable death" that survivors carry with them for the rest of their lives.[10] Even those who recovered to the degree that they were able to pursue successful careers continue to be affected by "an unending lethal influence," a sense of being the victim of a force that threatens the species. Hiroshima, it must be emphasized, was the victim of a primitive low-yield weapon and, subsequently, the recipient of long-term medical, economic, and social assistance from a society left untouched by nuclear devastation. The psychological aftereffects of a nuclear war between the superpowers are certain to be more pronounced and more widespread than those associated with Hiroshima. They may pose as great a challenge to the long-term survival of a society as the physical destruction caused by blast, fire, and radiation does in the short term.

Nuclear war may leave survivors in such a profound state of shock that at least in its immediate aftermath they are incapable of responding to whatever political and military authority is able to reassert itself. This phenomenon is all the more likely to the extent that people have not been prepared beforehand for the horrors of the postattack environment. Survivors who are not psychologically incapacitated may be very hostile to authority if they see it as having been in any way responsible for the catastrophe. In conventional wars, governments usually attempt to rally support by portraying themselves as the defender of all that is sacred.

Conventional wars also retain a human element regardless of their scale or level of destruction. Combatants and civilians are aware that everything that happens, no matter how unintended in consequence, is the result of human decisions and actions.[11] They also "learn" something about the enemy in the course of the war, either firsthand or through the media. They can form an "enemy image" on which to displace their own frustrations, insecurities, and aggressive drives. Knowing this, governments have often gone to war to deflect such hostility away from themselves. Governments also count on the enemy's actions, for example, offensives, bombing raids, or atrocities against civilians, to rebound to their domestic political advantage. As the German onslaught against the Soviet Union in World War II revealed, even the most unpopular government can in the long run benefit from the depredations of a barbarous invader.

An intercontinental nuclear war will be different. Its nuclear phase is likely to be short, perhaps lasting only hours or days. It will also be highly impersonal as neither the adversary who pushes the button nor the missiles that deliver its warheads will be seen. There may be no combat at all in the traditional sense,

[10] Robert Jay Lifton, *Death in Life: Survivors of Hiroshima* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1976).

[11] Eric J. Leeds, in his provocative study, *No Man's Land: Combat and Identity in World War I* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), suggests that the bewildering and terrifying experience of trench warfare on the Western Front was also beyond the ability of combatants to understand in human terms. He explores the ways in which they sought to impose meaning and order upon their situation, by invoking magic and ritual.

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and certainly none that will impinge on the consciousness of the heartland populations. This will deprive soldiers and civilians alike of a palpable image of the enemy, so necessary to make the devastation of war psychologically comprehensible.

Nuclear war will also differ from conventional war by virtue of the magnitude of its destruction. The psychological effects of twenty million dead in the course of an hour and a half are certain to be different and greater than the impact of the same number of fatalities sustained during the course of four years of war. This combination of impersonality and instantaneity may make nuclear war more closely resemble a natural disaster than a war in the minds of the survivors. If this is true it may have some hitherto unanticipated but important political consequences. Studies of natural disasters reveal that those who warned of disaster are likely to become the focus of acute hostility when their pessimistic prognostications turn out to be correct.[12] This is so, one psychologist speculates, because people tend to interpret disasters as forms of personal punishment and warnings as threats of punishment.[13] Thus, a government that attempts to prepare its people for the possibility of a nuclear war during an escalating crisis may be punished by the survivors as a result.

The preceding argument is admittedly speculative. However, it highlights a second important truth about war in general and nuclear war in particular: the survival of any political system in war is at least as much a function of its legitimacy as it is of its military capability. To the extent that a government is seen as culpable for war and by extension for the damage resulting from it, its chance of survival diminishes. This is one more reason why for purposes of assessing deterrence military means cannot be divorced from the political context in which they might be used. Attributes of this context determine whether a government will be supported by its people and whether such support seems essential for postattack conventional military operations.

Astute statesmen have always been sensitive to the need to develop and maintain public support in war. Bismarck's manipulation of the Hohenzollern Candidacy and his editing of the "Emms Dispatch" are often cited as examples of how a clever political leader can manipulate an adversary in order to generate public enthusiasm for war. The American national experience, on the other hand, offers examples of how public opposition to war can act as an effective check upon leaders. Woodrow Wilson was prevented from entering World War I until Germany's unrestricted use of submarines in 1917 brought American public opinion around. Franklin Roosevelt was even more constrained by public antipathy to intervention in World War II. His constitutionally dubious and intentionally provocative efforts at goading Hitler into declaring war on the United States got nowhere until the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor. More

[12] See C. Fritz and E. Marks, "The NORC Studies of Human Behavior in Disaster," *Journal of Social Issues* 10 (January 1954): 26-41; Martha Wolfensten, *Disaster* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957), pp. 11-30; Irving L. Janis, "Psychological Effects of Warnings," in *Man and Society in Disaster*, eds. George Baker and Dwight Chapman (New York: Basic Books, 1962), pp. 55-92.

[13] Wolfensten, *Disaster*, p. 20.

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recently, the American failure in Indochina was at least in part attributable to the inability of successive presidents to maintain popular support for that war.

While democracies are more vulnerable than authoritarian governments to the vagaries of public opinion, the latter must also demonstrate some degree of sensitivity to public sentiment in order to maintain support for military sacrifices. Stalin was aware of this need and in the fall of 1944, for example, gave considerable pause before advancing beyond the borders of the Soviet Union into Eastern Europe for fear of its effect on Soviet conscripts.[14] Afghanistan may yet come to illustrate the vulnerability of even the Soviet system to public opinion if the Red Army continues to sustain a steady and not insignificant rate of casualties without bringing the end of that war any closer in sight.

The staggering loss of life and destruction that can be expected to result from even a limited nuclear war makes it advisable, perhaps even essential, for leaders, regardless of what kind of political system they manage, to "prepare" their people for such an event. This would require educating the public about the nature and effects of nuclear war. A nation may also consider using a carefully orchestrated public-relations campaign designed to convince people that their government, if it must resort to nuclear weapons, will do so only in desperation as a last measure in defense of the country. Serious efforts to prepare people for nuclear war, however, are likely to be psychologically unsettling to those being instructed and politically damaging to those responsible for the instructing. Perhaps for these reasons neither the United States nor the Soviet Union, which has an extensive civil-defense program, have chosen to enlighten its population about the realities of nuclear combat.

The survival of a political system in wartime and its ability to reconstitute itself in the aftermath of a nuclear attack are also influenced by conditions independent of the specific political context of the war. The previous legitimacy of the regime, the nature of its economic base, the extent of its ethnic or racial tensions—what Stalin might have called "permanently operating factors"—will play a crucial role in this regard. Any assessment of deterrence must take these factors into account, not only objectively but more importantly in terms of how they are perceived by the adversaries. This is admittedly another difficult task. A useful beginning can nevertheless be made by describing some of the most important of these factors and the ways in which they might retard or facilitate the respective political and economic recovery of the superpowers from a nuclear war.

Soviet Vulnerabilities

Viewed from this perspective the Soviet Union has a number of vulnerabilities that could pose serious difficulties for its leaders in the aftermath of a nuclear

[14] Vojtech Mastny, *Russia's Road to the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), pp. 156–57.

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conflict. For a start, there is Eastern Europe. The Soviets are not popular in any of these countries with the possible exception of Bulgaria. In Poland and East Germany, they are positively loathed by the local population. Both countries are astride the main communication routes between the Soviet Union and Western Europe, the most likely theater of conventional operations. Hostility and obstruction—perhaps even tolerated by local authorities in Poland—could cause serious problems for the Soviet military. If the Soviet Union were grievously wounded by a series of nuclear strikes, some of the satellite governments in Eastern Europe might even seize the opportunity to establish their independence from Moscow. The prospects for this could be substantially enhanced by a Western targeting strategy designed to destroy the tentacles of Soviet power in these countries while leaving their own national armies and industrial plants and population centers as intact as possible.

Beyond Eastern Europe, the Russians face considerable opposition within their own multiethnic empire where their political primacy is resented in varying degrees by all the other nationalities. In wartime, the Soviet nationality problem could become acute if dissident nationalities perceived the central government's power to be on the wane. Resistance to Bolshevik domination during the civil war (1918–1920) and to Soviet rule during World War II followed this pattern. In this regard, some of the dissident nationalities would profit from the fact that the European portion of the Soviet Union is certain to suffer more devastation than Soviet Central Asia by reason of the denser concentration of military and industrial targets it contains. The Muslim and Caucasian minorities in particular can be expected to fare much better than their Russian counterparts in terms of their physical survival, usable resources, and access to food. Dissident Muslims and other rebellious groups throughout the Soviet domain would also profit from the fact that Soviet conventional military capability, especially its command and control, will be targeted for destruction in any conflict other than the most limited nuclear exchange.[15]

Restive nationalities would also benefit from their geographic location. Most of them reside along the peripheries of the Soviet Union and, in many cases, alongside states that harbor territorial claims against the Soviet Union. The number of such states has increased since the physical expansion of the Soviet empire during and immediately after World War II. One must assume, as the Soviets probably do, that some of these states, perhaps China, would be tempted to take advantage of Soviet weakness to make good their claims.

Economically, the Soviet Union is also particularly susceptible to the disruptive effects of a nuclear war because of its highly centralized economy. Planning, production, and distribution decisions are made by ponderous bureaucracies at the several levels of the Soviet hierarchy. "The key characteristic of the Stalinist model of economic growth," notes Seweryn Bialer, "was its lack of economic self-generating, self-regulating, and adjusting features. To run at all,

[15] See Gary L. Guertner, "Strategic Vulnerability of a Multinational State: Deterring the Soviet Union," *Political Science Quarterly* 96 (Summer 1981): 209–23.

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let alone to perform well, it required an enormous political edifice to provide the decisionmaking and the push, the regulation, supervision, and coordination."[16] The need for direction from above remains the hallmark of the Soviet economy. Its hierarchical structure permits political leaders a range of economic choices denied to leaders in a capitalist society, but it is also more vulnerable to disruption.

The economy of the United States might be likened to a worm. Cut off any part, even its head, and the rest continues on and even regenerates the missing section. The Soviet economy, in contrast, more closely resembles an animal with a highly developed central nervous system. It is capable of complex behavior based on the coordinated efforts of its many parts, but sever its spinal cord and the rest of the beast quickly dies. During World War II, the Soviets performed prodigious feats in moving entire industries away from battle zones and reconstructing them in safer rear areas brick by brick and factory by factory. They could do this because their administrative apparatus was intact and able to coordinate and coerce the labor force. A nuclear war might decimate or disrupt the functioning of these cadres so that surviving centers of production would be without organized access to raw materials, energy, or markets. Economic reconstruction, especially in the initial postwar period, could be a slow and torturous process.

The Soviets seem aware of their economic vulnerabilities in this regard. Their civil-defense program aims at protecting not only the political leadership but economic managers and workers in key industries. Plans for protecting the economy and thereby enhancing Soviet capability for postattack recovery include the evacuation, dispersal, and sheltering of economic cadres and the emergency shutdown and relocation of essential industrial installations to low-risk areas. The Soviets have also developed some procedures for evacuating cities and resettling their populations in the countryside, although they have never rehearsed them. Evacuation, if successfully implemented, would significantly reduce immediate casualties in a war in which cities were attacked.

Critics of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) have pointed to the Soviet civil-defense program as a indication of Soviet willingness to fight a nuclear war.[17] This is a very questionable assertion. A moderate civil-defense program, a fair description of the Soviet effort, is no more a sign of intent to wage war than fastening a seat belt in a car is an indication of willingness to have an accident. Both are prudent preparations for undesired, even feared, outcomes that the actors in question may feel are beyond their power to avert. It may be more revealing to inquire why Americans tend to reject both seat belts and civil defense.

[16] Seweryn Bialer, *Stalin's Successors: Leadership, Stability, and Change in the Soviet Union* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 19.

[17] For some of the debate on civil defense, see T. K. Jones and W. Scott Thompson, "Central War and Civil Defense," *ORBIS* 22 (Fall 1978): 681–712; Daniel Goure and Gordon H. McCormick, "Soviet Strategic Defense: The Neglected Dimension of the U.S.-Soviet Balance," ibid., 24 (Spring 1980): 103–27; William H. Kincade, "Repeating History: The Civil Defense Debate Renewed," *International Security* 2 (Winter 1978): 99–120.

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More pertinent is the question of just how much benefit the Soviet Union would derive from its civil-defense effort in a nuclear war. This is clearly beyond the scope of the article. For the sake of argument, however, it is still useful to touch upon a few of the more salient aspects of this question. First, all major Soviet civil-defense plans require hours to days of advance warning to implement. They would be useless against an American "bolt from the blue" strike or in preparation for a similar Soviet strike because they would telegraph Soviet intentions well in advance of the attack. Large-scale civil-defense measures are only practical in slowly developing crisis situations. Even then Moscow may think twice about fully implementing its civil-defense programs unless Soviet leaders thought war to be imminent, thus making their fear of nuclear catastrophe self-fulfilling. The evacuation of cities in particular is certain to constitute a real threshold in a nuclear crisis, and any attempt to do this may elicit an ultimatum to desist or tempt a preemptive strike.

Assuming for the moment that the Soviets could carry out their civil-defense preparations in a leisurely and unimpeded manner they would not necessarily gain a significant advantage. The United States would still possess the capability to destroy most targets of economic value in the Soviet Union including most of the Soviet work force. Moreover, the United States nuclear arsenal is expected to increase considerably during the 1980s, from about 11,000 warheads to upwards of 30,000. To this must be added the planned expansion of long-range theater nuclear forces (LRTNF). By the mid-eighties the United States can be expected to have the flexibility to attack a wide enough range of targets to negate the effects of whatever efforts the Soviets make to disperse their industries and work force or to harden their factories against attack.

Another point to consider is the variety of options open to the superpowers in employing their strategic forces. Both can be expected to hold some forces in reserve. The United States is particularly well situated in this regard because of the large number of weapons it has at sea on submarines, about 75 percent of its MIRVed missile force by 1985. The American submarines are almost invulnerable when actually on station, a situation that is not likely to change in the foreseeable future. If Washington retained some residual reconnaissance, communication, and decision-making capability, it could retarget industrial sites, shelters, and dispersal areas weeks or even months after the intital strikes. Submarines could even be programmed to fire at predetermined intervals at targets expected to aid in economic recovery, obviating the need for postattack command and control. This kind of targeting strategy would render ineffective even more far-reaching civil-defense efforts than the Soviets have shown any inclination to implement.

The United States confronts neither of these two important impediments to postattack survival and recovery. It is not ringed by hostile states aspiring to regain lost territory at its expense. Nor does it have to cope with domestic foes who dream of its territorial dismemberment. The United States has a history of

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racial tensions, but the black community has sought to advance its interests within the context of the American national state. Black separatism, even in the heyday of Marcus Garvey in the 1920s, never had very widespread support. Moreover, blacks, who are widely dispersed among the white population, lack the kind of territorial base possessed by all the dissident Soviet nationalities, the Jews excepted. The Chicanos are the only important American minority with a real geographic base, but they are not a majority in any of the states in which they reside. Nor have Chicano leaders expressed any desire to reunite the southwestern states with Mexico.

The general legitimacy of the American national state and political system is no guarantee against the outbreak of widespread civil disruption in the wake of a nuclear attack. It may even contribute to such disruption, as survivors who, in any case, can be expected to have negative attitudes towards authority, resist efforts by unelected officials (such as surviving police and military personnel) to consitute themselves as authority because they are seen to lack legitimacy. Even in the absence of such a conflict, looting, vigilante reprisals, and all the kinds of excesses that occur whenever established authority breaks down can be expected.

Economically, the United States might also fare better than its Soviet adversary. A strong tradition of entrepreneurial initiative, self-motivation, willingness to take risks, and the experience of operating, even at the best of times, in an uncertain and chaotic environment seem the perfect preparation for the task of postwar reconstruction. Viewing reconstruction solely in economic terms, Americans, acting on the profit motive, could be expected to bring about their own economic miracle. The absence of central direction from Washington might even prove a spur to growth, as conservative critics of federal regulation allege.

American economic reconstruction would also benefit from a redundant transportation system. The thick net of highways, a questionable luxury in peacetime, would prove indispensable in the aftermath of a nuclear war. The highway system is so developed that enough of it may survive to allow the minimum necessary movement of goods and people to begin reconstruction. In the Soviet Union where transportation relies principally on railroads, the destruction of major railheads and bridges would more effectively halt movement. Communication with the Soviet far east would become all but impossible as the only land route connecting it to European Soviet Union is the Trans-Siberian Railway and the as yet unfinished Baikal-Amur Line (BAM). The highway system gives the United States another advantage: it has facilitated the more even geographical distribution of the means of production. This enhances the prospect of some industrial base surviving even a countervalue assault. Soviet industry by contrast is much more concentrated, since it has developed along major rail lines. Missile sites and major military installations are similarly situated, making Soviet industry more vulnerable to collateral damage in a limited nuclear war.

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Conclusion

This discussion has focused on three important attributes of deterrence. All of them reveal the inadequacy of residual military capability, however derived, as a comprehensive measure of strategic assessment. First, military capabilities reveal nothing about resolve. Resolve is a function of leadership, a people's traditions and expectations, and their perception of what is at stake. Strategic analysis in and of itself, analysis that ignores the political context of a war, is meaningless for any purpose other than testing and developing operational capabilities. Unfortunately, most American analysts adopt such a narrow approach. This is reflected in official assessments of the strategic balance that analyze decisions for war or peace in terms of technical calculations of relative military advantage.

Second, the ends of war—not its means—should be the yardstick of strategic analysis. The minimum objective of any state in a nuclear war is almost certain to be the survival of its political system and the maintenance of its territorial integrity. The Soviet Union may be more vulnerable than the United States in this regard by reason of its centralized economy, hostile neighbors, and restive minorities. For the United States, therefore, deterrence rests at least as much on its relative ability to recover politically and economically from a nuclear war as it does on its relative military capability to inflict damage. One can fairly dispute the precise advantage that either superpower enjoys with respect to recovery or the extent to which they accurately perceive the reality of their situation. Any assessment of deterrence that ignores such considerations, however, is most certainly incomplete and misleading.

Finally, nuclear war, even limited nuclear war, is certain to be more destructive than most studies of the subject acknowledge. For in addition to the immediate effects of blast, fire, and radiation there are the longer-term effects of radiation, the breakdown of health care, food processing, and distribution systems, and the psychological impairment, temporary and permanent, of the survivors. Historians suggest that it took almost a century for Europe to recover from the effects of the Black Death. The effects of a nuclear war could prove more enduring.

Leaders of nuclear nations are more likely to be deterred from using nuclear weapons if they recognize the staggering and perhaps incalculable costs of nuclear war, regardless of its relative outcome. Awareness of these costs may—and should—constitute a more potent deterrent than any degree of relative nuclear advantage. If this is so, the current fixation on military capability is not only misleading but dangerous.

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Whither the Future of Blacks in the Republican Party?

PEARL T. ROBINSON

Do blacks have a future in the Republican party? Any attempt to answer this question leads ultimately to another query: What is the future of the GOP in the American party system? During the 1960s and 1970s, statistics on party identification suggested that the Republicans had degenerated into "half a party."[1] Five months after Ronald Reagan's landslide victory over Jimmy Carter in the 1980 presidential contest, a *New York Times*/CBS News Poll reported that 41 percent of the respondents identified themselves as Republicans or Republican-leaning independents.[2]

In light of the substantial, though diminishing, gap between the small percentage of Republican partisans and the vast electoral support for Reagan, political analysts seeking to explain the depth and breadth of the 1980 Republican sweep have generally focused on the role of extraparty groups such as the National Conservative Political Action Committee and the Moral Majority. But much of the credit for these remarkable gains can be attributed to a program launched in 1977 by then Republican National Committee (RNC) chairman Bill Brock to broaden the base of the party by making special efforts to attract more women, young people, members of ethnic groups, working-class voters, blacks, and other minorities. Determined to build on the success of the 1980 elections, the

[1] Nelson Polsby, "Strategic Considerations," in *The National Election of 1964*, ed. Milton Cummings (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1969), p. 107.

[2] *New York Times*/CBS News Poll, 22–26 April 1981. This same poll found 49 percent of the respondents identified themselves as Democrats or Democratic-leaning independents. Among those who said without qualification that they belonged to one party or the other, 34 percent were Democrats and 22 percent Republicans. Reported in the *New York Times*, 3 May 1981.

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RNC under its new chairman Richard Richards is now intensifying its campaign to consolidate this realignment of partisan allegiance. The following discussion will consider what blacks as a political constituency stand to gain by participating in the RNC's drive to restore the Republican party to the stature of a full-fledged majority party.

I shall propose a conceptual framework based on the assumption that black voters and the Republican party initially contemplated an exchange relationship geared toward a reciprocal augmentation of their political power and influence. Although the benefits that accrue to the parties in such a relationship need not be commensurate, the principle of reciprocity is an essential element in the attraction. The aim of this analysis is to explore whether the Republican party and a segment of the traditionally Democratic black electorate may strike a political bargain that will be mutually beneficial.

What can blacks as a political constituency hope to gain in terms of substantive policy outcomes from increased identification with the Republican party? In attempting to answer this question, it is instructive to begin with a review of policies enacted by previous Republican and Democratic administrations that actively courted the black vote. The ensuing discussion focuses on the concept of critical realignment as a strategy for Republican resurgence, examines post-1976 probes between black leaders and the GOP, and considers the implications of designing political platforms with a declining emphasis on race. This analysis concludes by raising the issue of symmetry and asymmetry in political exchange in order to suggest the conditions under which blacks may derive meaningful benefits from increased participation in the contemporary Republican party.[3]

Consolidating the Black Vote

At different points in time, both the Republicans and the Democrats have perceived a need to attract black votes and have taken steps to secure black political allegiance. To this end, they have variously pushed through constitutional amendments, forged legislation, issued executive orders, taken aggressive administrative action, and made executive and judicial appointments that would benefit black constituencies.

Indeed, the heyday of black political participation in this country began fitfully in 1865 and continued until 1876 through the post-Civil War Reconstruction launched by Republican Presidents Abraham Lincoln and Andrew Johnson and radicalized by the Republican Congress. The Presidential phase of Reconstruction (which lasted slightly less than two years) was dominated by executive initiatives that set the stage for federal intervention in the domestic in-

[3] In the months immediately prior to the 1980 elections, only 8 percent of registered black voters identified themselves as Republicans. Based on a national sample of 1,177 telephone interviews conducted with black adults between 13 March and 9 April 1980 by Data Black Public Opinion Polls, New York City.

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stitutions of the South. Lincoln disenfranchised certain top officials of the Confederacy, extended general amnesty to the people of the South, laid down terms for the re-establishment and federal recognition of state governments, and advocated a limited black franchise. Johnson, who favored his slain predecessor's inclination for a conciliatory peace, issued a proclamation calling for the complete abolition of slavery, but did not extend the franchise to blacks.[4] Thus despite the imposition of federal authority, from 1865 to 1866 the Southern states gradually resumed control of their affairs under legislatures based on white suffrage. These bodies moved quickly to enact a series of onerous laws, referred to as Black Codes, designed to control the movement and regulate the labor of nominally free blacks.

Denouncing Presidential Reconstruction as little more than home rule for the South, radical Republicans broke with the leader of their party and seized the initiative in Congress. The radicals—who included in their ranks abolitionists, industrialists, and practical politicians—won a major victory in 1866 when Congress passed a Civil Rights Bill over President Johnson's veto.[5] For a time, this coalition was relentless in its efforts to force change on an unwilling South. The Republican Congress passed the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, ending slavery and involuntary servitude, creating a federal citizenship that assured equal protection of the law to all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and guaranteeing voting rights to all citizens. Republican stalwarts also struck down the restrictive Black Codes that had been passed by Southern state legislatures; pushed for free public school systems open to white and black children alike; and established the Freedman's Bureau which, among other things, ran schools for former slaves and also protected and defended the rights of the black laborer. Branches of the Union League of America, a patriotic organization that originated in the North to support the war and afterwards functioned in the South as a protective and benevolent society, nurtured the political involvement of blacks by organizing them into the Republican party. Registrars, who were often Northerners, military men, or agents of the Freedmen's Bureau, controlled access to the voting rolls and gerrymandered districts to maximize black voting potential. And blacks running on the Republican ticket were elected to political offices at all levels—federal, state, and local. Such a record led W.E.B. DuBois to characterize this brief moment in American history as "the finest effort to achieve democracy for the working millions which this world has ever seen."[6] And blacks as a group reciprocated with political loyalty to the Republican party that endured for a full four decades after the end of Reconstruction.

Nevertheless, it must be remembered that whatever the Republicans did in the

[4] John Hope Franklin, *From Slavery to Freedom: A History of Negro Americans*, 3d ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1969), pp. 301–5.

[5] Ibid.

[6] W. E. Burghardt DuBois, *Black Reconstruction* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1935), p. 727.

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name of blacks, they had the added advantage of furthering their own partisan interests. The radical Republicans feared that a moderate Reconstruction policy—that is, one that restored civil rights to Southern whites while leaving blacks to fend for themselves—might return the Democrats to national power.[7] Furthermore, the experience of the first two years of Reconstruction (when the policies set by Presidents Lincoln and Johnson were far more conciliatory than those enacted subsequently by the Republican Congress) had demonstrated that political leniency toward former citizens of the Confederacy simply paved the way for Democrats to regain control of the state legislatures.

As the decade continued, Southern whites mounted and escalated campaigns of violence and intimidation for the specific purpose of eradicating black political participation. This protest against what was labeled "black domination" succeeded both in deterring numerous blacks from exercising their right to vote and in winning the sympathy of a significant white reference public in the North.[8] By 1876 the political calculus clearly indicated that the rapidly diminishing pool of black voters had become expendable. That was the year the national Republican leadership struck a deal with white Southern Democrats who had regained control of their states. In exchange for Southern electoral votes needed to secure the presidency for Rutherford B. Hayes, the Republicans agreed to withdraw federal troops and end Reconstruction.

Despite this reversal, most blacks who exercised the franchise after Reconstruction remained loyal to the Republican party. The Democrats did not capture a majority of the black vote until Franklin Roosevelt's second term in the White House. And data on partisanship suggest that black political realignment was not really consolidated until Lyndon Johnson's administration (See Table 1). According to the Center for Political Studies' 1980 polls, 48 percent of black voters were Democrats, 17 percent were Republicans, while 35 percent were either independent or apolitical. But in the South a potential electorate of 3 million blacks was disenfranchised and deprived of basic liberties by Jim Crow laws. After President Kennedy's assassination in 1963, the country was more willing to grant a hearing to the civil rights movement, and Lyndon Johnson seized the opportunity. Combining the clout of the presidency with the skill and political capital acquired during his years in the Senate, Johnson's Democratic administration acted with resolve—boldly articulating policies, marshaling the support necessary to pass legislation, and making highly visible black appointments.[9]

Civil rights policy was near the top of his agenda. The 1964 Civil Rights Act

[7] Paul Lewinson, *Race, Class and Party: A History of Negro Suffrage and White Politics in the South* (New York: Russell & Russell, 1932; reissued in 1963), pp. 17–60.

[8] On the critical role of reference publics in protest movements, see Michael Lipsky, "Protest as a Political Resource," *American Political Science Review* 62 (December 1968): 1144–58.

[9] Among the most prominent appointments were Robert Weaver, secretary of HUD; Andrew Brimmer, governor of the Federal Reserve Board; Thurgood Marshall, solicitor general and then Supreme Court Justice; Samuel Nabrit, member of the Atomic Energy Commission; and Patricia Harris, ambassador to Luxembourg.

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TABLE 1

Black Party Identification

Year	Democrats	Republicans	Independents and Others
1937	44%*	37%	19%
1940	42	42	16
1944	40	40	21
1948	56	25	19
1952	53	13	35
1956	50	19	32
1960	48	17	35
1964	74	7	20
1968	85	2	14
1972	68	8	25
1976	71	5	24

* Percentages may not add to 100 because of rounding.

Sources: Everett Carll Ladd, Jr., with Charles D. Hadley, *Transformations of the American Party System* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1975), pp. 60 and 112; and Warren E. Miller, Arthur H. Miller, and Edward J. Schneider, *American National Election Studies Data Sourcebook, 1952-78* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 89.

signed by Lyndon Johnson was an omnibus bill that included among its provisions federal protection for voting rights; a mandate for implementing school desegregation; authorization to withhold funds from federally assisted programs that discriminate on the basis of race, color, or national origin; and a provision allowing for the possibility of a trial in a federal court for criminal case defendants whose civil rights may be violated in state courts. The following year the 1965 Voting Rights Act suspended voter-qualification literacy tests and provided for federal examiners to register people turned away by state officials. With these two pieces of legislation in place, the Democratic party appeared to be well-poised to cash in on the black vote.[10]

But on the heels of this masterstroke, racial violence erupted in Watts and was repeated in cities across the country. Despite many tactical and programmatic disagreements, black leaders of all kinds joined the masses of blacks in denouncing the Johnson administration for its insensitivity to the special problems of racism and economic inequality in the urban North. Although stunned by what he perceived as ingratitude for his civil rights record, Johnson eventually formulated a response that projected the image of aggressive government action. He transformed the War on Poverty, which had begun with the 1964 Economic Opportunity Act, into a top domestic priority—concentrating its funds in the big-city ghettos and creating new neighborhood service structures that initially were independent of state and local government agencies. He issued Executive

[10] For a summary of the Johnson civil rights initiatives, see James C. Harvey, *Black Civil Rights During the Johnson Administration* (Jackson: University and College Press of Mississippi, 1978).

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Order 11246 (1965) calling for nondiscrimination and affirmative action by federal contractors. And he assured passage of the 1968 Civil Rights Act, which focused on housing discrimination.

So striking are the similarities to some of the Republican initiatives that benefited blacks in the immediate post-Civil War South that the Johnson period has been referred to as the Second Reconstruction. And once again there can be discerned a political rationale based on reciprocity of interests.[11] The civil rights measures enabled blacks to vote and to have access to public accommodations and facilities. The effect of Johnson's second wave of programs was to add to the newly enfranchised Southern voters the potential for more solid Democratic support from poor blacks in the North as well as the black middle class. And blacks responded to these policies in two ways: by identifying with the Democratic party to a far greater extent than in the past, and by voting overwhelmingly Democratic at election time.

Ironically, the vulnerability that was beginning to plague the national Democratic party at this time was obscured by Lyndon Johnson's crushing 61.1 to 38.5 percent defeat of Barry Goldwater in the 1964 presidential contest. But to political analysts, the signs were clear. Demographic trends were signaling huge population shifts away from the traditionally Democratic central cities to those suburban communities that tend to favor the Republican party.[12] At the same time, Republicans had decided to reach out beyond their traditional strongholds. Members of the party's conservative wing formulated a Southern strategy designed to woo Democrats and Dixiecrats who had become disenchanted with the policies of national Democratic administrations.[13] In this regard it was extremely significant that the sum total of Goldwater's fifty-two electoral votes came from five Southern states plus his own Arizona. Moreover, the rising number of blacks in the central cities, combined with the new aggressiveness of some of their spokespersons, was leading to increased racial antagonism with working-class white ethnics and opening up the possibility that the Republicans might be able to attract this element away from the New Deal coalition.[14]

To consider the implications of these developments, it is necessary to look at the elections sequentially. In 1960 John Kennedy received an estimated 70.7 per-

[11] Frances Fox Piven, "The Great Society as Political Strategy," in *The Politics of Turmoil*, eds. Richard Cloward and Frances Piven (New York: Pantheon Books, 1973), pp. 271–83.

[12] For an overview of the demographic shifts in major urban centers, see John Herbers, "Census Losses Predicted in Cities Even if Undercounts Are Proved," *New York Times*, 24 August 1980.

[13] During the 1948 Democratic Convention that nominated Harry Truman, delegates from the Deep South walked out in protest of the strong civil-rights plank adopted for the party's platform. These "Dixiecrats" constituted themselves into a party and ran Strom Thurmond of South Carolina as their presidential candidate. Thurmond carried four states—South Carolina, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. This episode marked the first time since the Civil War that the Democratic party did not carry the South in a presidential election.

[14] Martin Kilson, "Blacks and Neo-Ethnicity in American Political Life," in *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience*, eds. Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 236–66.

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cent of the black vote in a close election. Four years later, President Johnson did not need black support to defeat Goldwater. Rather than providing the margin of victory, the black bloc vote functioned in 1964 to cover the marginal slippage that was beginning to occur among other traditionally Democratic voters. The second wave of Johnson programs, which began in 1965, consolidated a newly enfranchised black Southern electorate and also won increased support from blacks in the North. As partisan allegiance has waned among key Democratic constituencies, the function of the black vote as a form of political insurance has been increasingly important. And the Democratic party is still collecting on the benefits it accrued as a result of Johnson's policies. In 1968 the Democratic presidential candidate Hubert Humphrey polled 96.7 percent of the black vote. An estimated 87 percent of the black vote went to George McGovern in 1972. Some 90 percent backed Jimmy Carter in 1976, and in the 1980 Reagan landslide, black support for Carter (at more than 80 percent in a three-way split) was the strongest of any major voting constituency.

Critical Realignment as a Strategy for GOP Resurgence

Franklin D. Roosevelt's 1932 presidential victory was based on a new political coalition that joined together ethnic voters in large cities, members of labor unions, rural Southerners, Catholics, liberal intellectuals, and minorities. In analyzing this election, V.O. Key described it as a critical realignment because it "had the significant long-run effect for the Democrats of creating abiding Democratic loyalties among . . . groups that had been either Republican or indifferent to politics."[15] Because this political coalition provided the basis for a twenty-year Democratic monopoly of the White House, it is sometimes easy to forget that the Republican party remained resilient at the state and local levels during the thirties, forties, and fifties. Consider the evidence: Gallup surveys on party identification taken in 1940 reported 37 percent Republicans, 43 percent Democrats, and 20 percent independents. While the Democrats hovered below the 50 percent level, the GOP continued to show strength as it captured both the House and the Senate in 1946 and again won control of both houses of Congress in 1952.[16] Thus a "critical realignment" of the party system simply means that the underlying cleavages determining which groups are likely to support a given party are altered in a durable fashion. Majority parties may be transformed to minority status, or traditionally one-party areas may become the focus of intense partisan competition.[17] But the process does not lead inextricably to the demise of one of the major parties.

[15] V. O. Key, Jr., *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups*, 4th ed. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1958), p. 577.

[16] Everett Carll Ladd, Jr., *Where Have All the Voters Gone?* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1978), p. 3.

[17] See James L. Sundquist, *Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment of Politi-*

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Accordingly, during the 1960s and the 1970s the Republican party experienced serious erosion of its traditional bases of support—in the Northeast, and among business and professional persons, the middle classes, and white Protestants. This weakening of the party's state and local cadres started even before the presidential calamities took their toll. The Watergate scandal, coming on top of the Goldwater debacle, accelerated the momentum of an already precipitous decline.

These setbacks notwithstanding, Republican political strategists have spent the past two decades trying to piece together a winning coalition. Efforts began in earnest with the promulgation of a "Southern strategy" trumpeted by the party's conservative right wing. In 1961 Barry Goldwater, addressing a gathering of Southern Republicans in Atlanta, articulated the conservatives' rationale for courting a new constituency when he declared, "We are not going to get the Negro vote as a bloc in 1964 and 1968, so we ought to go hunting where the ducks are."[18] He considered the South to be prime territory, and the likeliest targets its traditionally Democratic farmers, rural small-town whites, and urban and mill-town blue-collar workers—many of whom were beginning to feel threatened by federal government support for the civil rights movement. In addition to these Southern whites, Goldwater thought his conservative philosophy would be attractive to Northern Catholic ethnics and to the new economic interests that were developing in the Sunbelt.

As it turned out, the Southern strategy proved a dismal failure in the hands of the GOP's right-wing crusaders, but four years later Richard Nixon shaped it into a blueprint for presidential victory.[19] The Nixon appeal included promises to respect states' rights; to reorient the Justice Department's role in school desegregation, busing, and the implementation of the Voting Rights Act; to dismantle Johnson's War on Poverty; to restore law and order in the cities; and to alter the philosophical makeup of the Supreme Court.[20] Although his party won the presidency in 1968 with only 43.4 percent of the popular vote, political strategist Kevin Phillips projected an emerging Republican majority.[21] He suggested that the combined showings of Richard Nixon and George Wallace proved that the Republican party would rebuild by solidifying its support among hard-

cal Parties in the United States (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1973), pp. 5–10; and Walter Dean Burnham, *Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1978), pp. 6–10.

[18] Quoted in Walter De Vries and Jack Bass, "Cross-Pressures in the White South," in *Emerging Coalitions in American Politics*, ed. Seymour Martin Lipset (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1973), p. 309.

[19] Nixon's 1968 presidential victory was aided by the presence of George Wallace in the race. Wallace attracted support from disaffected elements in the Democratic party—particularly Southern whites and working-class ethnics who otherwise might have tipped the balance in Hubert Humphrey's favor. The Republican strategy aimed to win these voters in subsequent elections.

[20] Numan Bartley and Hugh Graham, *Southern Politics and the Second Reconstruction* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), pp. 184–200.

[21] Kevin P. Phillips, *The Emerging Republican Majority* (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1969).

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working, law-abiding, middle-income whites—especially white Protestants in the South and white Catholics in the North.

Phillips's predictions proved correct but premature. The Nixon administration failed to bring about a critical realignment of the electorate—in part because of its greater interest in wielding power from the top down rather than in fashioning support from the bottom up. FDR had concentrated on building grass-roots organizational allegiance to the New Deal by channeling patronage and relief funds to the big-city Democratic machines, targeting federal agricultural programs to cotton and tobacco farmers in the South and wheat farmers in the Midwest, and taking legislative and executive initiatives to strengthen and expand the power of labor unions.

In contrast, under Nixon's leadership the Republicans counted heavily on gaining affective support among disgruntled voters by dismantling programs, slowing down enforcement procedures, and taking a hard line against people and policies that had raised the ire of certain groups they sought to woo. Even the revenue-sharing feature of the administration's "New Federalism," which returned money to the states and localities, failed to create mechanisms for cementing attachments to the Republican party. Whereas the Nixon people were very good at the symbolic manipulation of politics, they sorely neglected the organizational and programmatic requisites of party building. Given that local Republican organizations had deteriorated drastically in all regions except the South, the party had little possibility of becoming competitive at all levels without more serious efforts at institutional revitalization.

At the national level, however, the GOP made efforts to provide an organizational structure for its new constituency with the establishment in 1968 of a permanent Heritage Groups Division of the Republican National Committee. This division was created to deal particularly with ethnic concerns. In 1971 some 200 delegates and prominent leaders from thirty Republican national ethnic organizations and twenty State Nationalities Councils representing an estimated 1000 clubs officially formed the National Republican Heritage Groups Council. Referred to as the Nationalities Council, this structure has standing committees that focus on membership drives, leadership conferences, opinion research, support for key legislation, fund-raising events, and ethnic youth activities.[22] Unlike the ethnic-based political machines and the various Catholic and Jewish organizations that have been so essential to the Democratic party's electoral victories, these Republican heritage groups are strictly party auxiliaries in which dues-paying members elect those who will represent them at every level of operation. The chairman of the Nationalities Council is an ex-officio member of the RNC.

Although initially not included, there are now Black Nationality Clubs within the Republican Nationalities Council. The move to bring black participants into the organizational structure was part of a broadly conceived revitalization plan

[22] "National Republican Heritage Groups (Nationalities) Council," (Washington, D.C.: Republican National Committee brochure, n.d.).

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developed when Bill Brock took over as party chairman in 1977.[23] While holding on to the vision of a new Republican majority, Brock instituted significant changes in the party's tactics, style, and political rhetoric. He sought to replace a penchant for polarization and zealous exclusivism with a new spirit of openness. To this end the party's appeal was repackaged and directed towards people belonging to all of the major groups in the political spectrum. Instead of linking the party's future with the ideological mobilization of the "silent majority" Brock promoted organizational revitalization and flexible pragmatism.

While the Nationalities Council and comparable outreach organs such as the Federation of Republican Women and the College Republican National Committee have played an important role in projecting a new party image, the RNC's major vehicle for grass-roots organizing has been its Local Elections Campaign Division (LECD). Created by Brock to direct the national committee's drive to gain state legislative seats, the LECD has led the way in supplanting old-style patronage politics with electronic politics and survey research. In 1980 it had thirty-one staffers and a budget of $2.7 million.[24] Its program involves district analysis, candidate recruitment, training and education of candidates and managers, and on-site assistance to candidates.[25] The LECD can scan computerized records on the political performance of every precinct and legislative district in the country to determine where to concentrate its financial and technical resources. Its opinion surveys provide local Republican candidates with the information needed to focus on popular issues. Demographic analysis is used to help identify candidates who complement the ethnic makeup of a legislative district's constituents.[26] By marshaling these various techniques, the RNC had made tremendous strides toward its goal of rebuilding the party at the state and local levels.[27] Overall, the national committee provided $6,200,000 in direct cash support and in-kind contributions to Republican candidates running in 1980 for the U.S. Senate, U.S. House, governorships, and state legislative seats.[28]

Clearly, the working assumption of Chairman Brock and his associates was that the "new majority" would not simply emerge. The growth of the Republican party may have been incipient in attitude changes as well as in population shifts from central cities to traditionally Republican suburbia and from the Northeast to the increasingly Republican Southern rim, but in

[23] For a detailed summary of Brock's revitalization activities, see John F. Bibby, "Party Renewal in the National Republican Party," in *Party Renewal in America: Theory and Practice*, ed. Gerald M. Pomper (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980), pp. 102–15.

[24] Morton Kondracke, "The G.O.P. Gets Its Act Together," *New York Times Magazine*, 13 July 1980, p. 44.

[25] Bibby, "Renewal in the National Republican Party," p. 110.

[26] Kondracke, "The G.O.P. Gets Its Act Together."

[27] From 1977 to 1980 the Republicans gained eleven governorships and more than 500 seats in the state legislatures. During this same period they picked up 44 House seats and 15 Senate seats.

[28] Bill Brock, *1980 Chairman's Report* (Washington, D.C.: Republican National Committee), p. 12.

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American politics few things can be taken for granted. RNC leaders realized that control of more state legislatures and governorships would give the party greater influence over the reapportionment of voting districts following the 1980 Census. Thus the national committee sought to build a broad and varied constituency base at the state and local levels in preparation for the 1980 elections. Out of this overall strategy came a plan to deny Democrats the margin of security they routinely derived from an overwhelmingly Democratic black vote.

In working to consummate the demise of the New Deal coalition, the RNC thus heeded an analysis provided for Jimmy Carter in 1976 by his political pollster, Patrick Caddell: ". . . the New Deal coalition is essentially premised on carrying a majority of the white electorate, something the Democratic candidate has not been able to do since the 1940's with one exception—Johnson's victory in 1964."[29] In 1976, the black bloc vote compensated for the Democrats' slippage among white voters and helped send Carter to the White House.[30] In this instance it appeared that the lingering impact of the civil rights policies and economic programs promoted by Democratic administrations had salvaged a close election. But Bill Brock concluded that Carter's campaign style and Republican indifference also influenced black voters. So in 1977 he recruited Wright-McNeill and Associates, a black political consulting firm based in Columbus, Georgia, to work with his staff and develop an outreach program for black community involvement.

Blacks and the GOP: The Rediscovery

In 1977 the RNC launched its new program to attract black voters and candidates with an initial $257,300 contract to Wright-McNeill.[31] The firm, which was given an office in the RNC's Washington headquarters and ran the committee's Black Community Involvement Division, received subsequent contracts that totaled more than $1 million over the following three years.[32] The financial resources and sophisticated political techniques of the RNC could under any circumstances be expected to attract the attention of some blacks. But Wright-McNeill's role is best understood as a catalytic agent acting on several other factors that are in and of themselves pushing the black electorate toward a more bipartisan political profile.[33] The basic underpinnings of this process are a

[29] Patrick Caddell, "Initial Working Paper on Political Strategy," 10 December 1976, cited by Everett Carll Ladd, Jr., "The Shifting Party Coalitions—1932-1976," in *Emerging Coalitions*, Lipset, p. 101.

[30] Carter won 50.1 percent of the popular vote and 297 electoral votes; he received 46.6 percent of the white vote and 90.0 percent of the black vote; and black votes for Carter exceeded his margin of victory in thirteen states, with a total of 216 electoral votes.

[31] Charles C. Hucker, "Blacks and the GOP: A Cautious Courtship," *Congressional Quarterly* 36, no. 17 (29 April 1978), p. 1049.

[32] Interview with Dr. Robert Wright, head of Wright-McNeill and Associates, Washington, D.C., 18 June 1980.

[33] For a penetrating analysis of blacks' changing role in the party system see Martin Kilson,

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growing socioeconomic diversification of the black community; the impact on blacks of the general trend toward declining partisan intensity; and the resurgence of black leadership advocacy of two-party, balance-of-power politics. Each of these developments is to some extent an outgrowth of the success of the civil rights movement.

For most of this country's history, virtually all black Americans—irrespective of income, occupation, or educational status—have been affected by the sociology and politics of racism. As just one example of the consequences of American racism, in 1959 the median income of white male college graduates exceeded that of nonwhite male graduates by 81 percent.[34] For reasons such as this, the civil rights issue has been a persistent factor in determining the party affiliation of blacks in all social and economic categories. New Deal liberalism, with its emphasis on economic opportunity for the disadvantaged and FDR's conscious attempt to include minorities in the coalition, precipitated the black electorate's massive shift from the Republican to the Democratic party. The trend was reinforced by the policies of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, and in 1980 polls showed that 70 percent of all blacks were Democrats.[35]

Yet much of the present support is "soft"—it has declined in intensity over the past decade. In 1968 when the party affiliation of 85 percent of the black population was Democratic, 56 percent of all blacks considered themselves strong Democrats, while another 29 percent viewed themselves as weak Democrats (see Table 2). By 1978 black partisanship had altered such that 37 percent were strong Democrats and 30 percent weak Democrats. During this same period, the portion of black independents grew from 11 to 26 percent.[36] Although the Democratic party managed to hold the votes of most of its weak partisans and capture the support of many of the independents and Republicans as well, these data reveal a potential pool of black recruits for the GOP.[37] To be a credible alternative for blacks, however, the Republican party must provide policy options that are congruent with the gains of the civil rights movement—policies that reinforce the new patterns of black economic and social mobility and sustain government-backed antidiscrimination and employment activities.

"Afro-Americans and the Party System: Toward Diversification and Bipartisanization," in the updated and soon to be reissued book *What the Negro Wants*, ed. Rayford Logan (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944).

[34] Richard B. Freeman, *Black Elite: The New Market for Highly Educated Black Americans* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1976), p. xix.

[35] Data Black Opinion Polls, 1 May 1980.

[36] The decline in party identification is a general phenomenon among the American voting population and is not limited to blacks.

[37] A Data Black poll released on 1 May 1980 reaffirmed the potential for GOP inroads into the black vote. A total of 1,177 blacks were asked the following questions: "On a scale of 1 to 5, where '5' means 'excellent' and '1' means 'poor,' how would you rate the job Jimmy Carter is doing to help black Americans?" The mean score was 2.59. In a breakdown by income, the mean for those earning less than $15,000 was 2.72, for those in the $15,000 to $24,999 range it was 2.45, and it dropped to 2.28 for respondents earning more than $25,000.

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TABLE 2

Changes in Intensity of Black Support for Political Parties

	1952	1956	1960	1964	1968	1972	1976	1978
Strong Democrat	31%	27%	27%	52%	56%	37%	35%	37%
Weak Democrat	22	23	21	22	29	31	36	30
Independent Democrat*	10	6	5	8	7	8	14	15
Independent Independent	4	7	12	6	3	12	8	9
Independent Republican*	4	1	4	1	1	3	1	2
Weak Republican	8	12	10	5	1	4	3	3
Strong Republican	5	7	7	2	1	4	2	3
Apolitical	17	18	14	5	3	2	1	2

* "Independent Democrats" are Independents who tend to favor the Democratic Party. "Independent Republicans" are Independents who lean toward the Republican party.

Source: Miller et al., *American National Election Studies Data Sourcebook*, p. 89.

The GOP's biggest potential black constituency is the product of governmental actions designed to counter the traditional discriminatory practices of the free market and to redistribute income and opportunity. It was aggressive government measures like the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the 1965 Voting Rights Act, and Executive Order 11246 on affirmative action that significantly altered employment practices in the public and private sectors and led to unprecedented improvements for some blacks in job opportunities and salaries. Under the impetus of government intervention, the structure of the labor market began to change from its historic pattern that relegated college-trained blacks to low incomes and poor job categories and minimized income differentials between the various categories of black wage earners.[38] As unprecedented job opportunties opened up for highly trained blacks, the late 1960s and early 1970s witnessed the beginnings of a new black middle class—new in the sense of being more similar to whites than was previously the case with respect to economic and educational attributes as well as participation in the political system. One characteristic difference, however, is that high-level black workers are more likely than high-level white workers to be employed in the public sector. In light of these facts, it becomes clear that many middle- and upper-income blacks have philosophical as well as practical reasons to continue supporting the Democratic party. Indeed, their vested interests appear to be at odds with the Republicans' philosophy of limited government and preference for giving free rein to the private sector and market forces.

The fact remains, however, that the partisan orientation of upwardly mobile blacks is subject to the cross pressures of race as well as class interests. Thus, Republican efforts to proselytize black voters have concentrated on deemphasizing this psychic discomfort by working to change the party's negative

[38] My discussion of changes in the job market and differing black and white profiles is based on Freeman, *Black Elite*, pp. 151–75.

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image while leaving its basic philosophy intact. Wright-McNeill's advice to candidates seeking to win black votes was explicit on this point:

> The Republican Party *must* combat its negative image/negative perception . . .
> *if*
> The Republican Party wishes to gain additional black voter support . . .
> *And*
> The Republican Party can make such inroads without betraying Republican Party Principles and Philosophies.
> *It is all a matter of "articulation"!*[39]

In addition to the work done by paid political consultants, nonpartisan encouragement for a move toward greater black participation in the Republican party has come from leaders of the major civil rights organizations. In the past, these leaders had praised the Democratic party for its role in fostering antidiscrimination policies, but the increased salience of economic issues during the Carter presidency led to a different tack. Former National Urban League president Vernon Jordon captured the headlines in 1977 with his criticism of Carter's domestic policies. Pointing to the president's failure to keep campaign promises to lower black unemployment, reform welfare, and effectively attack urban problems, Jordan charged that the black community was being shortchanged precisely because it had voted so overwhelmingly Democratic.[40] The ball was picked up by Reverend Jesse Jackson of Operation PUSH (People United to Save Humanity), who accepted Bill Brock's invitation to address the RNC's January 1978 meeting. Jackson, a Democrat, told the Republicans, "We must pursue a strategy that prohibits one party from taking us for granted and another party from writing us off."[41] NAACP executive secretary Benjamin Hooks, an erstwhile Republican, took public offense when candidate Ronald Reagan declined an invitation to address the association's national convention held July 1980 in riot-torn Miami. Shortly thereafter Hooks was a hastily added speaker on the program of the Republican convention which nominated Reagan in Detroit. Hooks used this national forum to dramatize the importance of Republican support for the poor and the disadvantaged if the GOP were to become a viable political option for more black voters.

Thus in their various ways, the leaders of these civil rights organizations have been trying to engage the Republican party in creative dialogue to suggest programs that would enhance the party's appeal to black voters. Having decided that the black community would derive greater benefits from political oscillation between the two parties, they are convinced that the practicality of such a strategy depends on the policy choices presented to the electorate.

Herein lies the problem: While black leaders see the two-party option as

[39] Wright-McNeill and Associates, "The Republican Party Image, The Black Community, and Electoral Politics," material prepared as a guide for candidates.

[40] "A Fallout Between Friends," *Time*, 8 August 1976, pp. 27–8.

[41] Reverend Jesse L. Jackson, "Speech before the Republican National Committee," 20 January 1978, Washington, D.C.

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leverage to precipitate socioeconomic change, the Republican party is waxing strong on resurgent conservatism. If there is to be a basis for a rapprochement, the Republicans are going to have to reposition themselves along the lines suggested by former Senator Edward Brooke of Massachusetts:

> For too many years, it was an article of faith with some Republicans that opposition to big federal government was the same as creative problem solving. Well, it wasn't. . . .I can say what [the Republican party's] members should and must mean if they are to attract black votes into their ranks.
>
> They must mean a total rejection of second class citizenship for any American. . . .For when black people talk about justice and equality of opportunity in America, we are talking about much more than voting rights or open accommodations. We are talking about economics, and the power that flows directly from financial independence.[42]

Agenda Building with a Declining Emphasis on Race

Economic issues are a frequent basis of coalition politics, and, conversely, the differential impact of economic policies can heighten political cleavages. For these reasons, debates about the degree to which race and economic opportunity are congruent always turn to considerations of possible political allies. This constituency-broadening function of the economic frame of reference becomes apparent when examining recent trends toward developing a black political agenda that couches issues in terms other than race.

In 1976, political scientist Charles Hamilton presented a position paper to the National Democratic party's platform committee on possible approaches to black issues in the upcoming presidential campaign. He proposed that shared economic interests could form the basis of an electoral coalition among blacks, liberals, and white ethnics and suggested that a campaign that focused on issues such as full employment, national health insurance, and income maintenance would have clear political advantages for the black community because it would deny the opportunity to use race as a polarizing issue. Hamilton was persuaded that in the political climate which prevailed in 1976, a prudent strategy for maximizing the possibility of Democratic electoral success would soft pedal affirmative action and busing and concentrate on issues that lend themselves to "deracialized solutions."[43]

Four years later when the Republican party decided to include in its platform a plank on black Americans, it picked up the deracialization motif. The plank focused on economic issues and stated, "Our fundamental answer to the prob-

[42] "Remarks of Senator Edward W. Brooke [to] Operation PUSH," Chicago, Ill., 25 February 1978.

[43] Charles V. Hamilton, "De-racialization: Examination of a Political Strategy," *First World* 1, no. 2 (March–April 1977): 3–5. Hamilton presented deracialization as a short-term strategy to deal with the special circumstances of the 1976 election. He also pointed out that there are issue areas—such as busing and affirmative action—that are vitally important to blacks but where deracialization will not work well because many whites perceive them in a zero-sum manner.

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lems of black Americans is the same answer we make to all Americans—full employment without inflation through economic growth."[44] But the GOP's decision to address the concerns of black Americans by adopting traditional conservative policies reflects the rigidity of its philosophical orientation. There was limited political mileage in an economic appeal to the black community of a Republican platform that "categorically" rejected the notion of a guaranteed annual income; declared that "inflation can be controlled only by fiscal and monetary restraint, combined with sharp reductions in the tax and regulatory disincentives for savings, investment and productivity"; rejected the creation of a national health service; and spoke disparagingly of public-service jobs and the food stamp program.[45] The concept of establishing enterprise zones to solve the problems of unemployment and economic decay in the central cities by giving tax breaks to job-creating businesses, suspending certain environmental and workplace regulations, and allowing for salaries below the minimum wage was new and never fully developed during the presidential campaign. So on the whole the Republicans' approach to economic problem solving restricted the party's potential black supporters to a very narrow constituency.

Interestingly, many black leaders would have preferred that the Republican net be cast more broadly. For example, when Benjamin Hooks addressed the Republican Convention, he focused on the problems of disadvantaged blacks but linked their fate with the still tenuous status of the black middle class. He argued that "laissez-faire" and "trickle down" solutions would not resolve the economic crisis and cautioned his audience not to be "lulled into a sense of false security or be placated by the progress we have achieved, for today in America, . . .fully one-fourth of its Black citizens live well below the poverty level. We are relegated to sub-standard housing, unequal representation in the professions, over represented among our prison population, and under represented in the halls of government."[46]

Hook's remarks underscore the clash between the all-inclusive symbolism of the RNC's outreach campaign and the upper-class bias of the party's policy formulations. In this regard, a more accurate statement of the link between deracialization and coalition building in current Republican thinking is being articulated by the Lincoln Institute for Research and Education, a conservative operation launched in 1978 to reevaluate public-policy issues that have an impact on the lives of "black middle America." J.A. Parker, the Institute's president, has said that "blacks who are not poor no longer feel compelled to act as if they were poor."[47] Furthermore, he rejects the notion of a monolithic black vote and proclaims the desirability of a coalition formed on much more narrowly based economic interests:

[44] "Republican Platform: Family, Neighborhood, Work, Peace, Freedom," proposed by the Committee on Resolutions for the Republican National Convention (Detroit, 14 July 1980), p. 9.

[45] Ibid., pp. 6, 16, 29, 50.

[46] Benjamin L. Hooks, "Speech delivered at the Republican National Convention," 15 July 1980, Detroit, Michigan.

[47] J.A. Parker, "A New Era," *Lincoln Review* 1 (Spring 1979): 3.

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> American blacks, particularly those in black middle America, have benefited significantly in the past two decades through legislative and legal decisions affecting school desegregation, equal opportunity in education, housing and employment. Enormous political, economic and social gains have been made through the combined efforts of the private, public and independent sectors.
>
> America's black middle class is now required to confront many of the same issues which concern white middle America. . . .
>
> In the search for new "friends" to help further their interests, blacks are now having to break with the coalitions of the past which were depended upon to further their goals.[48]

A reading of the 1980 Republican platform strongly suggests that its real target group was Parker's black middle America.

The GOP effort to court the black vote in the 1980 elections was in some ways similar to Franklin Roosevelt's attempt to attract black support during his first presidential campaign. Then the Democrats were trying to woo an overwhelmingly Republican constituency by appealing to its economic interests. Although most economically distressed groups voted enthusiastically for Roosevelt in 1932, he did not win a majority of the black electorate until 1936. The political skepticism of blacks in the 1930s was such that neither the dismal economic realities of the Great Depression nor the candidate's impassioned promises of government relief programs was sufficient to make them immediately abandon the party that carried the label of being pro-civil rights. It took substantive material incentives, particularly in the face of the Democratic party's limited sensitivity to racial problems, to induce blacks to move toward a new partisan attachment.[49] After several years, the massive delivery of welfare services to blacks in both rural and urban areas established the utilitarian principle of political exchange as the rationale for voting Democratic. If the Republicans are to be successful at attracting more black support in the 1980s, they too must complement the politics of economic promise with substantive benefits and rewards.

The Black Vote in 1980

There is general agreement among election analysts that the black vote had little impact on the results of the 1980 presidential contest. Estimates of black support for Reagan have ranged from a low of 6.1 percent to a high of 16 percent—a range that poses more serious problems for statisticians than for political pundits.[50] Whatever the exact figure, it is clear that more than 80 per-

[48] Ibid.

[49] In contrast to the Reconstruction era, the federal government under Franklin Roosevelt's leadership did not champion civil rights legislation or publically endorse racial desegregation. On this point see John B. Kirby, *Black Americans in the Roosevelt Era* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1980), pp. 106–51. For an inventory of the New Deal's record on political appointments, welfare benefits, and work relief for blacks, see Ralph J. Bunche, *The Political Status of the Negro in the Age of FDR* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1973), pp. 612–31.

[50] Figures on sample black precincts cited by Eddie Williams and Milton Morris in their essay on

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TABLE 3

Presidential Vote Showing Shifts in Electoral Support for Carter

	Carter 1976	*Carter 1980*
Blacks	82%*	82%
Hispanics	75	54
Whites	47	36
East	51	43
South	54	44
Midwest	48	41
West	46	35
Democrats	77	66
Independents	43	30
Republicans	9	11
Female	50	45
Male	50	37
Catholic	54	40
Jewish	64	45
Protestant	44	37
Born-again white Protestant	—	34
18-21 years old	48	44
22-29 years old	51	43
30-44 years old	49	37
45-59 years old	47	39
60 years or older	47	40
Family income		
Less than $10,000	58	50
$10,000-$14,999	55	47
$15,000-$24,999	48	38
$25,000-$50,000	36	32
Professional or manager	41	33
Clerical, sales or other white-collar	46	42
Blue-collar worker	57	46
Looking for work	65	55
Education		
High school or less	57	46
Some college	51	35
College graduate	45	35
Labor union household	59	47
No member of household in union	43	35

* Percentages may not add to 100 because of rounding.

Source: 1980 election day surveys by *New York Times*/CBS News Poll.

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cent of the black electorate remained loyal to the Democratic party at a time when virtually every other traditionally Democratic voting constituency abandoned Jimmy Carter at the polls (Table 3). Moreover, blacks on the whole began the Reagan era with great skepticism about the benefits of Republican rule. Surveys taken at the start of the Reagan presidency showed a substantial gap between the levels of black and white confidence in the new administration. The Gallup Poll found that only 16 percent of blacks thought Reagan would make a "great" or a "good" president, compared with 43 percent of whites; that far fewer blacks (26 percent) than whites (48 percent) thought Reagan would be able to reduce inflation; and that only 31 percent of blacks compared with 49 percent of whites thought Reagan could reduce unemployment.[51]

Despite these striking indicators of political alienation from Reagan Republicanism, many blacks supported Republican candidates in state and local elections around the country. And a tendency toward split-ticket voting is evidence of weakening partisan attachments. Thus in order to discern shifting alignments in black voting behavior, it is necessary to look below the level of presidential politics.

It should be noted that early preelection surveys conducted by RNC political strategists determined that black voters were going to stick with Jimmy Carter or the Democratic nominee no matter what the Republicans did in 1980.[52] Thus, while a decision was made to develop a presidential strategy that committed substantial party resources to winning traditionally Democratic white ethnics, a major thrust for the black vote was never a serious option.

When the Reagan-Bush campaign got under way, Arthur Teele, a black Republican, was brought in and given responsibility for directing presidential overtures to the black electorate. Meanwhile the Wright-McNeill firm, which continued to work for the RNC, concentrated more intensely on selected races for the U.S. Senate, the House of Representatives, and local senate and house seats in fourteen states.[53] A look at the outcomes of some of these targeted races is instructive.

Following a political assessment of the black vulnerability of Democratic contenders and the potential attractiveness of Republican candidates, the RNC

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the presidential election year in the National Urban League's *State of Black America—1981* gave Reagan 6.1 percent of the black vote. On 7 November 1980 the Joint Center for Political Studies in Washington, D.C. announced preliminary findings that Reagan received just over 9 percent of the black vote. The *New York Times* initially reported that its exit polls showed Reagan captured 16 percent of the black vote. When the *New York Times*/CBS News Poll was published, Reagan had 14 percent of the black vote. The Gallup Poll release of 1 February 1981 reported that one black in ten voted for Reagan. A Data Black poll released just one week prior to the election indicated that of those blacks most likely to vote, only 3 percent were for Reagan.

[51] The Gallup Poll, 1 February 1981.

[52] This section is based on an interview with John McNeill, political consultant, Washington, D.C., 26 March 1981.

[53] Wright-McNeill worked with Republican candidates in the states of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, South Carolina, Missouri, Louisiana, Michigan, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Texas.

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TABLE 4

Republican Victories and the Black Vote in Selected 1980 U.S. Senate Races

State	Winner	Percentage of State Vote	Percentage of Black Vote
Alabama	Jeremiah Denton	50.2	9.0
Florida	Paula Hawkins	51.7	13.2
Georgia	Mack Mattingly	50.9	39.0
Oklahoma	Don Nickles	53.5	40.7
Pennsylvania	Arlen Specter	50.5	32.0

Sources: State vote percentages from *Congressional Quarterly* 39, no. 17 (25 April 1981): 717-25; black vote percentages are from Wright-McNeill and Associates, "Year End Report (1980)," submitted to the Republican National Committee.

selected five U.S. senatorial races—in Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania—and launched special appeals to black voters. These were all highly competitive contests in which the results could have gone either way. Wright-McNeill's job was to provide the Republican contenders with information on salient issues in the various black communities, contacts with key black groups and persons of influence, and survey research on black voter attitudes and support. They promoted media techniques to reach the black electorate and counseled their clients on the selection of message content, timing, vehicles, and the use of key words and phrases in speeches and debates.[54]

Election results suggest that these techniques may have contributed to Republican successes among segments of the black electorate. Republicans won all five seats with margins ranging from 50.2 to 53.5 percent (Table 4). According to figures compiled by Wright-McNeill, in Alabama, Florida, and Georgia, GOP candidates who captured 9 percent, 13.2 percent, and 39 percent of the black vote respectively, won seats formerly held by Democrats. Pennsylvannia's new Republican senator received an estimated 32 percent of the black vote and was elected with a slim 50.5 percent tally. Thus in contrast to the presidential election, black support for Republican candidates in 1980 did have an impact on several critical races for the U.S. Senate. Indeed, a thorough postmortem of the Democrats' loss of control of the Senate must take into account their party's marginal slippage among black voters in elections targeted by the RNC.

A closer look at split-ticket voting in Georgia reveals why black partisan attachments are likely to become more fluid as both major parties move to the right. In November 1980, an overwhelming black bloc vote for Carter helped him win his home state in what was otherwise a Southern sweep for Reagan; but incumbent Democratic Senator Herman Talmadge got about a third fewer black votes than Carter and narrowly lost his bid for a fifth term to Mack Mattingly, a conservative Republican. The Voter Education Project compiled statistics based

[54] Wright-McNeill and Associates, "Year End Report (1980)," unpublished report submitted to the Republican National Committee, Washington, D.C., p. 9.

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on official election returns from Fulton County (which encompasses Atlanta) and found that Carter polled 97.6 percent of the black vote in comparison to 72.3 percent for Talmadge. Conversely, 27.7 percent voted for Mattingly.[55] These figures suggest that party oscillation among blacks may increase as they face more choices between candidates who are liberal on either racial or economic class issues—but not both.

Although blacks were generally disappointed with Carter's handling of the economy, they considered him strong on civil rights and supportive of the principle of federally funded social programs. On the other hand, Ronald Reagan's platform was so far to the right that most blacks could not view his candidacy as a credible alternative to Carter.

Senatorial contender Mack Mattingly might have been equally as repugnant to the black electorate had it not been for Talmadage's record as a longtime foe of civil rights. So some of the blacks who went to the polls undoubtedly took advantage of this opportunity to settle an old score. Others were probably influenced by the taint of scandal that had resulted in the Georgia Democrat's being denounced by the Senate for financial misconduct and "reprehensible" behavior. Yet if one looks beyond matters of race and ethics to considerations of economic policy, Talmadge, who comes out of the tradition of Southern populism, has a long record of support for government programs to aid the poor and the disadvantaged. He was one of the originators of the food stamp program; he worked to expand and improve federal school-lunch programs; and he was an advocate for small-town rural America and a sponsor of legislation designed to help farmers who are too old, too uneducated, or too poor to benefit from the advances of modern agricultural technology.[56] Accordingly, a 1980 *Congressional Quarterly* voting study of support for the Senate's conservative coalition of Republicans and Southern Democrats found Talmadge voting in agreement only 43 percent of the time. This lukewarm record of conservative bloc voting compares with a score of 91 percent for Georgia Democratic Senator Sam Nunn that same year.[57] Thus the fact that Talmadge, the once vocal segregationist, polled 72.3 percent of the black votes in Fulton County is a measure of the salience of economic class issues in that constituency. As this case shows, a racially moderate Republican who is a budget-cutting conservative has some appeal to black voters, but that appeal is tempered by economic self-interest.

In sum, 1980 was not a watershed year for black political behavior. In the presidential election, the well-established pattern of strong support for the Democratic candidate was reaffirmed. When state and local elections are taken

[55] The Voter Education Project, Atlanta, Georgia, "Statistical Analysis of Black Vote for President and U.S. Senate in Fulton County General Election November 4, 1980."

[56] George Douth, *Leaders in Profile: The United States Senate* (New York: Sperr & Douth, Inc., 1975).

[57] "Conservative Coalition Support and Opposition: Senate," *1980 Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, vol. 36 (Washington, D.C.), p. 37-C.

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into account, evidence of split-ticket voting points to a decline in the intensity of black support for the Democratic party. For the foreseeable future, this national/local dichotomy of black voting loyalty and declining partisanship vis-à-vis the Democratic party is likely to continue on its present course unless the Reagan admininstration's economic program is either a dramatic success or a dismal failure.

Symmetry and Asymmetry in Political Exchange

In making a case for increased participation by blacks in the Republican party prior to the Reagan triumph, economist Thomas Sowell described the reciprocal benefits in the offing as follows: "With the GOP a distinctly minority party and card-carrying Republicans an endangered species, there seems little to lose and much to gain by at least making some inroads into the Democrats' monopoly of the black vote. Blacks, in turn, need at least bargaining leverage to force Democrats to take them seriously, and only a split ticket and a vote that can go either way provides that leverage."[58] Mutual advantage and the power to punish: These are the bargaining chips of political exchange.

As used here, political exchange refers to a reciprocal relationship directed toward the augmentation of power, influence, or benefits within a political arena. A relationship established under these terms is instrumental in nature; its maintenance depends upon the constant flow of rewards, services, and occasional threats between the respective parties. The participants are free to change allegiance when it appears that rewards either may no longer be forthcoming or, alternatively, may be greater with some other party.

Mutual advantage notwithstanding, reciprocity in political exchange is characterized by greater or lesser degrees of symmetry in the distribution of payoffs among the participants. In the U.S. political system, where public policy is formulated in an environment of competing groups and interests, those who are resource-poor are at a serious disadvantage. The Republican party's core constituencies (business, middle- and upper-income groups, agribusiness) command tremendous resources—particularly when compared to the means blacks have at their disposal. Since asymmetrical power relationships are derivatives of the differential allocation of resources in the socioeconomic order, blacks are bound to have a difficult time convincing the GOP to embrace their policy views, influencing elected Republican officials, getting adequate rewards for their support, and exercising power within the party's councils. As is known from the experience of clientelist politics and political machines, power asymmetry does not preclude the possibility of political reciprocity.[59] Yet Charles Hamilton's analysis of the client-recipient relations that developed

[58] Thomas Sowell, "Can the Party of Lincoln Woo the Blacks?" *Newsday*, n.d.

[59] See James C. Scott, "Political Clientelism: A Bibliographic Essay," in *Friends, Followers, and Factions*, eds. Steffen W. Schmidt et al., (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977).

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under the "soft-money" programs of the Great Society is a reminder that in certain circumstances asymmetry can block the likelihood of any meaningful exchange relationship and have a depoliticizing effect on the weaker of the partners.[60] For relatively powerless groups, therefore, the political imperative is to move toward greater power symmetry with other groups within the political arena.

For the foreseeable future, the movement of blacks toward this goal is likely to be incremental. Increased political efficacy will come with the development of more numerous and adroit leadership cadres at the state and local levels—persons who hold institutional positions of power including elective office, staff positions with key politicians, and jobs in party bureaucracies. But if blacks are to guard against the specter of declining political influence, the critical area for the 1980s must be in the sphere of independent black organizations. The possibilities for such activities are wide-ranging: from the mounting of third-party efforts to articulate issues, formulate policies, and field candidates otherwise ignored by the major parties; to politicization of black interest groups; to experimentation with a recent American invention—the political action committee. Some devices may be more effective than others, but in the drive to reduce power asymmetry, creative and judicious political initiatives must originate within and be organized by members of the black community.

Likewise, blacks should be involved in the formulation of any "deracialized" black agendas that are put forward by either of the major political parties. The Reagan administration has claimed that its budget proposals will ultimately benefit blacks more than the rest of the population once the economy is performing properly, but the best contemporary example of a successful use of the economic wedge to promote black interests is the record of former Senator Brooke.

Brooke, who often insisted that he was not a black politician but a politician who happened to be black, included the following among his major legislative accomplishments: a legal provision limiting to 25 percent of income the amount public-housing tenants can pay for rent; increased appropriations for school districts undergoing court-ordered or voluntary desegregation; the Small Business Act Section 8(a) set-aside to channel federal procurement contracts to firms owned by socially and economically disadvantaged persons; a separate 10 percent minority set-aside program for federal public-works projects; and a variety of efforts to assist minority businesses through the Small Business Administration, the Office of Minority Business Enterprise, and overseas development activities sponsored under the Foreign Assistance program. Many of Brooke's initiatives were oriented toward minority business interests, but he addressed social problems as well. Thus, he selected issue areas that permitted the formulation of policies that address the needs of large social and economic groupings and at the same time advance the interests of strategic black populations.

[60] Charles V. Hamilton, "The Patron-Recipient Relationship and Minority Politics," *Political Science Quarterly* 94 (Summer 1979): 211–27.

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Many black Republicans would like to continue the Brooke approach.[61] But Reagan's decision to make inflation fighting the number one economic priority of his administration has brought budget cuts that imperil black entrepreneurs as well as the poor and the disadvantaged. Reduction in aid for food stamps, Medicaid, public housing, and Aid to Families with Dependent Children have received more publicity, but assistance to minority businesses has suffered a similarly drastic fate. Small Business Administration loans, Economic Development Administration loan guarantees, the Section 8(a) set-asides, and the Minority Business Development Agency have been trimmed, and the Reagan administration's drive to eliminate regulations that contribute to inflation has led to the recision of many requirements designed to increase government procurement from minority firms.[62] Intense lobbying efforts by interest groups such as the National Association of Black Manufacturers and the Association of Minority Contractors have not succeeded in altering the administration's course of action. In effect, black Republicans find themselves the unwitting victims of power asymmetry within the GOP. Under such conditions, they have little ability to block or control policy outcomes.

What then is the future of blacks in the Republican party? Clearly, the distinctly minority position of the GOP in the American two-party system has dramatically reversed since 1977 when Bill Brock initiated the RNC's black outreach program. During this interim, black leaders have been talking about the need for an alternative to the Democratic party, and RNC political consultants have worked to change the Republican party's negative image in the black community, but mechanisms for enhancing black input into the GOP's policymaking process were neglected. In 1981 the Republican party emerged stronger than it had been in thirty years, while black political influence fell to its lowest level in two decades.

Under Chairman Brock the RNC spent heavily to reorient black voter attitudes by schooling white candidates in the language of minority issues, packaging a new Republican image, recruiting black candidates, and subsidizing their campaigns. This sudden infusion of Republic party resources created a political Eldorado for those willing to consider new alliances.

Given ideal conditions, such an operation could have enhanced the prospects of political exchange, but in this instance it encouraged dependence on a tenuous resource base. If one of the participants in an exchange relationship lacks the capacity for autonomous action, manipulation replaces reciprocity, and the political ramifications can be devastating. In view of the fundamental power

[61] For example, Progress, Inc., a group of Republican businessmen in Washington, recommended increases in Small Business Administration direct loan guarantees, an expansion of the 8(a) set-aside program, and special tax incentives to aid minority business development. In the main, black support for cuts in aid to minority businesses and the rescinding of regulations which promoted government contracts with sometimes more costly minority firms has come from academics like economists Thomas Sowell and Walter Williams and those blacks who have accepted posts in the Administration.

[62] "No 'Safety Net' for Business," *Black Enterprise* 11, no. 11 (June 1981): 53.

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asymmetry between blacks and other constituencies in the GOP, there was little likelihood that coequal participation by blacks in its ranks would come from efforts financed by the party coffers.

For this reason, the recent organization of three national black political action committees is a significant development. The Parker-Coltrane Political Action Committee was launched under the tutelage of Representative John Conyers, Jr., of Michigan; the Congressional Black Caucus has set up a political action committee; and Mayor Richard Hatcher of Gary, Indiana, is organizing a committee called Blackpac that would finance campaigns aimed at defeating members of Congress who vote against liberal or progressive causes.[63] These independent groups have a variety of explicit functions: raising money for campaign contributions; recruiting black candidates for congressional, state, and local elections; sponsoring candidate training conferences and voter registration drives; and overseeing legislative and administrative lobbying. If effective, these political action committees could also function to strengthen the political hand of black Republicans by reducing their power asymmetry and resource dependence on the party.

Now that the Republican party is resurgent, blacks can ill afford the risk of being isolated from power. But those who do not share the party's current conservative philosophy will have to be far better organized if they hope to influence its policies. Middle-class blacks are likely to be in the forefront of such mobilization efforts as they seek to protect their economic interests. In order to maximize their influence they will have to move into policy roles at all levels and in key functional areas of the party. More black candidates must be elected to office either as Republicans or as independents who are willing to form short-term alliances with Republicans. Black leaders will have to become more adept at extracting payoffs from Republican candidates who receive strategic black votes that help win close elections like the 1980 U.S. Senate races in Georgia and Pennsylvania. But since reciprocity is the basic principle of political exchange, the extent of bipartisanship in the black electorate in the 1980s ultimately depends upon whether or not conservative Republicanism can support civil rights and accommodate the economic interests of the black middle class.

[63] See the Joint Center for Political Studies, "First Black Political Action Committee Formed," *Focus* 9, no. 11 (November 1981): 7; and Reginald Stuart, "Blacks and Allies Studying Politics," *New York Times*, 4 April 1982.

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The Politics of Official Bilingualism in Canada

MILTON J. ESMAN

One of the main responses of Canada's government and its political elites to the challenges from Quebec since 1960 has been the policy of official bilingualism. Its political objective has been to convince the French-speaking minority concentrated in Quebec that they are fairly treated and should commit their political future to Canada. The central government's methods have been to raise the status of the French language to parity with English, to make French a language of service to the public and of work in federal agencies, to achieve "balanced participation" among the English and French speakers in the federal civil service, and to persuade and induce provincial governments to do likewise.[1] Canada's political elites have attempted to implement these policies in a federal political structure and a private enterprise economy in which the central government has limited power to compel compliance outside its own institutions.

The intellectual case for the federal response to the challenge of Quebec's "Quiet Revolution" was shaped by the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. Its terms of reference in 1963 were "to inquire into and report upon the existing state of bilingualism and biculturalism in Canada and to recommend what steps should be taken to develop the Canadian confederation on the basis of an equal partnership between the two founding races, taking into account the contributions made by the other ethnic groups to the cultural

[1] For a good summary of federal bilingual policy during the Trudeau era, see *A National Understanding: The Official Languages of Canada, Statement of the Government of Canada on Official Languages Policy* (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services, 1977).

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enrichment of Canada and the measures that should be taken to safeguard that contribution."[2]

The Bilingualism and Biculturalism Commission represented a grand assize on the issues of Anglophone-Francophone relations in Canada. Its findings in a preliminary report and in six lengthy volumes resulting from eight years of intensive research and deliberation demonstrated conclusively that relations between Anglophones and Francophones were far from equal anywhere in Canada.[3] By every indicator of socioeconomic status—for example, education, income, and occupation—Francophones even in Quebec were significantly below the Canadian average, below the status even of recently arrived immigrant groups. The federal capital, federal administration, and the armed forces functioned entirely in English. Francophone participation in the civil service, especially at the higher levels, was disproportionately low. Except in Quebec, Francophones employed in Federal institutions were compelled to use the English language in their work, which handicapped them competitively and required them to acculturate to Anglo-Saxon styles of behavior. Even in areas of substantial French settlement outside Quebec, public services were seldom available in French. The burden of bilingualism was borne quite unequally among the two groups. One-third of all French Canadians, but only 5 percent of Anglophones, spoke both languages. French Canadians had become a second-class minority throughout Canada, even in Quebec.

The commission's prescription was to establish a language regime throughout Canada that would insure equal status for both languages. In effect the commission proposed to extend nationwide the spirit and practice of bilingualism that had long prevailed informally in the *public* sector of Quebec where members of the public could claim and receive services in either language. The premises underlying these recommendations, most of which were incorporated into the Official Languages Act (OLA) of 1969,[4] were that:

- —French-Canadian discontents could be mitigated in large measures by equality or parity in language status and practice.
- —The relevant arena for a new bilingual language regime was all of Canada. Three provinces with substantial official language minorities—Quebec, Ontario, and New Brunswick—should become bilingual. Where administratively feasible, public services, federal and provincial, should be available in both languages in other provinces. The commission thus embraced the personality rather than the territorial principle of language practice.[5]

[2] Privy Council Minute 1106 of 19 July 1963 as reproduced in *The Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism*, Book 1, *General Introduction: The Official Languages* (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1967), appendix 1, pp. 173–74.

[3] Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, *Preliminary Report and Books*, 9 vols. (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1965–71). See Books 1, 2, 3a, 3b, 4, 5, and 6.

[4] 17–18 Elizabeth II, c. 54.

[5] Kenneth McRea, "The Principle of Territoriality and the Principle of Personality in Multilingual States," *International Journal of the Sociology of Language* 4 (August 1975): 33–54.

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The individual Canadian, anywhere in Canada, should be able in dealing with government to use the official language of his or her choice.

— Leadership and example by the federal government could provide the necessary impulse for the country, particularly the English-speaking majority, to accept and adjust to an initially unpopular set of changes. In Canada's "deferential" political culture, the provincial governments, the business community, and the ordinary citizen would have to accommodate those prescriptions the national political elites judged to be necessary to Canada's well-being and its survival as a single political community.[6]

Ten years of experience with this far-reaching effort at attitudinal and behavioral change in language policy and practice demonstrates that none of these premises were valid. The grievances and aspirations of the majority of French-Canadians who live in Quebec could not be mitigated by official bilingualism. Instead, a growing consensus of opinion leaders in Quebec has come to favor an officially unilingual Quebec. Moreover, to the majority of Quebecois (as most French-Canadians in Quebec now prefer to be identified) the relevant arena for language policy is their province, not all of Canada. Securing the predominance of the French language in Quebec is more important than formal language equality throughout Canada, even though this may prejudice the interests of French-Canadian minorities in other provinces. And despite an all-party front and the support of elites from all sectors of Canadian society, federal political elites had limited influence on grass-roots attitudes or on the behavior of provincial governments.

Though these original expectations have not been realized, nothing in this turbulent decade has refuted the critical insight of the Bilingualism and Biculturalism Commission that an equitable language regime is necessary to the maintenance of Canada as a single political system. Rather than official bilingualism, nationwide, it now appears that the territorial principle will supplant the personality principle at the provincial level, while a bilingual regime will prevail in the institutions and operations of the federal government.

The Implementation of Bilingualism

The recommendations of the Bilingualism and Biculturalism Commission and the provisions of the Official Languages Act can be summarized under five major topics: equality of status; access to public services; public employment; second language and minority language education; and multiculturalism.

Equality of Status and Access to Public Services

Paragraph 2 of the federal Official Languages Act of 1969 declares categorically that "the English and French languages are the official languages of Canada for

[6] For an exposition of the deferential culture thesis, see Robert Presthus, *Elite Accommodation in Canadian Politics* (Toronto: MacMillans, 1973).

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all purposes of the Parliament and government of Canada and possess and enjoy equality of status and equal rights and privileges as to their use in all the institutions of Parliament and the government of Canada." The effect of this enactment which extended equal status from the federal Parliament and courts and the legislature and courts of Quebec to all the institutions of the government of Canada have been far-reaching, both symbolically and substantively.[7] All official issuances by the executive agencies of the federal government, crown corporations, and the armed forces, which had operated exclusively in English except in Quebec, were subsequently to appear in both official languages. During the first decade of the OLA this policy was vigorously enforced by a fluently bilingual prime minister who was deeply dedicated to this principle, who insisted that the "French fact" be recognized and accepted throughout Canada, and who appointed Francophones conspicuously in unprecedented numbers to senior positions. The ambiance of the national capital region, which prior to 1970 had all the features of an English provincial city, became increasingly bilingual and bicultural. The OLA established the position of commissioner of official languages, a language ombudsman responsible to Parliament. It is the commissioner's responsiblity to investigate, mediate, and report on complaints regarding the administration of official language policy and otherwise exercise surveillance over the implementation of the act.[8]

The Bilingualism and Biculturalism Commission recommended that Quebec remain bilingual and that New Brunswick with its 34 percent French minority and Ontario with nearly half a million Francophones adopt official bilingualism. In the Canadian federal structure, however, this is a subject over which the central government can exercise only a diffuse moral influence. In 1974 Quebec turned its back on bilingualism, thereby reducing the status of English. The government of Ontario has refused to adopt a bilingual regime, though it has extended services in French, especially in education and judicial procedures.[9] Only New Brunswick made the symbolic gesture, adopting official bilingualism in 1970. The achievement of equal status at the federal level did not induce the two provinces with the largest official language minorities to follow suit, even symbolically.

The main thrust of the OLA is that "Canadians should be able to communicate with and to obtain services from the Federal institutions of government in the official language of their choice and arrangements should be made to this effect wherever there is sufficient demand for it."[10] This meant in practical terms

[7] These practices are governed by section 133 of the British North America Act of 1867.

[8] The *Annual Reports of the Commissioner of Official Languages*, published by the Department of Supply and Services in Ottawa and written in attractive journalese, contain useful information on the status of implementation of official bilingualism. See William W. Bostock, "The Commissioner of Official Languages: A Canadian Response to a Situation of Ethno-linguistic Cleavage," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 3 (October 1980).

[9] See Province of Ontario, Office of the Government Coordinator of French Language Services, "Implementation of French Language Services," mimeographed (Toronto, 16 November 1979).

[10] Government of Canada, Official Languages Branch, Treasury Board, *Revised Official Languages Policies of the Public Services of Canada* (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1977).

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that the agencies of the federal government would have to begin to provide services in French outside Quebec, a very considerable change from the prevailing practice of using English only.

To implement this policy the Bilingualism and Biculturalism Commission recommended and the OLA incorporated the notion of "bilingual districts." Wherever official language minorities equal or exceed 10 percent, bilingual districts were to be established in which services would be provided in both languages. Despite the efforts of two successive advisory boards to delimit appropriate districts, this policy has not been implemented and indeed has been abandoned.[11] The principal reason for this failure has been the opposition of the provinces. Provincial governments fear that the presence of federal bilingual districts would impose irresistible pressure on them to follow suit. They are reluctant to do so, for both financial and political reasons. Even the federalist Liberal party government of Quebec objected to the designation of Montreal as a federal bilingual district, despite its large Anglophone minority (34 percent) and despite the fact that services have been provided in English, by both the federal and provincial governments, for more than two centuries. The provincial government objected because the designation of a federal bilingual district would create in the province a contradictory language regime, Quebec having adopted French in 1974 as its sole official language.

After postponing action for two years following the report of its second advisory board, the federal government in September 1977 quietly dropped the concept of bilingual districts and decided not to activate that provision of the OLA, "primarily because bilingual services are generally available in areas likely to be considered for inclusion in any bilingual districts and because of the difficulty of formally delimiting boundaries which would result in a consistent and equitable treatment of minority official language populations."[12] Instead of setting the example that provinces would be induced to follow, the federal government was compelled by provincial intransigence and the absence of supportive constituencies to abandon one of the major instrumentalities that it had written into law.

The federal government has been most successful in extending public services in both languages in the national capital region, where it can exercise maximum influence. Elsewhere in English-speaking areas progress has been slow, but gradual. The annual reports of the commissioner of official languages detail the steady pressure on federal agencies and crown corporations in response to public complaints and investigations to extend services in French. Radio and television service is increasingly available in minority official languages, and there is substantial evidence that federal agencies are learning how to deal with French-speaking minorities in Nova Scotia and Manitoba as effectively as they

[11] The reports of the two Bilingual Districts Advisory Boards were issued in 1972 and 1975 respectively by Information Canada. See Kenneth McRae, "Bilingual Language Districts in Finland and Canada: Adventures in the Transplanting of an Institution," *Canadian Public Policy* 4 (Summer 1978): 331–51.

[12] Government of Canada, Treasury Board, *Revised Official Languages Policies*, p. 12.

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have dealt over the years with English speakers in Quebec. The important questions that have emerged are whether and how provincial services, which tend to be more important than federal services to the average Canadian, will be available in the official minority languages; and whether French minority communities, even if provided with public services in their mother tongue, can survive in an industrialized society where their language has little or no economic value.

Government Employment in the Employee's Language of Choice

This principle can be summarized as follows: "Canadians of the two official language groups should have equitable opportunities for employment and a career in the federal institutions of government, and to carry out their work in the official language of their choice. . . . the two official language groups should participate equitably in the federal institutions of government."[13]

The Bilingualism and Biculturalism Commission recommended that Francophones be equitably represented in the federal public services both in numbers and levels of responsibility. While rejecting formal quotas, the commission proposed the policy of "balanced participation." In accepting this concept, the government encountered the dilemmas of all affirmative-action programs: how to achieve numerical proportionality without risking reverse discrimination against better qualified members of the majority community, and how to prevent deterioration in standards of recruitment, staff morale, and the quality of public services.[14] Under pressure from the civil service unions, the federal government has resolutely maintained that there will be no compromise with the "merit system" of recruitment and personnel management.

The federal Public Service Commission has made special efforts to recruit from French-speaking universities. In addition, a number of Francophones originally brought to Ottawa as political appointees have subsequently been incorporated ("parachuted") into the permanent civil service. The results have been a gradual but palpable movement toward proportionality. According to the Public Service Commission, the Francophone presence in government service by 1977 stood at 27 percent, slightly higher than the French-speaking proportion of the population. In the officer category the proportion reached 22.7 percent.[15] Despite this improvement, the commission noted that a disproportionate number of Francophones in the higher grades work in service depart-

[13] Ibid.

[14] Charges of reverse discrimination and reduced efficiency abound in the popular literature but are hard to document. For one account, see Gerald Porter, *In Retreat: The Canadian Forces in the Trudeau Years* (Toronto: Deneau and Greenberg, 1979).

[15] Public Service Commission of Canada, *Annual Report* (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1977), pp. 25–29. Dennis Olson finds that among political and bureaucratic elites at both federal and provincial levels there is a "British-French Alliance," both groups being proportionately overrepresented. See "The State Elites," in *The Canadian State: Political Economy and Political Power*, ed. Leo Panitch (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977).

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ments and language-related activities, that relatively few are employed in scientific and technical activities, and that only 14.1 percent use French most frequently at work. Compared with the dismal picture painted by the Bilingualism and Biculturalism Commission a decade earlier, however, and despite severe competition from the rapidly expanding public sector in Quebec, this performance constitutes notable progress. It is no longer exceptional to encounter Francophones in senior positions in the armed forces or the federal civil agencies.

The Bilingualism and Biculturalism Commission also sought to make French a language of work so that French speakers could serve the government in an environment that reflects their own cultural milieu. Thus a more representative bureaucracy would increasingly reflect the bilingual and bicultural realities of Canada. The principal instrument for carrying out this policy, the "basic organizing and management principle" advocated by the Bilingualism and Biculturalism Commission, would be "French language units" (FLUs), in which the internal language of work and of communication would be French. The commission rejected the notion that large numbers of civil servants would have to become bilingual. In recognition of sociological realities, the great majority would work in unilingual English or French language units. Only officials involved in cross-boundary relationships between English and French language units or supervising such units would have to be bilingual. While recognizing the benefits of individual bilingualism, the commission endorsed the alternative principle of "institutional bilingualism." "The service is obligated to be bilingual; the Canadian citizen is not—nor is the Canadian public servant. The Federal Public Service itself must be bilingual. . . . some members of its staff will have to be bilingual, however, many will continue to need only one language. . . . thus as a bilingual institution the federal administration must contain organizational arrangements designed to ensure that individuals can work and develop professionally in their own language."[16]

There has been continuing tension between the policies of individual and institutional bilingualism. Pursuant to the Parliamentary Resolution of 23 June 1973, which dealt with language of work, the Treasury Board, on the advice of the departments, designated 53,000 positions as bilingual—19 percent of the federal total of which 45 percent were in the national capital region. The designation of so large a number of positions seemed to tilt in the direction of individual bilingualism. The government expanded its full-time language-training programs, both for unilingual incumbents of bilingual posts and for unilingual appointees who indicated a willingness to undergo training in a second language.

Two years later the government attempted to promote FLUs, but operating departments resisted this effort as being administratively unworkable. Moreover, it drew unexpectedly little support from French-speaking civil servants, many of whom looked upon the FLUs as deadened ghettos. In September 1977,

[16] Bilingualism and Biculturalism Commission, Book 3, *The Work World*, p. 90.

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French language units were abandoned and the policy of individual bilingualism once again came to the fore. These changes were among the government's actions in response to escalating criticisms of the administration of its language-training programs as ineffective and wasteful of public funds. According to its critics, too many jobs were designated as bilingual, language-training programs were poorly adapted to the specific needs of mid-career civil servants, and the quality of teaching at the government's language-training centers was amateurish.[17] Consequently, according to the *Annual Report of the Commissioner of Official Languages* in 1975, "the very great majority of Anglophone graduates are not using their 'Federal French' to an extent most people would think worthwhile." Only 7 percent used French more than 30 percent of the time, and 91 percent either never used it or used it only occasionally. The prescription was to reduce drastically the number of bilingual positions, improve the level and quality of training for the reduced number requiring bilingual skills, and concentrate on the longer-term goal of improving the linguistic skills that Canadians bring to the civil service by emphasizing language training in secondary schools.[18]

In response to this criticism, the government eliminated French language units and cut back on language training, but did not succeed in reducing the number of positions designated as bilingual. The current theme is improved individual bilingualism. Until 1983, unilingual incumbents and appointees to bilingual positions will continue to be eligible for language training, but some positions will be designated as "imperative bilingual." Appointees to these posts must be linguistically fully qualified. By 1983, when the conversion to bilingual federal services will be completed, government officials anticipate that all incumbents and most applicants will meet the language qualifications of their positions so that the size and scope of language-training activities can be drastically reduced. Responsibility for implementing official language policies has been devolved to the operating departments under guidelines provided by the central administrative agencies.

The costs of official bilingualism reached $503 million (Canadian) for the fiscal year 1978/79, about 1 percent of the total federal budget.[19] In the financial crunch of September 1978 when the government decided to reduce public expenditures by 5 percent as an anti-inflation measure, the bilingual programs were cut back by 20 percent, or about $100 million.[20] In a determined effort to achieve an irreversible movement toward a bilingual public service, the Trudeau government was extremely generous in its financial allocations for public service

[17] Independent Study on the Language Training Programmes of the Public Service of Canada (under the direction of Dr. Gilles Bibeau), *General Report* (n.p., n.d.).

[18] *Annual Report of the Commissioner of Official Languages, 1975*, p. 8.

[19] Government of Canada, Treasury Board, *News Release*, Estimates Fact Sheet no. 8, 22 February 1978.

[20] Among other cuts, the controversial "bilingual bonus" of $800 annually for bilingually qualified staff members was eliminated. Government of Canada, Treasury Board, *News Release*, 5 October 1978.

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language training. Its failure to insist on effective cost and quality controls exposed these programs to political attack and left them vulnerable to budgetary reductions. Nevertheless, impressive results have been achieved. Qualified bilingual incumbents in bilingual jobs increased from 53 percent in May 1974 to 80 percent in September 1977. Francophone employees are much more disposed than in the past to use French at work, especially in Ottawa where half the positions have been designated bilingual.

Federal Grants for Language Education and for Multiculturalism

There is broad consensus among opinion makers in Canada that intergroup understanding could be encouraged if the individual Canadian were to develop facility in the second official language. Since more than a third of French-Canadians know English, the target is the 95 percent of Anglophones who know no French. If more Anglophone applicants for bilingual positions were already qualified in French, the need for expensive government-sponsored language-training programs would be greatly reduced, and so would the hostility of civil servants to the bilingual regime.

In 1970 the federal government began to subsidize second-language teaching in public schools, an activity controlled by the provinces. Federal grants to provinces for that purpose now exceed $200 million a year. Yet the commissioner of official languages noted that between 1970 and 1975 the percentage of Anglophone high-school students studying French actually fell from 55 to 42 percent.[21] The federal government has expressed the hope that by 1983 there will be enough bilingual applicants to warrant the elimination of "conditional appointments" to bilingual positions.[22] Yet the indifferent response of high-school and college students to the opportunity to learn French makes this a precarious prediction, unless the Anglophone majority is to be underrepresented in bilingual positions, including most of the senior policymaking posts in Ottawa. While the federal government has invested generously in subsidies to provincial secondary schools for training programs in a second language, the governments of English-speaking provinces have not responded to the national bilingual policy by making French a required subject for high-school graduation or for admission to universities.

Persons of non-Anglo Saxon, non-French origin exceed the number of French speakers in Canada. In many areas, especially west of Ontario, there are relatively few Francophones. Substantial proportions of the population are of Ukrainian, German, and Scandanavian origin. Even in Ontario, outside the French bastions in the north and east, and particularly in metropolitan Toronto, "neo-Canadians"—Italians, Greeks, Jews, Slavs and, more recently, Asian immigrants—greatly outnumber French speakers. The Bilingualism and Briculturalism Commission, committed to the concept of confederation as a

[21] *Annual Report of the Commissioner of Official Languages, 1975*, p. 28.

[22] Government of Canada, Treasury Board, *Revised Official Languages Policies*, p. 26.

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compact or "partnership" between the two "founding races," resisted pressures to accord official status to any of these languages.

With minor exceptions in Quebec, immigrants have accepted English as the language of Canada. Having given up any claim to official status for their ancestral languages, which they are rapidly abandoning, new immigrants tend to be quite unsympathetic to public policy that confers any higher status on French or compels them to learn French for any purpose. The French, they believe, are another ethnic minority that should accommodate, as they have, to the North American majority.

The commission recommended measures by which the federal government might provide encouragement and financial support for institutions that would help to maintain and perpetuate minority cultures and languages as part of the "cultural mosaic" of which Canadians are proud and which they believe distinguishes Canada from the so-called melting pot practice of the United States.[23] The federal government has adopted multiculturalism, administered by a minister of state. Modest sums of about $5 million per year have been made available to this office to subsidize, support, and strengthen the institutions of minority cultural groups, including the ethnic press, radio and television broadcasts, cultural events, and publications about the contribution of ethnic minorities to the building of Canada. The government has mobilized a constituency of ethnic intellectuals and community leaders to participate in multicultural programs and to share its modest benefits.[24] The political purpose, of course, has been to protect the flanks of the official languages policy at relatively low financial cost from groups that have little reason to favor it and might be in a position to do it harm.

Administrative Success, Political Standoff

In those areas where the writ of the federal government prevails, where it need not rely on cooperation by provincial governments, the official languages programs have registered impressive administrative successes. In the space of a decade, language behavior within federal institutions has changed: public services are increasingly available in both languages; French is used as a language of work; and an increasing proportion of staff members at all ranks come from backgrounds where French is the native language. Yet outside the federal government, bilingual policies have had rough sailing. These policies have not been accepted in English-speaking provinces where difficulties were anticipated, or in Quebec where they were not. They have not brought the "two solitudes" together, nor have they blunted French-Canadian nationalism. But while they have not insured the unity of Canada, that unity would have been at much

[23] Bilingualism and Biculturalism Commission, Book 4, *The Cultural Contribution of the Other Ethnic Groups.*

[24] K. G. O'Bryan, J. G. Reitz, and O. M. Kuplowska, *Non-Official Languages: A Study in Canadian Multiculturalism* (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services, 1976).

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greater risk without official bilingualism, for this would have symbolized the inferior status of the French minority.

The OLA in 1969 and the Parlimentary Resolution of 1973 were enacted with all-party backing, despite lukewarm support among Western Canadian politicians of all political persuasions.[25] Canada's political elites of all parties, all economic sectors, and all language backgrounds, were committed to the survival of the confederation; all the political parties were interested in Quebec votes, which seemed to depend on a position supporting equality for the French language. The all-party entente, in the context of Canada's practice of party discipline, prevented opposition to official language policies from surfacing as a legitimate political issue. With a few exceptions, opposition was expressed in Parliment only by back-benchers, and their questions focused on alleged inefficiency, wastefulness, and overzealous administration, not on the policy itself. Moreover, the political elites successfully mobilized elites of other sectors—journalists; educators; clergy; financial, industrial, and labor leaders—into an elite phalanx that supported the official language policy as an expression of enlightened citizenship and a prerequisite to the future of a united Canada. But this impressive elite mobilization was insufficient to persuade public majorities either in Quebec or the English-speaking provinces.

The federal parties that supported official bilingualism were manifestly unable to bind their provincial counterparts. The Quebec government, which in 1974 formally adopted a unilingual regime, was of the same Liberal persuasion as the federal governments of Pearson and Trudeau that had vigorously attempted to extend Quebec's informal bilingualism to all of Canada. Nor could the federal government, by precept or example or even by financial subsidies, induce or coerce provincial governments, New Brunswick excepted, to concede more than limited cooperation. While the English-speaking provinces have gradually yielded some services, especially in education, to their French-language minorities, none has been willing to accept bilingual districts.

English speakers have felt that they, the majority, were being asked to bear all the material and symbolic costs of a program that they did not consider necessary, in order to buy support for Canada from an unreasonable and undeserving minority. In effect, they believed they were being blackmailed. When the representatives of that minority, the government of Quebec, turned their backs dramatically on bilingualism in 1974, the prospects for a bilingual regime, nationwide, were effectively doomed. A significant straw in the wind was the resignation of Trudeau's minister of defense, James Richardson, less than a year after the enactment of Bill 22 (which declared French the sole official language of Quebec); the specific reason that this Winnipeg lawyer offered for his resignation was opposition to Trudeau's insistence on Canada-wide bilingualism. If Quebec insisted on denying bilingual status to English—despite a long tradition of bilingual practice—why should the English-speaking provinces

[25] Only seventeen members of Parliament, led by former Prime Minister John Diefenbaker, voted against the OLA.

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accord equal status to French? The major failure of the Bilingualism and Biculturalism Commission's strategy was its inability to appreciate the dynamics at work among younger French-speaking opinion leaders in Quebec.

Rejection in Quebec

There is a massive literature on the Quiet Revolution that brought new elites to power in Quebec in 1960. These elites were committed to modernization, secularization, and the use of the state as the engine of rapid economic development, cultural assertion, increased autonomy, and a greater role for Quebec in international affairs. French-Canadian nationalism, epitomized by the slogan "maîtres chez-nous" (masters in our own house), was a factor in provoking the Quiet Revolution and in turn was reenforced by the political successes of Quebec's governments during the 1960s.[26]

On language policy and practice, two major themes surfaced with the Quiet Revolution. The first was the use of French as a language of work in modern industrial, financial, and commerical enterprises in Quebec. As the Bilingualism and Biculturalism Commission demonstrated, the modern sector of Quebec's economy was characterized by ethnic stratification—English in the board room, French on the factory floor.[27] Modern sector firms were owned primarily by English speakers and operated at the professional and management levels almost exclusively in the English language. Persons of French ethnic origin were underrepresented and discriminated against. When admitted to professional or managerial positions they were compelled to use English, a second language that handicapped them professionally, subjected them to pressures to assimilate, and symbolized the inferior status of their community.

While the ethnic and linguistic stratification had been accepted as inevitable by previous dominant elites in Quebec, especially the clergy, it could not be tolerated by the emergent elites of the Quiet Revolution. Not only was it symbolically offensive that in their national homeland the language of the majority should be condemned to second-class status in the world of business, but there were instrumental factors as well. The Quiet Revolution represented the aspirations of a growing educated group that rejected the traditional economic division of labor, insisted on gaining access to high-income employment, and aspired to bring Quebec's economy under their control.[28] While the rapid expansion of the activities of the government of Quebec opened thousands of good jobs to members of this group, their eyes were also on corporate head-

[26] A good English-language summary and interpretation of the Quiet Revolution is Dale Posgate and Kenneth McRoberts, *Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976).

[27] Bilingualism and Biculturalism Commission, Books 3a and 3b, *The Work World*. These facts are further detailed in the lengthy *Report of the Commission of Enquiry on the Position of the French Language and French Language Rights in Quebec* (Quebec: Government of Quebec, 1972).

[28] Hubert Guindon, "Two Cultures: An Essay on Nationalism, Class and Ethnic Tension," in *Contemporary Canada*, ed. Richard H. Leach (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1967).

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quarters in downtown Montreal which represented economic power. They demanded the right to compete for these positions and to use their native language in their work—a situation that would require these enterprises to convert to French as the dominant language of work.

The Bilingualism and Biculturalism Commission reflected at length on the employment discrimination that French speakers in Quebec encountered outside the church and the provincial government. They urged that French be increasingly used as a language of work, but that the transformation be accomplished gradually and voluntarily by business enterprises, with assistance and encouragement by the federal and especially the Quebec governments. The emerging Quebec elites, however, would not be pacified by gradual or voluntary measures. Already one faction, with the support of much of Quebec's educated youth, had formed a new party led by the popular René Lévesque that demanded political independence and sovereignty for Quebec. The political momentum was growing and pressures on the Quebec government to move toward French only were becoming irresistible.

The second theme that became prominent during this period was the idea of French as an "endangered language" and an "endangered culture" in North America, even in Quebec. Behind this notion which gained increasing credence among Quebec intellectuals were two factors, both derived from the rapid urbanization and modernization of French-speaking society. The first was the sudden and precipitous decline in the fertility of French-Canadians. For three-hundred years French-Canadians had maintained the highest birth rate in the world. Despite a massive inflow of immigrants, 90 percent of whom acculturated to English, and despite the emigration of a million Quebeckers to New England late in the nineteenth century, French-Canadians had maintained their proportion of Canada's population at about 30 percent for more than a century. Suddenly, the birth rate plummeted and leveled off in the 1960s at slightly below the Canadian average. At this point French-Canadian intellectuals began to contemplate the nightmare of "minorization." Since immigrants who customarily adopt English represented the dynamic growth factor in the demography of Quebec, fear was expressed that French-Canadians might gradually lose their majority, first in Montreal and eventually in the province.[29] Minority status in Quebec or even in Montreal would doom French culture in North America. The solution, according to leaders of the Quiet Revolution, was to compel immigrants in Quebec to acculturate to the French language and specifically to educate their children in French medium schools. Parental freedom of choice about the medium of education, a long-standing practice in Quebec that the Bilingualism and Biculturalism Commission endorsed, would have to be eliminated. In this way the risks of eventual demographic minorization would be reduced.

Another factor was the growing fear of assimilation for a minority-language

[29] For a balanced and scholarly treatment of this subject, see Jacques Henripin, *Immigration and Language Imbalance* (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1974).

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community in a North-American urban-industrial environment. When most French-Canadians lived as "habitants" in isolated farming communities under the close surveillance of their priests, both the Catholic faith and the French language were secure. In an urbanized and secularized environment, however, opportunities in government, science, and business are much more readily available in English than in French. The mass media are suffused with English-language messages, content, and styles from Canada and especially the United States. The only protection for the French language under these conditions, it was felt, must be a certain degree of self-segregation; and such self-segregation would be impossible under a bilingual language regime. Quebec, therefore, must become a unilingual French-speaking society. Though Trudeau and his intellectual allies ridiculed the idea that French was endangered in North America and pointed to the unprecendented vigor and creativity of French-language education, literature, and performing arts, the idea nevertheless took hold among French-Canadian nationalists and found its way into public policy.

To promote and protect the French language and French culture it would be necessary to concentrate on Quebec. There alone the resources of the state were available to act on behalf of Francophone society. The relevant arena of action thus was not Canada, but Quebec. Bilingualism might be a good thing in the rest of Canada, but it was no answer to the needs of Quebec's majority. Moreover, prospects for maintaining French-speaking communities outside Quebec, except perhaps for neighboring New Brunswick and northeastern Ontario, were very problematical because a language will wither when it has no economic value. The data were ominous. The rate of assimilation among the ethnic French outside Quebec approached 30 percent per generation and the trend seemed irreversible.[30] The modest and temporary encouragement that official bilingualism could provide for these scattered communities was far too limited to warrant the grave risks that a bilingual regime would entail in Quebec.

These views are by no means unanimously held in Quebec. The liberal Trudeau rejects them entirely. To him the destiny of French-Canadians lies not in self-segregation, not in the substitution of inward-looking nationalism and an authoritarian state for an authoritarian and reactionary clergy, but in the opportunity for French-Canadians to participate as equals in all dimensions of endeavor everywhere in Canada.[31] Others take an intermediate position between the liberal and the nationalist views, but the nationalists have carried the day on language policy. A consensus has developed that French must become the official and in fact the dominant language in Quebec.

By 1974 the federalist provincial Liberal party determined that its best tactic against the growing threat from the separatist *Parti Québécois* was to take a militant position on the issue of language. Brushing aside the objections of

[30] Data from the 1971 census indicate that 1.4 million people outside Quebec are of French ethnic origin; 925,000 come from French-speaking families; but only 675,000 now speak French regularly in their homes.

[31] Trudeau's position on this subject, to which he has adhered, is expressed in his manifesto *Federalism and the French Canadians* (Toronto: MacMillans, 1967).

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English speakers, on 31 July 1974 Bill 22 was enacted into law.[32] It declared French to be the sole official language of Quebec, provided that all professionals licensed by the province must qualify in the French language, required that large and medium-size enterprises convert to French at the managerial level and increase the number of French speakers in their ranks, and decreed that all children of immigrants who cannot demonstrate a working knowledge of English henceforth attend French medium schools. The Liberal party's inept administration of the educational provisions of Bill 22 resulted in violent protest among Italian immigrants in Montreal who had borne much of the impact of the new law. This contributed to the spectacular victory of the *Parti Québécois* in November 1976.[33] The first and most symbolic legislative project of the *Parti Québécois* government was its Charter of the French language, Bill 101 of August 1977.[34] This was a radical piece of legislation designed to confirm in every area of life the dominant position of the French language. For example, it denied English-language education even to English-speaking immigrants from elsewhere in Canada unless one of their parents had been educated in English-language schools in Quebec. It discontinued the practice of issuing judicial decisions and publishing official versions of legislation in English—a measure subsequently declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of Canada.[35] Its fundamental provisions, however, merely extended and made imperative the basic policies enacted three years previously by the federalist Liberal government. Federalist and separatist opinion are in agreement that French must be the official and dominant language in Quebec and that official bilingualism is no longer an option. The main differences are what rights should be conceded to the English-language minority.[36]

The political and economic consequences of the direction that Quebec has taken on language policy are already evident, but their magnitudes cannot be determined. Montreal's once proud and powerful Anglophone community numbering a million, whose elites until World War II dominated Canada's economy, now feels threatened by political forces over which they have little influence. Quebec's economy, already the victim of forces that have moved the

[32] National Assembly of Quebec, Thirtieth legislature, 2d sess. Bill no. 22, Official Language Act, assented to 31 July 1974. For a review of the history of Bill 22, see Michael Stein, "Bill 22 and the Non-Francophone Population in Quebec," in *Quebec's Language Policies: Background and Response,* ed. John R. Mallea (Ville de Laval, Quebec: Laval University, International Center for Research in Bilingualism, 1977).

[33] With 41 percent of the popular vote against a divided opposition, the *Parti Québécois* won a comfortable majority of seats in the National Assembly.

[34] Assemblee Nationale du Quebec, Thirty-first Legislature, 2d. sess., assented to 20 August 1977.

[35] On December 13, the Supreme Court held that Chapter III of Title One of Bill 101 violated section 133 of the British North America Act, which requires that the proceedings of the Quebec legislature be published in both official languages.

[36] Claude Ryan, the leader of the Liberal party of Quebec, while opposed to the "abusive" provisions of Bill 101, has made it clear that Quebec must remain officially unilingual, but with guarantees for minority rights. See Montreal *Star*, 23 January 1978.

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center of Canada's economy to Toronto and even further west, is likely to be further strained. Sections of corporate headquarters, an important factor in Montreal's economy, have been moving out of the province to avoid the problems of working in French, as well as Quebec's high personal and corporate income taxes, and the ultimate threat of independence.[37] With little fanfare, however, a new and dynamic French-speaking managerial and financial bourgeoisie has emerged during the past two decades, attenuating the ethnic division of labor in the modern economy as described by the Bilingualism and Biculturalism Commission.

Ambivalence and Hostility in English Canada

That the English-speaking majority would treat official bilingualism with little enthusiasm was anticipated by those who shaped and implemented that policy. The raw Orange Order (with roots in militant Irish Protestantism) style anti-Catholicism of the middle and late nineteenth century has largely dissipated, but the great majority of English speakers regard Canada as an English-speaking country. They do not accept the notion that confederation was a compact or partnership between Canada's two "founding races," thus justifying equal and official status for both languages, but for these languages only. They consider it the duty of ethnic minorities, not excepting the French, to adjust to English. French might be used as a regional language in Quebec to cater to its French-speaking majority. But elsewhere in Canada it is wrong to "stuff French down our throats."

The popular majority of English speakers was not consulted about official bilingualism. In the Canadian style these decisions were taken by a small political elite that engineered an all-party agreement in order to minimize public controversy on a sensitive issue. Canadians began to encounter the new policy when they saw unfamiliar bilingual signs on federal buildings and bilingual labels on groceries and drug products, and when they observed civil servants being forced to learn French in order to hold their jobs and read about alleged discrimination against English-speaking employees. They heard about the costs of bilingualism at a time of inflation and generalized complaints about high taxes. The mood was skeptical and varied in different parts of the country, but it was not necessarily hostile. A survey in July 1977 indicated that 83 percent of respondents, including more than 75 percent in every province, agreed that "all Canadians should have the right to receive services from the Federal government in either English or French"; 81 percent agreed that all provinces should, where practicable, provide public education in either language for those who

[37] The economic and employment effects of Quebec's policy and uncertainties about its future political status are contentious issues. The C.D. Howe Institute, in a study prepared by Fernand Martin, "Montreal: An Economic Perspective" (1979), estimates the probable loss of corporate headquarters jobs at between 20,000 and 70,000, depending on government policy.

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desire it.[38] The increasing willingness of English-speaking provincial governments to provide elementary and secondary education in the French medium seems to reflect this attitude.

English speakers do not, however, concede the equal status of the two languages in areas with English-speaking majorities or indeed in Canada as a whole. The 1977 survey also indicated that 80 percent of English speakers believe English should be the more important language. Bilingualism, nationwide, seems to be offensive to their view of what Canada represents. They concede the use of French in public services when the minority requests it, but will not accord it equal status.[39] And in their less generous moods, when they are irritated by inflation or wage and price control or when they are annoyed by what they consider the imperious personality of a French-Canadian prime minister who is strongly identified with "French power," they turn on official bilingualism as a convenient scapegoat.

The one group that has borne the brunt of official bilingualism has been English-speaking federal civil servants. Many of them accept bilingual requirements as politically necessary but resent the special strain that it imposes on them and the threat they perceive to their careers. As disciplined bureaucrats they have limited opportunities to articulate their anxieties except through their unions. They have, however, spoken at the polls beginning in their general election of 1972 when the Liberal party lost two normally Liberal seats in Ottawa ridings with large civil service constituencies in what was generally regarded as a protest against the bilingual programs. The abandonment of French language units and the decision to devolve the administration of bilingual programs to the departments were concessions to English-speaking civil servants. As greater percentages of the incumbents of bilingual positions achieve bilingual competence, however, this source of opposition has begun to decline.

In a more perverse mood many English speakers sympathized with the challenge of the Canadian Airline Pilot's Association to the official language policy. Canada's airline pilots, 94 percent Anglophone, are a highly organized, powerful, and independent group neither beholden to nor controlled by Canada's political elites. When the federal government attempted to extend bilingualism to air traffic control over the airspace of Quebec by authorizing ground-to-air communication in either official language, the pilots protested on safety grounds. The federal government was not requiring the pilots to know or to use French, but only permitting its use by consenting French-speaking pilots and ground controllers. When the government refused to comply with their insistence on English only, the pilots struck and paralysed air traffic throughout

[38] Survey conducted by Goldfarb Associates of Montreal and Toronto and published in *The Searching Nation*, (Toronto: Southam Press, Ltd., 1977).

[39] A Gallup poll published in the Toronto *Star*, 9 April 1977, reported that two-thirds of English speakers were opposed to any further bilingual measures intended to prevent the separation of Quebec.

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Canada for ten days during June 1976. They returned to work only after the federal government agreed to suspend bilingualism in air traffic operations over Montreal pending a thorough examination of the implications of bilingual communication for air safety. This capitulation by the federal government to English intransigence became a cause célèbre in Quebec and was used effectively by the *Parti Québécois* in their successful election campaign a few months later. To Quebec nationalists it demonstrated that the federal government will always yield to a determined English majority, even when they are in violation of the law and regardless of the merits of the case; only an independent Quebec can be relied on to protect French rights and interests. Though English-speaking elites deplored this strike, it evoked widespread sympathy among English-speaking publics. Yet three years later, in a more temperate mood, the pilots and air controllers acquiesced in the decision of the short-lived Clark government, acting on the unanimous recommendation of the commission of inquiry, to convert to bilingual air traffic control over the airspace of Quebec.[40]

The Future: Bilingual Center, Unilingual Regions

A decade of experience with official bilingualism has demonstrated that the design of the Bilingualism and Biculturalism Commission as incorporated in the OLA will not be acceptable to either of Canada's language communities. The decisive event was the repudiation of bilingualism by Quebec when it enacted Bill 22 in 1974. This act undermined the moral rationale for bilingualism in English Canada and made it difficult for Trudeau and his associates to promote this policy convincingly to skeptical mass publics and unresponsive provincial governments. The fatal flaw in the commission's design was its inability to appreciate the emergent political forces in Quebec whose grievances bilingualism was intended to pacify. Earlier generations of French-Canadians who had witnessed the hanging of Louis Riel in 1885, the attenuation of rights to use the French language in Manitoba in 1890, and anti-French policies in Ontario in 1913 might have welcomed the commission's formula as a just and generous move on the part of the English-language majority. In the environment of Quebec, 1970, it was too little too late.

Experience in ethnic conflict management, in such countries as India, Belgium, Switzerland, and Yugoslavia, points to a set of practices that are consistent with trends now under way in Canada.[41] The first of these is *territorial unilingualism*. The official language of a territorial unit, in Canada's case a province, is the language of its majority. In Quebec it is now French and so it will remain. In the other provinces, except for New Brunswick and perhaps

[40] "Victory for Francophones: Ottawa Agrees to Bilingual Air Control over Quebec," *Toronto Globe and Mail,* 22 August 1979.

[41] For examples in Belgium, Switzerland, and Yugoslavia, see Milton J. Esman, ed., *Ethnic Conflict in the Western World* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1977).

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Manitoba, it will continue to be English.[42] Concessions can be made to official language minorities, especially in education and judicial procedures. One of the educative effects of the official languages experience during the past decade has been to persuade the majority of English speakers that some such rights ought to be accorded to French-speaking minorities, so long as costs are not excessive. The main problems will be the French-speaking minority in Ontario and the Anglophone minority in neighboring Quebec. Neither is likely to enjoy equality of language status at the provincial level or the full range of provincial services, as the Bilingualism and Biculturalism Commission advocated and as Trudeau has hoped. Rights to public services in minority languages will be worked out primarily by provincial political processes, and may be moderated as an exercise in reciprocity by interprovincial negotiation. Thus, the provincial premiers, meeting in Montreal in February 1978, agreed in principle that primary and secondary education should be provided in the official language of their choice to children of French- and English-language minorities wherever numbers warrant. Quebec's de facto policy of continuing to provide services in English for its English-speaking minority is a convincing precedent.

Complementing official unilingualism in the provinces, the federal government and its institutions will have to reflect the linguistic duality of the country both symbolically and in practice. Thus certain practices proposed by the commission and instituted by the OLA—*parity* in status, *proportionality* in representation, and *availability* of federal services in both languages—will have to be maintained and in some cases further developed. There is a growing consensus that the business of the federal government must be carried out in both languages.[43] Outside Ottawa, the prevailing language of *federal* services will be the majority language of the province, with facilities for service to official language minorities where there is significant demand. In these respects the administrative successes of the past decade in institutionalizing a bilingual regime at the federal level will serve Canada well. The administrative infrastructures have been established by the federal government and are no longer objects of political controversy. At the broader level of developing *individual* bilingual skills through federal subsidies to provincial educational systems, such activities seem likely to continue because they are universally considered to be desirable

[42] On 13 December 1979, the same day that it overturned the offending provisions of Quebec's Bill 101, the Supreme Court held Manitoba's Official Languages Act of 1890 to be in violation of the Federal Manitoba Act of 1870 under which the province was admitted to the confederation. The 1870 act mandated equal official status for both languages. What Manitoba will do after ninety years to restore language rights to its small and declining French-speaking minority, 40,000 persons or 4 percent of the provincial total, is uncertain.

[43] These practices initiated during the Trudeau period were in no way abridged, nor were there any pressures to do so by the Progressive-Conservative government led by the Alberta Anglophone, Joe Clark, who succeeded Trudeau in May 1979. Clark's short-lived minority Conservative government was defeated in Parliament in December 1979 and replaced by Trudeau and the Liberals in the general election of February 1980.

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and impose only moderate costs. Among English speakers, bilingual skills will be instrumental in enhancing the constituency that is sensitive to the needs of Quebec and provide some of the linguistic resources and accommodative attitudes useful for those who seek careers in federal administration and federal-level politics.

In the Canadian pattern of federalism, where the constituent provinces enjoy considerable autonomy, it is impossible for the central government to impose policies against the will of determined majorities on subjects within the constitutional competence of the provinces. Language is such a subject. Because language issues can mobilize determined majorities, federal states tend to follow the territorial rather than the personality principle of official language use. The politically dominant group in any area determines the status of language.[44] The victims of this pattern are official language minorities residing within the constitutent units. In Canada, however, there appears to be an emerging consensus that while they should not be granted parity or official status in the provinces, some public services, both federal and provincial, should be available in the official minority language, where this is administratively feasible. Especially in Ontario and Quebec, where the numbers are significant, this appears to be the likely settlement.

Bilingualism at the center, and offical unilingualism with pragmatic concessions to official language minorities in the provinces—this is the direction in which Canada seems to be moving after a decade of experimentation and conflict under the OLA. While this may disappoint those who, like Trudeau and the Bilingualism and Biculturalism Commission, envisioned a regime of language equality based on the personality principle from the Atlantic to the Pacific, it is a pragmatic settlement that reconciles the preferences of majorities with the essential needs of minorities. This pattern does not contradict the concept of a single Canadian political nationality to which 80 percent of Canadians, including more than 50 percent of French Quebeckers, are apparently committed.[45] And the practice of federal bilingualism is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for the continued adherence of Quebec to the Canadian Confederation.[46] On 20 May 1980, 59 percent of Quebec's voters, including a majority of Francophones, rejected the *Parti Québécois*-sponsored referendum

[44] For a vigorous statement of this position see Jean Laponce, "Le Comportement Spatial des Groupes Linguistiques: Solutions Personnelles et Territoriales aux Problemes de Minorites" [The spatial behavior of language groups: personality and territorial solutions to minority problems], *International Political Science Review* 1, no. 4 (1980).

[45] Goldfarb Associates, *The Searching Nation*, p. 4. Eighty percent of Canadians, including slightly more than half of French-speaking Quebeckers, consider their primary identity to be "Canadian."

[46] Polling data during the past decade have indicated that no more than 20 percent of Quebeckers desire independence. The majority seem to favor some form of increased provincial autonomy—a view shared by most English-speaking provinces, especially in the West. For a discussion and summary of these issues and one point of view, see the three-volume *Report of the Task Force on National Unity* (Ottawa: Department of Supply and Services, 1979).

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that would have authorized the government of Quebec to initiate negotiations with Ottawa concerning a new regime of political sovereignty combined with economic association. This proposal clearly threatened the political unity of Canada. Fear of the economic consequences of separation was an important factor. Another reason for their preference for "renewed federalism" over "sovereignty-association" was the accommodative behavior of recent federal governments, both Liberal and Conservative, a major component of which has been the policy of official bilingualism.

As this article was going to press, the Parliament of Canada on 2 December 1981 enacted the Canada Act which, when approved by the British Parliament, will "patriate" the British North America Act of 1867 as amended, no longer requiring future approval of amendments in London. Included in the Canada Act is a "Charter of Rights" that both "entrenches" the practice of bilingualism by the federal government and requires the provincial governments, where numbers warrant, to provide elementary and secondary education (but not other services) in their minority official language to Candian citizens, but not to immigrants. Canadians will be able to challenge violations of these rights in the courts. Though the government of Quebec dissented vigorously from some provisions of the Canada Act, and though the federal Parliament and provincial legislatures are permitted to override specific provisions of the charter, there was no objection in principle to the language provisions. This reflects the emergence and the institutionalization of a national consensus on language policy along the lines outlined in this article.

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State Capacity and Economic Intervention in the Early New Deal

THEDA SKOCPOL
KENNETH FINEGOLD

The worldwide depression of the 1930s hit two capitalist industrial economies—Germany and the United States—hardest of all, and it spurred major political transformations in both nations. In Germany there was the jarring descent from parliamentary democracy into the Nazi dictatorship. No such radical change of regime occurred in the United States. Yet the "New Deal" of Franklin Delano Roosevelt's first two presidential terms (1933–1940) was one of the most innovative sets of measures put through by any of the liberal-democratic governments caught up in the maelstrom of the Great Depression. In the context of U.S. history, moreover, the New Deal—along with the national mobilizations for World Wars I and II—was a major watershed in the establishment of an economically interventionist national state.

Two of the New Deal's most ambitious efforts at economic intervention—one destined to be shortlived and the other to prove more enduring—were launched right at the start. Both the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) and the Agricultural Adjustment Act were passed by Congress in the spring of 1933, during the heady "Hundred Days" of intense legislative activity that followed FDR's inauguration amidst the depths of the depression. These acts were an extraordinary new departure for the U.S. national government, which abandoned

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its previous stance of minimal interference in the domestic market economy in favor of comprehensive attempts at administrative intervention.

Signed into law on 16 June 1933, the National Industrial Recovery Act was hailed by President Roosevelt as perhaps "the most important and far-reaching legislation ever enacted by the American Congress."[1] The NIRA's goal, according to the president, was "the assurance of a reasonable profit to industry and living wages for labor with the elimination of the piratical methods and practices which have not only harassed honest business but also contributed to the ills of labor."[2] Title I of the NIRA envisaged the pursuit of industrial recovery through the "united action of labor and management under adequate governmental sanctions and supervision." Industry by industry, "codes of fair competition" were to be drawn up to regulate production practices across enterprises. Moreover, each and every code was required to include provisions ensuring workers minimum wage and maximum hours, as well as a Section (7a) guarantee of the right of employees, "to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing."[3]

The Agricultural Adjustment Act actually preceded the NIRA: it was signed into law on 12 May 1933. More single-minded in purpose than the NIRA, it nevertheless undertook an equally challenging task. The act aimed to raise prices for "basic agricultural commodities"—raise prices, that is, in relation to the prices paid by farmers themselves for products of industry. The objective was nothing less than to change the overall economic relationship between commercial agriculture and industry in America. The Adjustment Act authorized government agencies to experiment with administrative controls over both production and marketing as well as over "rental or benefit payments" from the government to farmers who cooperated with public programs. All of this was doubly justified by the Roosevelt administration: first, as a new line of attack on the long-festering agricultural depression that had left farmers clamoring for government aid throughout the 1920s, and secondly, as a propitious route to national recovery from the post-1929 depression.[4]

Both acts declared very broad objectives and granted enormous authority—and leeway in legislative interpretation—to the executive branch. Essentially, the two acts mandated the establishment of authoritative new administrative organizations—the National Recovery Administration (NRA) and the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA)—through which economic functions formerly shaped by market competition would be planned and regulated in the public interest. The "voluntary" participation of farmers' com-

[1] *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, 13 vols., compiled by Samuel I. Rosenman (New York: Random House, 1938), 2:246.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Quoted from the text of the act, reproduced in Leverett S. Lyon et. al., *The National Recovery Administration: An Analysis and Appraisal*, 2 vols. (New York: Da Capo Press, 1972; originally 1935), 2:895.

[4] See *Papers of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, vol. 2, p. 74, for Roosevelt's remarks in his 16 March 1933 submission of the Agricultural Adjustment Act to Congress.

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mittees and trade associations was envisaged as the primary means for putting AAA and NRA programs into effect, but it was clear that the government had been granted authority to induce cooperation and coerce recalcitrants.[5] Moreover, government officials were allowed plenty of space to initiate plans and regulations to achieve the desired broad goals of recovery, stabilization, and relief. An advocate of public pianning like Rexford Tugwell could be forgiven for hoping in the spring of 1933 that the Recovery and Adjustment Acts had together opened the door for unprecedented government coordination and direction of the entire U.S. productive economy.

Indeed, imagine for a moment that these two acts had together fully achieved their declared objectives. If both acts had succeeded—and if their efforts could have been coordinated—the United States might have emerged from the depression by the mid-1930s as a centralized system of politically managed corporatist capitalism. The state would have been directly involved in planning prices and production levels and in allocating income shares to capitalists, workers, and farmers. Commerical farmers would have made income gains relative to industry, and industrial workers would have gained some sort of collective organization (but without rupturing in the process their subordinate and cooperative relationship to industrial management). Industrialists, meanwhile, would have enjoyed minimally competitive relationships with one another under the aegis of government supervision.

What actually happened was quite different. Despite the parallel broad grants of executive authority in the recovery and adjustment acts, the administrative organizations established under their provisions had sharply contrasting trajectories of development: the National Recovery Administration became, over time, increasingly unwieldy, conflict-ridden, and uncertain about its basic goals and preferred means for achieving them, while the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (to a much greater degree) sorted out its priorities, resolved a major internal contradiction of programs and personnel, streamlined its organizational structure, and launched ambitious new plans for the future. When the Supreme Court declared the first Adjustment Act unconstitutional, it was quickly replaced, whereas Title I of the NIRA was not reformulated after the Schechter decision of May 1935. In short, the early New Deal's agricultural program ended up being successfully institutionalized, but the industrial program did not. And the ulterior political consequences of the Recovery Act's failure and the Adjustment Act's success reverberated throughout the rest of the New Deal.

The collapse of the NIRA left thoroughly unintended legacies in its wake. On the one hand, the ideal of overall business coordination was shattered and gave way to an uneven pattern of government regulation across industries; a few industries achieved special government intervention to help rationalize competi-

[5] In the case of the AAA, two supplementary acts were later passed to *force* cooperation with certain production-control programs. These were the Bankhead Cotton Control Act and the Kerr-Smith Tobacco Control Act.

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tion in their own ranks, while most shied away from further "bureaucratic" entanglements.[6] On the other hand, the dream of harmony between corporate management and industrial labor dissolved into even more bitter conflict, first over the enforcement of NRA-sponsored code provisions protecting the interests of labor, and then over the emergence of labor unions independent of direct management control. These conflicts, moreover, fed back into the administrative and representative processes of government in ways that eventually led to the passage of the "Wagner" National Labor Relations Act to legalize independent labor unions.[7]

Meanwhile, the Agricultural Adjustment Administration proved much more successful in organizing commercial farmers for their own collective good than did the NRA at organizing industrial capitalists.[8] Between 1933 and 1936, the AAA contributed to raising farm prices toward "parity"—that is, raising farm prices relative to industrial prices so that the ratio approximated the pre–World War I standard of "prosperity" for American agriculture. What is more, commercial farmers, especially those of the South and Midwest, gained important political benefits as a by-product of AAA activities. A major farm lobby organization, the American Farm Bureau Federation (AFBF), was able to expand its operations in tandem with the local administration of production control programs under the AAA. In turn, from the mid-1930s on, the AFBF became pivotal in defending its own organizational interests and the class interests of commercial farmers. Whereas industrial capitalists ended up losing relative power to labor unions, commercial farmers were ultimately able to use well-institutionalized farm programs to beat back all challenges from the agricultural underclasses and to gain an enduring governmental niche within the post-New Deal political economy.

The full political effects of the Recovery Act's failure vis-à-vis the Adjustment Act's relative success cannot be explored in this article. But even to allude to these effects is to underline the importance of the fate of these two programs in the overall trajectory of the New Deal. Regardless of whether either program was successful in strictly economic terms,[9] it is obviously important to under-

[6] For the best general analysis of the NIRA, its failure, and the aftereffects, see Ellis W. Hawley, *The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966).

[7] The various strands connecting the NIRA (and its failure) to the formulation and passage of the Wagner Act are summarized in part 3 of Kenneth Finegold and Theda Skocpol, "Capitalists, Farmers, and Workers to the New Deal—The Ironies of Government Intervention" (Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 13 August 1980).

[8] A good overview of the New Deal's agricultural programs is Richard S. Kirkendall, "The New Deal and Agriculture," in *The New Deal: The National Level*, eds. John Braeman, Robert H. Bremner, and David Brody (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1975), pp. 83–109.

[9] For carefully reasoned assessments of the economic effects of the NRA and the AAA, see two Brookings reports: Lyon et. al., *National Recovery Administration*; and Edwin G. Nourse, Joseph S. Davis, and John D. Black, *Three Years of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1937). Observers doubt whether either the NRA or the AAA did much to promote *national* economic recovery. Yet the AAA seems to have contributed to the

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stand why the New Deal's initial effort to intervene in agriculture was institutionalized so much more successfully than its effort to regulate industry. This question becomes all the more intriguing when we realize that neither conventional pluralism nor conventional Marxism offers much help in answering it. Despite their sharp disagreements over the basic source and significance of power in society, both of these theoretical approaches seek to explain political outcomes in *socially determinist* ways. Thus pluralist theory suggests that the best organized interest groups in society, and those with access to the greatest political skills and resources, would be the ones to achieve their political goals in "the governmental process"—with the proviso, of course, that some compromise might have to be reached to satisfy other somewhat powerful and resourceful interests also involved in the political process.[10] As for Marxism, its various adherents would all tend to agree on one conclusion: capitalists as a class should benefit most from politics in capitalist society. Some Marxists would attribute this to capitalists' direct control over the state or political resources;[11] other neo-Marxists would say, instead, that the state can be expected to intervene "relatively autonomously" for the objective interests of the capitalist system (and class), regardless of whether or not capitalists control political decision making.[12] Either way, however, political outcomes (short of revolution) should work disproportionately to the benefit of capitalists.

But in light of these general expectations created by pluralism and Marxism, the paths of development of the National Industrial Recovery and Agricultural Adjustment Act cannot but seem surprising in various ways. To begin with the NIRA: Industrial capitalists were highly organized by 1932.[13] Not only were large firms formidable entities in their own right, there were also effective trade associations in many industries, and there were business-wide bodies such as the Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers. With remarkable unity from late 1931 on, industrialists and their representatives

raising of farm income while the increases in profits that capitalists had hoped would follow upon the stabilization of production and the regulation of conditions of competition under the NRA failed to materialize in many industries.

[10] For a classic statement of the pluralist position, see David B. Truman, *The Government Process*, 2d ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971; originally 1951).

[11] For example, Ralph Miliband, *The State in Capitalist Society* (New York: Basic Books, 1969).

[12] For various examples, see Nicos Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes*, trans. Timothy O'Hagen (London: New Left Books, 1973); Claus Offe, "Structural Problems of the Capitalist State," *German Political Studies* 1 (1974): 31–56; and John Holloway and Sol Picciotto, eds., *State and Capital: A Marxist Debate* (London: Edward Arnold, 1978).

[13] The 1920s was a period when many new trade associations were founded, and when trade association leaders took on increasingly important coordinative functions. On this latter point, see Louis Galambos, *Competition and Cooperation: The Emergence of a National Trade Association* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966). For statistics on waves of foundation of associations by U.S. capitalists, see Philippe C. Schmitter and Donald Brand, "Organizing Capitalists in the United States: The Advantages and Disadvantages of Exceptionalism" (Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 1979).

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pressed upon federal authorities a single major strategy for the recovery of American industry: the relaxation of the antitrust laws and government sponsorship for industry-by-industry cooperation to coordinate prices and regulate production levels and conditions of employment.[14] Indeed, through the National Industrial Recovery Act, industrial capitalists got pretty much what they asked for—and their control over the implementation of the recovery program was even more complete than was their influence in the legislative process that produced the NIRA. Yet, this program of government intervention, although tailored to the industrialists' specifications, nevertheless led or contributed to very unwanted outcomes for the capitalists: internecine political quarrels, threats of increased government supervision, and the legalization of independent labor unions.

Farmers in the United States were not as highly organized as industrialists at the beginning of the 1930s. And, perhaps even more important, competing "national" farmers' associations were pushing quite different programs for farm recovery as late as 1932.[15] During Roosevelt's presidential campaign and in the months between his election and inauguration, the major farm organizations—the Grange, the American Farm Bureau Federation, and the Farmers' Union—had to be coaxed into supporting the innovative production-control provisions that eventually became embodied in the Adjustment Act. (The Farmers' Union, in fact, ultimately refused to go along.) Yet, even though the ideas for key AAA programs did *not* originate with farmers or their interest-group representatives, farmers still ended up doing well, both economically and politically, under the New Deal's venture of government intervention in agriculture. Thus, in neither the case of the Adjustment Act or Recovery Act can the demands, the organization, or the class economic power of social groups directly explain the results of the New Deal government interventions affecting the interests of either farmers or industrialists. To accomplish such explanation, we must go beyond the social-determinist proclivities of conventional pluralism and conventional Marxism alike.

Our explanatory approach centers on the issue of *state capacity*. Decisions made by governments cannot always be carried through; there is no law guaranteeing that governmental authorities will attempt only those interventions that they really can execute. The administrative organization of government is crucial, especially when policies calling for increased government intervention are to be implemented. Governments that have, or can quickly assemble, their own knowledgeable administrative organizations are better able

[14] Hawley, *Problem of Monopoly*, chaps. 2 and 3; and Robert F. Himmelberg, *The Origins of the National Recovery Administration: Business, Government, and the Trade Association Issue, 1921–1933* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1976).

[15] Robert L. Tontz, "Memberships of General Farmers' Organizations, United States, 1874–1960," *Agricultural History* 38 (July 1964): 143–56; Gertrude Almy Slichter, "Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Farm Problem, 1929–1932," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 43 (September 1956): 238–58; and William R. Johnson, "National Farm Organizations and the Reshaping of Agricultural Policy in 1932," *Agricultural History* 37 (January 1963): 35–42.

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to carry through interventionist policies than are governments that must rely on extragovernmental experts and organizations. For historical reasons specified below, the U.S. national state in the early 1930s had greater capacity to intervene autonomously in the economic affairs of agriculture than in industry. Both the Recovery and Adjustment Acts pledged the early New Deal to grandiose objectives and granted broad interventionist authority to the government. But given the state capacities actually at hand, it explicably turned out that the NIRA promised the truly impossible, while the Adjustment Act set its sights, in part, on attainable goals.

The Weakness of the American State and the Failure of the National Recovery Administration

In his 1939 book, *Business Cycles*, Joseph Schumpeter underlined the absence of a previously entrenched "skilled civil service," an "experienced bureaucracy" in New Deal America: "As a rule, . . . reforming governments enjoy at least the advantage of having that indispensable tool ready at hand—in most historical instances it grew up along with the tendencies which they represent . . . In this country a new bureaucracy had suddenly to be created."[16] Nowhere was this more true than when it came to implementing the NIRA's program of industrial regulation. As Schumpeter's observation suggests, the National Recovery Administration can best be understood by focusing on the prior historical development of the U.S. state.

During the nineteenth century the U.S. national polity was uniquely "stateless." It was, as Stephen Skowronek has put it, a government of "courts and parties"—one that functioned remarkably well in an expanding, decentralized capitalist economy.[17] A potent judicial system regulated and defended property rights, while locally rooted and highly competitive mass political parties handed out divisable economic benefits to meet their patronage requirements. The parties knit together the various levels and branches of government and placed severe limitations on the expansion of any bureaucratic administration or civil service composed of positions outside the electoral-patronage system. The way was finally opened for the construction of autonomous national administrative systems—civil and military alike—but only after the electoral realignment of 1896 sharply unbalanced the parties in many formerly competitive states and created a national imbalance strongly in favor of the Republicans. Even so, administrative development came slowly, unevenly, and in ways imperfectly under central executive coordination and control. Presidents from Theodore Roosevelt onward took the lead, along with groups of professionals, in pro-

[16] From a selection reprinted in Robert F. Himmelberg, ed., *The Great Depression and American Capitalism* (Boston, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Co., 1968), p. 69.

[17] Stephen Lee Skowronek, *Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877–1920* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), chap. 2. This paragraph draws on Skowronek's analysis as a whole.

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moting federal administrative growth and bureaucratization. Yet Congress resisted many of the efforts at administrative expansion and, at each step, contested the executive branch for control of newly created federal agencies.

One might suppose that World War I would have suddenly enhanced the U.S. national government's capacities for economic administration. In the historical experience of late medieval and early modern Europe, war was the great state-builder, as monarchs assembled officials to help them wrest men and goods from reluctant local authorities and resistant peasants. But America's first—somewhat limited—involvement in a modern international war came only *after* the emergence of a national capitalist economy in which capitalist corporations had taken the lead in the development of bureaucracy and in the employment of trained experts. Existing federal bureaucracies were not prepared to mobilize human resources and coordinate the industrial economy for war, so emergency agencies were thrown together for the occasion, mostly staffed by professional experts and "businesscrats" temporarily recruited from the corporate capitalist sector.[18] The major agency for industrial mobilization, the War Industries Board (WIB), was headed by freewheeling financier Bernard Baruch, who used business executives-turned-government officials to hound corporations into a semblance of cooperation in support of the war effort.[19] Because America's involvement in World War I was relatively brief, and because the task was to orchestrate a profitable overall expansion of production, the WIB's very tenuous ability to coordinate economic flows, control prices, and manage the interface between the military and industry was never made as glaringly apparent as it might have been. And once the "emergency" of war had passed, Congress quickly dismantled agencies such as the WIB, leaving the U.S. national state in many ways as administratively weak as before the war and leaving corporations on their own to pursue profitable growth, intramural control of their labor forces, and whatever industry-wide cooperation they could achieve without violating antitrust laws.

During their unbroken national political ascendancy in the 1920s, Republican administrations showed little inclination to extend the reach of bureaucratic state power. Instead, a distinctive way of extending government influence—an antibureaucratic strategy of state-building particularly well suited to the existing political and ideological circumstances—was ingeniously pursued by Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover, using his own initially relatively humble department, "the smallest and the newest of the federal departments," as a center of operations.[20] To Hoover, starting from a puny administrative base did not mat-

[18] The phrase "businesscrat" comes from Galambos, *Competition and Cooperation*, p. 205. He attributes the word to Gerald D. Nash and comments that it "accurately describes a twentieth-century breed of businessman who spends a significant part of his life working as a government bureaucrat" (p. 205, n. 3).

[19] See Robert D. Cuff, *The War Industries Board: Business-Government Relations during World War I* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973).

[20] Ellis W. Hawley, "Herbert Hoover, the Commerce Secretariat, and the Vision of an 'Associative State,' 1921-1928," *Journal of American History* 61 (June 1974):120.

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ter because, as Ellis Hawley explains, he envisaged the Commerce Department as the core of an "associative state" that would "function through promotional conferences, expert inquiries, and cooperating committees, not through public enterprise, legal coercion, or arbitrary controls."[21] The personnel and budgets of the component units of the Commerce Department expanded steadily under Hoover. But the more significant form of growth was through the spread of "adhocracy" rather than of bureaucracy, for Hoover used many government officials as facilitators of cooperation within and among powerful private groups, especially business trade associations.[22] Indeed, Hoover's strategy of state-building was very congenial to American capitalists, not only because his Commerce Department did many useful things for them, but even more because it splendidly accommodated "business groups desirous of governmental services but reluctant to give up their own autonomy"[23] Given the enormous barriers in the way of centralized administrative development, Herbert Hoover had, it seemed, hit upon the perfect formula for modern government in America.

With the crash of 1929, followed by the deepening depression and the advent of the Democrats, Hoover's ideal of the associative state and the trappings of power linked to it were inevitably swept aside. If for no other than the obvious reasons of adversary politics, the National Recovery Administration was *not* (either by the terms of the NIRA or by Roosevelt's decision) put into the Department of Commerce; instead the early New Deal's major venture into industrial regulation was launched as an independent agency, with its head directly responsible to the president. Politics aside, however, there would have been little administrative advantage to be gained in placing the NRA within Commerce. Without Hoover and his "adhocracy"—his network of cooperating private associations—the Commerce Department was still, as it had been before Hoover, relatively weak administratively, disunified and decentralized.[24] For, while the Department of Commerce as a whole had grown during Hoover's tenure as secretary (1921–1928) by over 3,000 employees (a 50 percent increase), and had nearly doubled its annual appropriations,[25] the supervisory center of the department, the Office of the Secretary of Commerce, had not expanded commensurately; in fact, from 1920 to 1929 the office had actually declined in

[21] Ibid., pp. 118–19.

[22] See ibid. "Adhocracy" is Hawley's term for the links between the Commerce Department and private associations.

[23] Ibid., p. 119.

[24] On the situation before Hoover, see Lloyd Milton Short, *The Development of National Administrative Organization in the United States* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1923), p. 408. Short points out that Commerce was put together from bureaus transferred from various other departments, and he comments: "While there is some evidence to indicate that Congress, in organizing this department, sought to give the Secretary a large measure of supervision and control over the organization and work of the several bureaus and offices, without regard to their status prior to their transfer to that department, this authority is not as complete as that possessed by the heads of some other departments, notably the Department of State and Department of Agriculture" (ibid.).

[25] Hawley, "Associative State," pp. 138–39, n. 84; and Joan Hoff Wilson, *Herbert Hoover: Forgotten Progressive* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Co., 1975), p. 86.

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personnel.[26] Moreover, the near collapse of foreign exports in the early days of the depression undercut the major thrust of the one departmental agency, the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, that had grown the most (by 552 percent in expenditures and by 436 percent in personnel) during the 1920s.[27] All in all, the Commerce Department had relatively little to contribute to the formulation and administration of regulatory codes for domestic industries—certainly much less than one might imagine at first glance, considering the strategic position of the department in the 1920s.

In one way of looking at it, the National Recovery Administration had to start from scratch to implement government-supervised industrial coordination. But in another way of looking at it, the Recovery Administration simply reproduced still another variant of the same governmental strategies used to "mobilize business" under Bernard Baruch's War Industries Board and used to "cooperate with business" under Hoover's "associative state." For the implications of the American state's persistent administrative weakness were to prove as telling for the NRA as they had been for the previous major phases of government-business relations in twentieth-century America. To a discerning eye, the prodromal signs were already apparent in the spring of 1933, as Roosevelt became extraordinarily reliant upon one man, General Hugh Johnson, to put together the entire NRA apparatus needed to implement Title I of the National Industrial Recovery Act.[28]

Aptly, the early NRA has been characterized as "the swirling chaos over which Hugh Johnson reigned."[29] The tasks at hand were exhilarating and overwhelming. An entire NRA staff, destined to grow to over 3,000, had to be instantly assembled.[30] And since Roosevelt wanted to get people back to work at once, a "Blue Eagle Campaign" was quickly launched to persuade employers to agree immediately to the blanket wage and hours provisions of the "President's Re-employment Agreement." With an enormous amount of public hoopla, Johnson consciously modeled the Blue Eagle Campaign on the war bonds drive of World War I in an effort to put NRA "enforcement . . . into the hands of the *whole* people."[31] Meanwhile, Johnson used his formidable powers of personal persuasion to prompt industries to draw up their own individual codes of fair competition. For the major industrial executives, as Louis Galambos notes,

[26] Carroll H. Wooddy, *The Growth of the Federal Government 1915–1932* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1934), pp. 166–67.

[27] Ibid., p. 176. Wooddy points out that the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce's work on export trade remained predominant in the 1920s. Work on domestic commerce grew, but less than one-fifth of the bureau's personnel specialized in this at the end of the decade (ibid., p. 177).

[28] A veteran of the War Industries Board, General Johnson was "Bernard Baruch's man" in the Roosevelt entourage, and he enjoyed a broad range of connections to the heads of corporations and to trade association leaders. See Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Coming of the New Deal* (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1958), pp. 87–88, 103–10.

[29] Galambos, *Competition and Cooperation*, p. 227.

[30] The 3,000 figure comes from Hugh S. Johnson, *The Blue Eagle from Egg to Earth* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Doran and Co., 1935), p. 286.

[31] Ibid., p. 261.

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"working with Johnson—or as they referred to him privately, Old Ironpants—was like trying to tame a whirlwind: if they succeeded, they would hold the reins on a source of tremendous power; if they failed, the whirlwind might well destroy them and all of their plans."[32]

When the dust settled after the first hectic months of the NRA, it certainly seemed that the business executives had succeeded in taming the whirlwind. Between June and October 1933, the major industries were brought under approved codes of fair competition, and processes were well under way that would result in over 500 codes covering about 96 percent of U.S. industry.[33] All codes necessarily embodied wage and hours provisions for labor, along with the proforma NIRA Section (7a) provision declaring labor's right to organize collectively. Despite these features, business leaders—especially the trade associations that represented many decentralized industries and the large corporations that dominated many oligopolistic industries—succeeded in formulating the codes so as to allow many loopholes in prolabor provisions as well as production cutbacks and noncompetitive, higher prices for most industries.

The key officials of the early NRA (besides Johnson himself) were "deputy administrators drawn almost invariably from the ranks of business"—indeed, sometimes from the very same industries with which they had to negotiate over code provisions.[34] These administrators were strongly sympathetic to the needs of the industrialists for a profitable environment and an end to "cutthroat competition" in the deflationary crisis. Beyond dealing with NRA "businesscrats" who were inherently sympathetic, industrial executives had even greater advantages in that they closely controlled most of the information about industrial operations on which the NRA codes and their enforcement would have to be based. "When the recovery program began," notes Galambos, "the government did not have much more information [on the workings of industry] than it had during the first World War."[35] Nor were there at hand trained government officials experienced in regulating or planning for industry with "the public interest" and some conception of the whole economy in mind. What is more, industrialists possessed the only organizational means—the trade associations—that could conveniently be used to implement the codes, once approved.[36] Most code authorities established for this purpose were selected and staffed by trade association personnel or industrial executives; and even the "government representatives" serving as code authorities were usually nominated by the Industrial Advisory Board of the NRA, a body itself made up of elite U.S. capitalists. Labor representatives, meanwhile, appeared on less than 10 percent of the initially established code authorities, and representatives

[32] Galambos, *Competition and Cooperation*, p. 209.

[33] Lyon et. al., *National Recovery Administration*, p. 141; and Johnson, *Blue Eagle*, p. 286.

[34] Hawley, *Problem of Monopoly*, p. 56.

[35] Galambos, *Competition and Cooperation*, p. 205.

[36] Ibid., chaps. 9 and 10 provide an excellent case study of the role of the Cotton Textile Institute in formulating and implementing the NRA code for the cotton textile industry.

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of consumers made it onto a mere 2 percent.[37] A contemporary observer was hardly exaggerating, therefore, when he described the early NRA as a "bargain between business leaders on the one hand and businessmen in the guise of government officials on the other."[38] General Johnson corralled the various participants and made them play the codification game very quickly, but business executives and their organizations held all the good cards. So, naturally, they came up winners—at least in the first round of play.

Rapid codification accomplished in this way soon led, however, to increasingly bitter controversies within the NRA. Business executives found that legalized regulation and planning by industries' own efforts, rather than by state initiative, resulted in an incoherent pattern of cross-cutting jurisdictions and a proliferation of administrative red tape. As Ellis Hawley points out: "In the beginning, . . . almost any group of businessmen that saw fit to call itself an 'industry' was treated as such, and the result was an amalgam of overlapping jurisdictions. . . . Caught in this tangle of multiple code coverage, many businessmen found themselves subject to conflicting orders, multiple assessments, and overlapping interpretations. . . ."[39] Besides, by joining the NRA effort, business executives inevitably brought conflicts within and between industries into a political arena. There were "conflicts between large units and small ones, integrated firms and non-integrated, chain stores and independents, manufacturers and distributors, new industries and declining ones, and so on ad infinitum."[40] Naturally, industries and subgroups within industries tried to use the NRA codes to their own relative advantage. And the NRA apparatus, itself thoroughly permeated by conflicting business interests, was unable to resolve disputes in an authoritative fashion. At worst, internecine feuds among business groups intensified; at best, they settled into uneasy stalemates. Either way, many business executives were bound to become increasingly frustrated with the NRA.

Finally, business's disillusionment with the NRA had roots in the failure of even the most successful self-regulatory codes to ensure market stability and steady profitability. Louis Galambos tells a revealing story in this respect for the cotton textile industry—an industry whose trade association, the Cotton Textile Institute (CTI), led the way in the fight for government-enforced industrial guilds and then drew up the very first code to be approved under the NRA. The code authority in cotton textiles was directly established by the CTI, and during 1933–1934 it was remarkably successful in maintaining its authority within the industry and its autonomy from unwanted interference by government officials. Nevertheless, the code authority in cotton textiles was still having difficulty in 1934 with the hoary problem of how to fine-tune flows of production in the industry so as to prevent inventory backlogs from building up and undercutting

[37] Hawley, *Problem of Monopoly*, p. 61.
[38] Quoted in ibid., pp. 56–57.
[39] Ibid., p. 69.
[40] Ibid.

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steady profitable yields. The trouble was that the code authority, as a representative of firms in the industry,

> could react to manifest problems, but could not anticipate difficulties before they impinged directly and decisively upon a large majority of the members. By opting for self-regulation instead of central planning, CTI had ensured that this handicap would be built into its NRA program.
>
> [Cotton Textile Institute officials] recognized by the summer of 1934 that prices could not be stabilized so long as the manufacturers' product groups had to initiate the decisions to cut production. They needed to give that responsibility to a person or persons who could keep in touch with the statistical reports and check any overproduction before it became serious. But that idea carried the association leaders onto dangerous ground: the experts who made these decisions might end up being government experts, and to the manufacturers that was an outcome to be avoided at any cost.[41]

Perhaps if there had existed from the start a well-established state administration knowledgeable about and sympathetic to the needs and aims of the business self-regulators, perhaps then the NRA, in its capacity as a government agency responsible for coordinating the formation of cartels of U.S. business enterprises, could have worked as the U.S. industrialists who initially pushed for it hoped it would. Under such circumstances, some U.S. capitalists (at least) would have consistently benefited from state-enforced plans and regulations, and they would not have perceived state administrators as threatening "meddlers." As it was, however, by the time expert administrators with their own ideas on how government intervention could induce recovery emerged within the NRA, they were seen as very threatening by capitalists, because they were acting as spokesmen for consumer and labor interests and were advocating social reforms as a concomitant of increased state regulation of certain aspects of business performance.[42] Under these circumstances, even industries that might have benefited from more state planning—or at least from more effective state backing for their own attempts at market regulation—simply shied further away than ever from the notion of "government interference in industry."

Despite—indeed, because of—the enormous influence they had in its operations, the NRA did not meet the original hopes of industrial capitalists for economic recovery through government-backed industrial coordination. And as the NRA became ever more conflict-ridden in 1934–1935, it actually generated dysfunctional side effects for its original business advocates. It helped to arouse and politicize labor-management struggles, and it set increasing numbers of disillusioned capitalists on a collision course with New Deal politicians. The virtually complete absence of autonomous capacity to administer industrial planning in the U.S. polity of the early 1930s condemned the NRA to be, at first, a charismatic mobilization effort, and then an arena of bitterly politicized and inconclusive conflicts. Whether the NIRA implied state planning for industry,

[41] Galambos, *Competition and Cooperation*, pp. 251–52.
[42] Ibid., pp. 236–39.

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or merely state coordination and backing for business planning, it asked too much of the public intelligence and the government machinery of the time. Consequently, as the New Deal continued, U.S. capitalists would learn that it was perhaps worse to have tried the NRA experiment and failed than not to have tried at all.

Commercial farmers, meanwhile, were learning a different lesson about the effects of government intervention in the agricultural economy. For, as shown below, the public intelligence and governmental machinery of the day were sufficient to realize the aims of the Agricultural Adjustment Act.

The Federal Agricultural Complex and the Roots of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration

When the Agricultural Adjustment Administration was hastily launched in the spring of 1933, there was as much potential for bureaucratic confusion, and even more likelihood of policy conflict and stalemate, as in the National Recovery Administration. Like the NRA, the organization of the AAA had to be assembled anew in a very short time, and the omnibus possibilities of the enabling legislation had to be embodied in actual programs. In a sense the nascent AAA was even more handicapped than the NRA, because contradictory programmatic emphases had been deliberately built into its initial leadership and organizational structure.[43]

By the spring of 1933, Roosevelt was personally convinced that a program of government-induced production controls for major staple crops (for example, cotton, wheat, and corn and hogs) was the best way to raise farm prices to parity. But advocates of marketing programs (calling for price fixing and the export-dumping of surpluses) were still politically strong within farmers' organizations, in the world of business, and in Congress. Characteristically, Roosevelt simply melded together the divergent approaches, not only in the Agricultural Adjustment Act, but also in construction of the AAA itself. George N. Peek, a determined advocate of marketing programs, was made administrator of the AAA, yet he was made responsible to Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace, who, along with his assistant secretary, Rexford Tugwell, was a confirmed believer in production controls. Commodities sections were the key operational parts of the AAA, the places where policies for each major crop would actually be formulated. Understandably worried that his policy preferences might lose out to the production-control advocates who were being recruited to head several key sections, Peek insisted on a dual structure for the major crops. Thus, in an ideal formula for administrative confusion and stalemate, a Division of Processing and Marketing run completely by Peek and his appointees was set up to parallel the Division of Production, and duplicate sec-

[43] Schlesinger, *Coming of New Deal*, pp. 45–49; and Van L. Perkins, *Crisis in Agriculture: The Agricultural Adjustment Administration and the New Deal* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), chap. 4.

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tions for wheat, cotton, and corn and hogs were established within the two divisions. There was no way to coordinate programs for these key crops except by recourse to the administrator (Peek himself) or, if his decisions were disputed, by appeal to Secretary Wallace or the president.

Policy clashes and appeals aplenty to higher authorities indeed abounded during the first nine months of the AAA. Nevertheless, the AAA's overall trajectory of development from 1933 to 1935 did not parallel the NRA's path toward greater divisiveness and ultimate stalemate. During 1933, a production-control program for wheat was formulated and implemented with some success, and (as plans were made for controls in 1934) emergency crop-destruction programs were carried through for cotton and hogs.[44] A series of clashes within the AAA pitted Peek and his people against the production-control advocates.[45] Peek had important business allies among processors of agricultural products, who naturally opposed production cutbacks. As late as August 1933, Peek was "still arguing that the whole farm problem could be solved by marketing agreements that would fix prices paid to farmers" and dispose of surpluses on the world market.[46] Peek was, moreover, determined to shield the business records of processing companies from AAA bureaucrats who were trying to keep down prices to consumers. But, after a number of showdowns on various issues—showdowns involving Wallace, and ultimately the president—Peek was forced out of the AAA and replaced as administrator by Chester A. Davis, a convert to the production-control approach.

Davis soon moved to reorganize the AAA, eliminating the parallel divisions by merging the sections under Processing and Marketing into the division of Production. During 1934, the AAA's programs—except for special cases like dairy products—became consistently oriented to raising farm prices by making payments to farmers to curtail their production. Overall plans were made by AAA experts in Washington and then implemented locally by committees of farmers. On the whole, the AAA functioned well.[47] And even as the NRA was coming under increasingly vociferous political attacks, the AAA benefited from a favorable review by Congress in 1934 and gained support from farmers and their organizations during 1934–1935. Moreover, while its emergency programs did their job, the AAA began to think ahead: a Program Planning Division was set up in 1934, and by 1935 it was proposing ways to coordinate new and existing agricultural programs and formulating plans for land use and soil conservation.[48] Planning Division ideas were to prove timely in 1936, when the first Ag-

[44] Perkins, *Crisis in Agriculture*, chaps. 6 and 7.

[45] The details are given in ibid., pp. 179–86; and in Schlesinger, *Coming of New Deal*, pp. 55–59. See also Gilbert C. Fite, *George N. Peek and the Fight for Farm Parity* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1954), chap. 15.

[46] Perkins, *Crisis in Agriculture*, p. 182.

[47] See the relatively favorable assessment of the Brookings Institution research team Nourse, Davis, and Black, *Three Years of AAA*. Perkins, *Crisis in Agriculture*, chap. 9, also gives a favorable overall assessment of the AAA.

[48] Richard S. Kirkendall, *Social Scientists and Farm Politics in the Age of Roosevelt* (Columbia:

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ricultural Adjustment Act was declared unconstitutional and a new approach to production planning had to be quickly proposed to Congress. In the case of the AAA—in contrast to the NRA—new, substitute legislation (the Soil Conservation Act of 1936, followed by the second Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938) was proposed and passed. Appropriate plans were available, and there was widespread political support for continuing the relatively successful efforts at government intervention in agriculture.

If, therefore, the AAA's relative success contrasts fairly clearly to the faltering of the NRA after 1933, how can we explain the difference? It might be argued that the task of regulating production and raising prices in agriculture was so much easier than the task of regulating industrial production, thereby making it possible to account for the entire difference between the AAA and the NRA in sheer economic terms alone. Agricultural production occurs on an annual cycle, with fewer key decisions to be regulated over time than in industrial production, where cycles from inputs to outputs are much more rapid. Yet there is an offsetting way in which regulation of industry should have been administratively easier: most production in many industries took place in small numbers of large firms, making interenterprise coordination potentially much easier than in agriculture, where production decisions on millions of family farms had to be coordinated and supervised. Otherwise, attempts to control production and raise prices inevitably created economic tensions within *both* sectors. Just as some industries bought the products of others, so did some farmers (for example, hog farmers) buy the products of other farmers (corn); and there were tradeoffs between competing products within both sectors. Finally, politicized class conflicts could (and did) emerge within both sectors; just as the organization and price of labor was an ever-present issue for industrial managers in their dealings with the NRA, so were conflicts between laborers or sharecroppers and farm owners a potent source of conflicts under the AAA, especially for cotton growers in the South. We would not deny that the economically determined sources of administrative difficulty faced by the NRA and the AAA were different in many particular ways. But we do maintain that these difficulties were sufficiently comparable—in either parallel or offsetting ways—to justify looking to contrasts in state capacity for economic intervention as a major, independent explanation for why the AAA ended up achieving its administrative goals more successfully than did the NRA.

Uniquely among the major emergency agencies of the early New Deal, the AAA was placed *inside* an existing federal department—the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)—and under the authority of its secretary, rather than being placed under a special administrator reporting directly to the president. The latter was the arrangement for the NRA, and we have already suggested reasons

University of Missouri Press, 1966), chap. 5. The original AAA production-control programs had negative side effects—for example, encouraging wasteful patterns of land use—that planners in the AAA were hoping to overcome; the invalidation of the first AAA gave them a welcome opportunity to try some new approaches.

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why little would have been gained by the NRA had it been put into the Commerce Department. In the case of the AAA, however, Secretary of Agriculture Wallace actively coordinated the special agency's activities with established USDA programs, and the AAA in fact benefited in numerous concrete ways from its embeddedness in the department. "There were some instances of friction between the AAA and the older organizations," notes historian Van Perkins; "more common, however, and rather remarkable, was the sense of accommodation and cooperation which existed. One of the most important connections was that between the AAA and the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, [BAE], which performed a considerable amount of statistical and analytical work for the AAA. . . .The records that had been compiled over the years by the BAE's Division of Crop and Livestock Estimates were indispensable for all control programs because, without those statistics, it would have been impossible to determine base production, allotments, and benefits."[49] In addition to resources of information, the AAA also drew key trained personnel from other parts of the USDA, especially from among present and previous employees of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics.[50] Moreover, the federally supervised Extension Service, tied to the USDA since the Smith-Lever Act of 1914, provided both personnel for the AAA and a ready-made field administration for organizing local groups of farmers to implement AAA programs. Without the Extension Service, the AAA in 1933 would have faced the almost impossible task of assembling a field administration from scratch in a matter of weeks.[51]

Just as we earlier linked the difficulties of the NRA to the historically explicable absence of relevant administrative strength in the U.S. national state, our explanation for the AAA's better performance looks back historically from the vantage point of the USDA's special administrative contributions. In general, as shown above, the civil administrative capacities of the U.S. national state in the 1930s were weak and poorly coordinated. But the historical development of different parts of the federal government had been uneven, and at the coming of the Great Depression, the U.S. Department of Agriculture was, so to speak, an island of state strength in an ocean of weakness. Although it did not achieve cabinet status until 1889, the Department of Agriculture was founded during the Civil War, when the Southern states were out of the union and when it was both possible and necessary for unprecedented federal initiatives to be taken. Influenced by the period of its birth, Agriculture enjoyed from its inception an unusual degree of administrative unity and flexibility: few component bureaus were legislatively created by Congress, and all but the top officials (and the head of the Weather Bureau) were subject to appointment and removal by the head

[49] Perkins, *Crisis in Agriculture*, p. 97.

[50] Nourse, Davis, and Black *Three Years of AAA*, p. 59. Personnel also came from "the staff of the vanishing Federal Farm Board and from state agricultural college and experiment station staffs" (ibid.). On the BAE's contributions to the AAA, see also John M. Gaus and Leon O. Wolcott, *Public Administration and the United States Department of Agriculture* (Chicago, Ill.: Public Administration Service, 1940), p. 54, n. 54.

[51] Perkins, *Crisis in Agriculture*, pp. 97–99.

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of the department; thus, new offices could be created and periodic reorganizations could occur, subject only to post-hoc approval by Congress when appropriations were made. Much more than other department heads, Agriculture secretaries (or, before 1889, commissioners) were able to regard—and shape—their department as a functionally unified domain.[52]

In key steps taken before and after World War I, secretaries of Agriculture (especially David Houston and Henry C. Wallace) reorganized the department to heighten its capacities for policy-oriented research and for centrally coordinated policy implementation. Increasing emphasis was placed on agricultural economics rather than on the natural sciences, culminating in the 1922 establishment of the all-important Bureau of Agricultural Economics (formed through the consolidation of the Office of Farm Management, the Bureau of Crop Estimates, and the Bureau of Markets). During the 1920s, the "new Bureau performed important general-staff services for the Secretary and the Department in a period of formative development both in the field of agricultural economics as a social study and in the evolution of governmental policy on agriculture. . . ."[53] By 1931, the BAE's chief could rightly say of his bureau: "There is scarcely an economic phase of agriculture that is not comprehended in its services and research."[54] In the seven decades following its birth, the USDA had developed from "essentially a collection of natural-scientific research workers with attachés for informational and publication services" into an agency of government with extraordinary capacity to formulate and implement domestic economic and social policies.[55]

Moreover, well before the dawn of the Republican New Era, the USDA had become one of the heftiest civilian parts of the federal government. In 1915, the department's annual expenditures were about 8 percent of total federal civil expenditures (exceeded only by such other categories of civil expenditures as public improvements and marine transportation),[56] while the Commerce Department accounted for about 5 percent of civil expenditures. Herbert Hoover's Department of Commerce was the glamorous center of new governmental growth in the 1920s, but *both* Agriculture and Commerce grew by about 400 percent between 1915 and 1930, leaving Agriculture almost twice as big as Commerce at the end of that period, just as it had been at the beginning.[57] Moreover,

[52] Short, *Development of Administrative Organization*, pp. 393–94; and Wooddy, *Growth of Federal Government*, pp. 277–78.

[53] Gaus and Wolcott, *Public Administration and the USDA*, p. 53.

[54] Quoted in Wooddy, *Growth of Federal Government*, p. 209.

[55] Gaus and Wolcott, *Public Administration and the USDA*, p. 32.

[56] This figure is adapted by Skocpol from Wooddy, *Growth of Federal Government*, using the total civil expenditure figure given in Table II (p. 543) and using a rough (underestimated) total for Agriculture Department expenditures arrived at as indicated in note 57. The figures are calculated in 1930 dollars.

[57] Adapted by Skocpol from ibid. Reflecting the government's own practice in his time, Wooddy presents figures on federal expenditures by functional categories rather than by department. Since breakdowns by bureaus are given in individual chapters, it proved possible to modify the functional totals for "agriculture" and "commerce" by reshuffling bureaus. Certain major bureaus were omitted:

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while the Office of the Secretary of Commerce did *not* keep up with Commerce's overall growth, the Office of Secretary of Agriculture—the center of coordination and staff services for the whole department—*did* keep pace in terms of personnel with the Agriculture Department as a whole.[58]

Tracing the genealogy of the USDA as an administrative part of government provides useful background information. Yet for the purpose of understanding the origins of agricultural planning in the New Deal, it is even more important to see the USDA as part of a larger nexus of institutions that functioned—to a unique degree in pre-1930s U.S. national politics—to bring professional expertise to bear on public issues and on governmental policymaking about them. At about the same time as the USDA was created, the Morrill Act was passed, authorizing federal land grants to support the establishment in each state of a college oriented to agricultural research and education. In practice, these "land-grant colleges" were slow to establish themselves, and their greatest impact on farm practices came after the establishment of federally subsidized, state-run Experiment Stations in 1887 and the federalization of the Extension Service in 1914. By the end of the nineteenth century, though, the USDA was already recruiting many of its civil servants from the land-grant colleges. Indeed, characteristic career lines were beginning to carry individuals from the colleges to Experiment Stations (or Extension Service posts), then into the Department of Agriculture, and perhaps finally back to administrative positions in the colleges or in state agricultural programs.[59]

One impact of the connection between the USDA and the land-grant colleges was, predictably, to solidify the department's distinctive collective identity. From the "homogeneity of origin, training, and type of career and professional interest of those who were rising to the higher posts in the permanent civil service of the USDA there emerged a corporate atmosphere in the Department."[60] Thus, looking back historically, the authors of a 1940 Social Science Research Council (SSRC) study of public administration in the USDA were able to conclude that "the personality factor"—that is, the influence of extraordinary entre-

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the Weather Bureau and the Bureau of Public Roads from Agriculture; and the Census Bureau from Commerce. Also (for minor deviations) the Food and Drug Administration was left out of Agriculture; the (independent) Federal Oil Board was left in Commerce; and the (independent) Federal Farm Board was left in Agriculture (for 1930). The Agriculture Department expenditure figures are therefore not exact, but they are good rough approximations, consistent over time. Both departments' budgets are underestimated, Agriculture's probably more than that of Commerce.

[58] Ibid., pp. 281, 166–67.

[59] Gaus and Wolcott, *Public Administration and the USDA*, p. 15.

[60] Ibid., p. 16. Indeed, one sure indication of Agriculture's "corporate identity" over the decades is the presence in the library of many "in-house" histories of the department, as well as major social-scientific studies of its structure and operations. The Gaus and Wolcott study is a fine example of the latter. For an example of the former, see Gladys Baker et. al., *Century of Service: The First 100 Years of the United States Department of Agriculture* (Washington, D.C.: Centennial Committee, USDA, 1963). Except perhaps the State Department, no other federal cabinet department has so much self-consciousness as Agriculture. There are no book-length studies of Commerce, for example.

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preneurial secretaries or bureau heads—"has probably not been so important as perhaps in the history of other departments.". . ."Here [in the USDA, the personality factor] has been dissolved because a corporate factor—the influence of land-grant college training and tradition—has been overwhelmingly strong."[61]

Another important development flowing from the USDA's ties to the colleges was the symbiotic linking of academic life with the expanding domains of government research and policymaking. As farmers faced new problems and as government officials groped for new policies to help agriculture, teachers and researchers in the land-grant colleges redefined the scope of instruction and research. Indeed, the new disciplines of agricultural economics and rural sociology emerged and flourished at this intersection of agricultural policy and land-grant education.[62] In turn, of course, answers and dilemmas arrived at in the colleges were carried into the Bureau of Agricultural Economics where, partly under academic stimulation and partly because of the availability of accumulated statistics and experience, efforts were increasingly made to look holistically at U.S. agriculture, in order to understand and cope with its changing place in the American economy and the world economic order.

During the 1920s, farm pressure groups used government-collected statistics to highlight the disastrous decline in farm income, and political demands mounted for government corrective action. Agricultural experts—whether current, former, or prospective government employees—grappled with politically proposed solutions and in many cases formulated proposals of their own. Many divergent answers were offered during the debates of the 1920s and the early depression. The sheer proliferation of demands for government action reflected the previous contacts of farmers with the USDA (and with the state-level programs associated with the department). Similarly, the proliferation of technically and administratively sophisticated proposals reflected the ease with which, in the agricultural sector of the U.S. political economy, professionally trained people had for some time moved freely from scholarship to application, from academia to government policymaking and implementation. Both farmers and agricultural experts were, so to speak, "state-broken" well before the New Deal launched its planning efforts.

More than that, and finally perhaps most decisive of all, many agricultural experts were willing to make policy *for*, rather than just *with*, the farmers and their organizations.[63] Accustomed to the challenges of public office, their training and career experiences had given them a concrete sense of what could (and could not) be done with available governmental means. Having gained a public-service perspective—or, to put it another way, having learned to take the point

[61] Gaus and Wolcott, *Public Administration and the USDA*, p. 86.

[62] Ibid., pp. 35-37.

[63] In his *Social Scientists and Farm Politics*, Richard Kirkendall argues that the agricultural experts were more than merely "servants of power," that is, paid experts working for farmers' organizations (or, for that matter, for business executives). He contrasts them to the experts working for industry discussed by Loren Baritz, *Servants of Power: A History of the Use of Social Science in American Industry* (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1960).

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of view of the state—agricultural experts could devise policies with means, and even goals, beyond those directly advocated by farm pressure groups. Two key examples are Milburn Wilson's advocacy of government-administered production controls and Howard Tolley's proposals for land-use planning: Although both Wilson and Tolley formulated policy proposals well before the New Deal, neither could successfully "sell" them to farmers' organizations or to Congress.[64] Without Roosevelt's support, and without the Democratic ascendancy in 1932, these agricultural economists could not have translated their ideas into government action. Yet once the Adjustment Act was passed, Wilson, Tolley, and other professionals associated with them could seize the opportunity to implement new policies. Familiar with the resources of the USDA, they quickly moved into key operational posts in the AAA, so as to launch the agency on a programmatically coherent course.[65] Had the agricultural economists merely responded to the diverse pulls of farmers' demands and of immediate political pressures in 1933, they would have bogged down in the omnibus possibilities of the Agricultural Adjustment Act and in the organizational contradictions of the Adjustment Administration under George Peek. Instead, their ideas about production control and other types of government planning *for* agriculture helped them to set the AAA on a course that turned out to be relatively coherent and successful.

Conclusion

Looking back historically from the New Deal, we can see that agricultural experts, their ideas, and the administrative means they could use to implement the ideas *all* were products of a long process of institution building whose roots go back to the Civil War, when the U.S. Department of Agriculture was chartered and the Morrill Act was passed. Two points of broader analytic significance are worth underlining about the political effects of the complex of agricultural institutions that developed in U.S. history between the Civil War and the Great Depression.

First, these institutions laid the basis for an *administrative will to intervene* in the national market economy. This happened in ways interestingly analogous to those analyzed by John Armstrong for European administrative elites and by Alfred Stepan for contemporary interventionist military regimes in Latin America.[66] Both of these authors place great emphasis on prior historical development of institutions and patterns of elite socialization that forge a unified ad-

[64] See Kirkendall, *Social Scientists and Farm Politics*, chap. 2; and William D. Rowley, *M. L. Wilson and the Campaign for the Domestic Allotment* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1970), chaps. 7–9.

[65] Wilson gave up the chance to be assistant secretary of Agriculture in order to head the more operationally crucial Wheat Section of the AAA.

[66] John A. Armstrong, *The European Administrative Elite* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1973); and Alfred Stepan, *The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978), chap. 4.

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ministrative leadership imbued with an "interventionist role definition," a collective sense that it can diagnose, and use state intervention to act upon, socioeconomic problems. In his study of European administrators and state activities to promote economic development, Armstrong writes that a "large measure of organizational unity and homogeneity in socialization among elite administrators has been crucial for development [of an] interventionist role definition," and he also points to the importance of administrative field experience, scientific education, and exposure to "systematic economics training."[67] Stepan asks how certain militaries in Latin America in the 1960s moved from a narrowly military definition of their roles to a collective belief that the military could and should take responsibility for national economic development; his answer focuses on the broadening of military education to include studies of society and the economy as a whole as well as techniques of economic planning.[68] As shown above, USDA administrators and agricultural-economics experts went through experiences analogous to Armstrong's interventionist administrators and Stepan's "new" military professionals: their education and career experiences tended to forge a corporate identity, the USDA itself was administratively unified to a high degree, and both government experience and social-scientific training encouraged the combination of technical expertise and orientation to practical action with a holistic view of agriculture in the national economy.

Second, the U.S. agricultural complex historically nurtured not only an administrative will to intervene but also a process of "political learning" about what could be effectively done for farmers and society as a whole through public agricultural policy. In a ground-breaking study of the long-term development of social policies in modern Britain and Sweden, Hugh Heclo maintains that politics "finds its source not only in power but also in uncertainty—men [that is, people] collectively wondering what to do."[69] He argues that social policy developments have not usually come simply as a result of electoral competition, pressures from interest groups, or programmatic initiatives by political parties. The *occasion* for new policy departures may be created by such precipitants: "Changes in the relationship of power—wider political participation, election results, party government turnovers, new mobilizations of interest groups—have served as one variety of stimulus, or trigger, helping to spread a general conviction that 'something' must be done."[70] But *what to do* is another matter, argues Heclo. Here the answers—the actual contents of workable policies—tend to come from government administrators and other expert elites who have been closely in touch over time with attempts and failures in a given field of public-

[67] Armstrong, *European Elite*, p. 305.

[68] In addition to Stepan, *State and Society*, chap. 4, see Stepan, "The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion," in *Authoritarian Brazil*, ed. Stepan (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1973), pp. 47–65.

[69] Hugh Heclo, *Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1974), p. 305.

[70] Ibid., p. 306.

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policy endeavor. "Even [successful] increases in administrative power," says Heclo in a passage that sounds ideally suited for a discussion of the New Deal's NRA versus the AAA, "have had as their basis less the ability to issue authoritative commands than the capacity to draw upon administrative resources of information, analysis, and expertise for new policy lessons and appropriate conclusions on increasingly complex issues."[71]

In the case of the relatively successful Agricultural Adjustment Administration, the New Deal was indeed able to draw on a well-established governmentally centered tradition of political learning about what needed to be and could be done through government intervention in agriculture. The policy innovators and eventual policy implementors were not simply government officials, for they had moved into and out of government posts and carried experiences back and forth from government to educational institutions, maintaining contacts in the processes with major farm interest groups.[72] Yet, there was an important thread of continuity in the succession of programs implemented by the USDA. As the authors of the 1940 Social Science Research Council study of the USDA put it, in a formulation strikingly like Hugh Heclo's "political learning" argument:

> Since 1932 public attention has been centered upon the New Deal program as marking a sharp reversal in trends in government policy; nevertheless, the more we study the evolution of agricultural policies the more we are impressed with their continuity over an extended period, notwithstanding changes in party control of government. Changes occur, but the new policy will be found to have roots in some undramatic research, fact-gathering, information-providing or similar "noncoercive" activity. . . .Civil servants assigned to the task of analysis come upon situations in which a public interest is discovered. . . .In this evolutionary process the functions of government are changed. . . .[73]

What is more, the SSRC authors might have said, in this way the basis is laid for a *successful* extension of government administrative intervention when a political conjuncture such as that of 1932–1933 creates the opportunity.

Like the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the National Industrial Recovery Act created an extraordinary opportunity to extend government intervention into the economy. But, leading into the depression, no properly *political* learning had been going on to lay the basis for the NRA. Such learning as was going on in the 1920s about how to plan for industry was happening within particular in-

[71] Ibid., pp. 305–6.

[72] Heclo argues that policy innovations usually come from "middlemen at the interfaces of various groups" (ibid., pp. 308–9). The interesting thing about the complex of agricultural institutions in the United States was that it encouraged (and allowed) trained people to *move about* from colleges to extension posts to the USDA, and so forth, within the public world of American agriculture. Farmers' associations were active at many points in this world, so experts were never divorced from "politics" even as they maintained their own scientific and administrative roles.

[73] Gaus and Wolcott, *Public Administration and the USDA*, p. 69. Part 1 of this study is, indeed, coherently constructed around a highly insightful "political learning" argument. The book bears reading not only for its "facts" but also for its sophisticated argument about the historical interplay of USDA development, farm politics, and agricultural policymaking and implementation.

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dustries, with trade association leaders doing the learning.[74] When the federal government withdrew from even nominal control of industry after World War I, it left the field clear to the giant corporations and to the trade associations, whose efforts Hoover simply encouraged and attempted to coordinate, instead of building up independent governmental apparatuses. Thus, when the depression struck and the New Deal found itself committed to the sponsorship of industrial planning, there was only "the analogue of war" to draw upon—an invocation of the emergency mobilization practices used during World War I.[75] Yet, in the depression, government's job was much more difficult: not just exhorting maximum production from industry, but stimulating recovery and allocating burdens in a time of scarcity. For this, a tradition of political learning—from prior public administrative supervision of industry—would have been invaluable. But, in contrast to the situation in agriculture, the U.S. state lacked the "administrative resources of information, analysis, and expertise for new policy lessons and appropriate conclusions" on the "increasingly complex issues" presented by the challenge of industrial planning. Thus the National Recovery Administration failed in its mission of coordinating industrial production under the aegis of public supervision, and the apparent opportunity offered by the National Industrial Recovery Act's extraordinary peacetime grant of economic authority to the U.S. government was lost. The reach of the New Deal's ambitious early venture into industrial planning simply exceeded the grasp that could be afforded by the public institutions and intelligence of the day.

[74] Galambos, *Competition and Cooperation*, focuses on the "organizational learning" of trade association leaders as one of its major themes.

[75] See William E. Leuchtenburg, "The New Deal and the Analogue of War," in *Change and Continuity in Twentieth-Century America*, eds. John Braeman, Robert Bremer, and E. Walters (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1964) for an excellent discussion of the invocation of World War I symbolism and models, especially under the NRA.

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Party and Bureaucracy: From Kennedy to Reagan

ROGER G. BROWN

Among the most widely discussed trends in the recent development of our governmental process have been the declining role of organized parties and the problems of control over an immense and unwieldy bureaucracy. Both phenomena have changed significantly the strategies and effectiveness of presidential management. It is important, therefore, to consider the consequences of their convergence as factors in the contemporary political environment. The underlying assumption of this analysis is that we gain a clearer understanding of complex interrelationships by focusing on the shifting interface *between* institutions, as a complement to the separate study of each.

The aim of this article is to examine the impact on the presidency of the evolving relationship between parties and the growing executive establishment over the past two decades. At the center of the discussion are the modern incarnations of patronage, that ancient and not always honored form of political barter. Data were collected to determine patterns of party affiliation among top-level presidential appointees during the period 1961-1980. Although several interesting trends emerge from the aggregate percentages, it is necessary to look beyond the numbers for an understanding of the broad changes which have occurred in the post-New Deal era.

The evidence of the five most recent administrations indicates that extensive use of scarce presidential appointments to reward party stalwarts or to bolster party organizations is no longer viewed by the White House as a profitable exercise. That is not to say, however, that patronage no longer exists nor that presidential appointments are now nonpartisan. Alternate reasons and mechanisms for the distribution of presidential plums have arisen, including the emergence

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in the White House of the public liaison operation, the Office of Congressional Relations, and personnel advisory systems much less reliant on the party organizations.

Three broad themes in the developing party-bureaucracy relationship have emerged over the past twenty years. First, the pool of patronage jobs at the president's disposal has been reduced to a relatively small but important group of positions in the policy-making hierarchy of executive agencies. Affiliation with the presidential party remains one of the most consistent characteristics among the majority of these appointees. Second, jobs and other presidential favors are now used much less often as a means of rewarding and nurturing the support of party organizations. Instead, they are husbanded carefully to be traded for the furtherance of legislative goals, to help build a measure of policy bias in favor of the president's programs within the agencies, or to garner support from an enlarged collection of special interest groups in a fragmented political milieu. Finally, the weakened national parties have been forced to cede many of the functions formerly under their control to a different form of bureaucracy made up of the White House and Executive Office staffs.

Party and Bureaucracy before 1960

From the start, it has been a political fact of life that the choice of a fellow partisan in no way insured the appointee's loyalty, either in a personal or programmatic sense. Hence, there is the much-quoted lament of President Jefferson that every appointment produced a hundred enemies and one ingrate. In fact, the prospect of filling government jobs so as to reward loyalists, cultivate political support, and yet staff the executive with qualified individuals has been an unpleasant responsibility to many presidents. For example, George Washington recognized at once that this would be "one of the most difficult and delicate parts of the duty of my office."[1]

The task Washington saw as onerous took on new meaning, though, when President Andrew Jackson seized the opportunity to alter substantially the composition and the ethic of the federal service. The spoils system allowed at one stroke the wholesale installation of Jackson loyalists in the bureaucracy. More than that, "the gentry was displaced or at least demoted as government was transferred from the hands of a self-appointed elite to a more representative sample of the population."[2]

By the early part of this century, meanwhile, the national party organizations had become more actively involved in the presidential appointments process. Given the impetus of strong national party chairmen like Republican Marcus Hanna and Democrat James Farley, the president's party developed a role as

[1] Quoted in Herbert Kaufman, "The Growth of the Federal Personnel Service," in Wallace S. Sayre, ed., *The Federal Government Service* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. 12.

[2] Ibid., pp. 20–21. For an extended exposition of Jacksonian bureaucracy, see also Matthew A. Crenson, *The Federal Machine* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975).

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"the unofficial employment agency for filling certain jobs in the executive branch. . . ."[3] Thus the national parties, working in concert with their organizations at the state and local levels, not only supplied a pool of applicants for patronage jobs but also served as presidential advisory bodies on political appointments.

The chief bridging mechanism was provided by the national party chairmanship. V. O. Key explained:

> The existence of such a patronage channel incidentally permits the maintenance of central records of appointments "charged" against individual Senators and Representatives, information useful in dealing with those who complain of their treatment in the distribution of patronage. . . . National chairmen become annoyed when the President makes appointments without clearance through organization channels.[4]

James Farley maintained this patronage channel for Franklin Roosevelt's first two terms. His experience is indicative of the intimate connections which then existed between party organizations and the bureaucracy via the appointment process.

After assisting in the successful 1932 campaign, during which he had marshalled the energies of more than 140,000 local party workers,[5] Farley set about filling the upper echelons of the administrative apparatus with Roosevelt loyalists. Although civil service protections had already excluded many federal jobs from presidential patronage, Farley was able to distribute an estimated 75,000 jobs during his tenure as party chairman.[6]

The vantage point which allowed such sweeping influence over executive appointments was Farley's concurrent position as postmaster general, a cabinet-level post and a most effective seat for the president's primary political adviser. Because many of the patronage positions at the president's disposal were those of local postmasters, postal clerks, and inspectors, the logic of the dual appointment is clear. Farley made much more of the opportunity than merely filling postal vacancies, however. "As head of the Post Office Department, he had a pass with which he rode free on any railroad, ostensibly visiting post offices, but also talking from place to place with state and local party leaders."[7] Farley has described his frequent after-dinner talks with FDR, which often included an exploration of patronage problems.[8] The results of Roosevelt administration personnel practices are dramatically reflected in the fact that nine out of every ten

[3] Cornelius P. Cotter and Bernard C. Hennessy, *Politics Without Power: The National Party Committees* (New York: Atherton Press, 1964), p. 138.

[4] V. O. Key, Jr., *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups*, 5th ed., (New York: Crowell, 1964), p. 350.

[5] James MacGregor Burns, *Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1956), pp. 126–7, and Charles Michelson, *The Ghost Talks* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1944), pp. 133–4.

[6] Cotter and Hennessy, *Politics*, p. 139.

[7] Ibid., pp. 93–4.

[8] James A. Farley, *Jim Farley's Story: The Roosevelt Years* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1948), p. 68.

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top-level appointees were affiliated with the Democratic Party.[9] Despite successive waves of reform efforts culminating in the Progressive movement at the turn of the century, the appointment process was dominated by political considerations.[10]

This active and continuing involvement by the party organizations in the distribution of federal patronage is the background against which current personnel selection processes must be viewed. By the end of the 1960s a nearly complete transfer of this function from the national party hierarchy to the White House staff had occurred.

Presidential Appointments, 1961-1980

The data presented below are tabulations of party affiliation among presidential appointees requiring Senate confirmation during the administrations of the five most recent presidents. These highly placed political executives represent only about a third of the approximately 2,000 political appointments still available to the president.[11] Most of the jobs not included in this group are routine appointments which do not require formal confirmation. The importance of the positions surveyed here, however, transcends their relatively modest numbers. They include cabinet members, under secretaries, assistant secretaries, agency heads, bureau chiefs, and general counsels. In short, these appointees represent the president's best chance to place his imprimatur on the vast executive apparatus upon which the effective management of his programs depends. Furthermore, "these positions are eminently suited for the payment of political rewards."[12]

In themselves, these data do not reveal the extent to which the party-bureaucracy relationship has changed in the last half-century. All five presidents continued to appoint many more political executives from their respective parties than from the opposition party.[13] Table 1 shows that of those presidential appointees who claimed a party affiliation, an overwhelming majority were of the president's party. Furthermore, most of those not affiliated with the presi-

[9] David T. Stanley, Dean E. Mann, and Jameson W. Doig, *Men Who Govern* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1967), p. 24.

[10] Martin Shefter, "Party, Bureaucracy, and Political Change in the United States," in Louis Maisel and Joseph Cooper, eds., *Political Parties: Development and Decay* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1978), pp. 222–65.

[11] Hugh Heclo, *A Government of Strangers: Executive Politics in Washington* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1977), pp. 36–40. For a more recent study of executive appointments, see G. Calvin MacKenzie, *The Politics of Presidential Appointments* (New York: Free Press, 1981).

[12] Richard F. Fenno, Jr., *The President's Cabinet* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 227.

[13] In some instances, the party affiliation of a nominee was not disclosed at the time of his or her appointment. These cases were tabulated along with those listed as "independent," which means that some totals may indicate lower percentages of appointments from the president's party than was actually the case. A judgment was made, however, that this procedure was preferable to one which excluded undesignated cases and thereby inflated the percentages of presidential party appointees.

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TABLE 1
*Distribution of Party Affiliation Among Major Presidential Appointees, 1961–1978**

Administration	*Number of Appointees*	*Percent from President's Party*	*Percent Party-Affiliated*	*Percent Unaffiliated*
Kennedy	430	63	73	27
Johnson	524	47	58	42
Nixon	737	65	73	27
Ford	293	56	64	36
Carter (1977–78)**	402	58	65	35

* Major Appointments as listed by the *Congressional Quarterly Almanac* include cabinet, subcabinet, and lower policy-level positions in the executive branch, including ambassadorships and positions on various boards and commissions. In the case of some positions, particularly those on independent regulatory commissions, the ratio of party affiliation among appointees is legislatively prescribed. Therefore, those cases were not included in the annual totals. The *C Q Almanac* indicates the party affiliation for every appointee for whom that information is available. When not listed or listed as "independent," the appointee's affiliation was included here as "unaffiliated."

** *C Q Almanac* lists of major presidential appointees confirmed during the years 1979 and 1980 contained a high proportion of names for whom no information on party affiliation was made available by the Carter administration. In 1979, out of a total of 256 appointees listed, only 48 were assigned a party affiliation. For 1980, only 22 of 148 listings included this information.

Source: All tables were compiled from the annual listings of confirmed presidential appointees in the *Congressional Quarterly Almanac* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1961–1980), vols. 17–36.

dential party labeled themselves as unaffiliated, not as members of the out party.

The party organizations themselves were falling victim to a host of systemic changes weakening substantially their influence in the selection process. The litany of ills that have beset the party organizations is by now a familiar one: an apparent decline in party identification and an increase in self-avowed independents in the electorate; efforts to reform the presidential nominating process in order to move it out of the smoke-filled rooms associated with party professionals; ready access to electronic media for presidential candidates; independent sources of campaign finances and expertise; and large personal staffs at every candidate's and president's command.[14]

In other words, presidents no longer had to depend on parties for the essential services these had long provided. Additionally, it had become even more important in an age of intense public scrutiny for presidents to avoid the appearance of blatant partisanship. As Rockman has argued, Americans have exhibited a

[14] For some of the many descriptions of the decline of party salience, see Austin Ranney, "The Political Parties: Reform and Decline," in Anthony King, ed., *The New American Political System* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1978), pp. 213–47; William J. Crotty and Gary C. Jacobson, *American Parties in Decline* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1980); and Walter Dean Burnham, "The End of American Party Politics," *Trans-Action* (December 1969), pp. 12–22.

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"bias against political organization,"[15] which leads to the anomalous expectation that politicians who have become presidents should be above party politics.

Some have argued that presidents have been the root cause rather than the innocent victims of the effects of party decline. One political scientist concluded that the president's party leadership has given way to a "reliance on emergent alternative bases of political support and recurring and systematic presidential efforts to undermine the development and maintenance of a strong national party organization."[16] Although this assessment of the president's responsibility for such systemwide changes may be too harsh, it does convey a sense of the significant shift in traditional linkages.

Given the lack of incentive for presidential support of party organizations, why did recent presidents continue to appoint so many fellow partisans? One obvious reason is that although his closest associates and his choices for political appointments may not be members of the party hierarchy, they often do share the president's political views and his party affiliation. So partisanship continues to serve as a symbolic source of kinship between the president and his colleagues who move into the bureaucracy. Most Republican presidents, for example, have identified career executives with the Democratic party and have felt compelled to counterbalance them with Republican political appointees.[17]

H. R. Haldeman describes President Nixon's near paranoia about "the entrenched servants" in the Internal Revenue Service "who thwarted his every move." According to Haldeman, the president felt that "as soon as a notable person in any field, from Billy Graham to John Wayne, announced his backing of Nixon, a tax audit notice would arrive in the next week's mail, courtesy of a loyal Democrat civil servant in the IRS."[18] The result of Nixon's distrust of what he saw as the Democratic bureaucracy was the second term reorganization plan, an attempt to place administration loyalists in positions throughout the executive establishment. According to Aberbach and Rockman,

> One of the major incentives for the Nixon Administration's attempt to centralize control over the federal bureaucracy . . . stemmed from a belief that while Democratic administrators were ideologically unsalvagable, even the Republicans in the social service agencies were absorbing more fully the ethos of their agencies. . . .[19]

In the view of the Nixon White House, apparently, Democrats were not only untrustworthy, they also rubbed off on formerly reliable Republicans.

[15] Bert Rockman, "Constants, Cycles, Trends and Persona in Presidential Governance," paper delivered to the American Political Science Association annual meeting (September 1979), p. 13.

[16] Harold F. Bass, Jr., "Presidential Responsibility for National Party Organization, 1945–1974" (Ph.D. diss., Vanderbilt University, 1978), p. 1.

[17] See, for example, Kaufman, "Growth," pp. 49–50, and Richard P. Nathan, *The Plot That Failed: Nixon and the Administrative Presidency* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1975), pp. 30–1, 45–54.

[18] H. R. Haldeman with Joseph Di Mona, *The Ends of Power* (New York: Times Books, 1978), p. 169.

[19] Joel D. Aberbach and Bert A. Rockman, "Clashing Beliefs Within the Executive Branch: The Nixon Administration Bureaucracy," *American Political Science Review*, 70 (June 1976), p. 466.

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TABLE 2

Percentage of Major Presidential Appointees from President's Party

	Administration				
Department or Agency	*Kennedy*	*Johnson*	*Nixon*	*Ford*	*Carter*
Agriculture	77	80	81	100	92
Post Office	100	78	56	—	—
Labor	100	75	80	50	62
Commerce	71	65	82	64	71
Interior	54	50	86	100	45
HEW	73	53	66	45	56
HUD	—	86	78	100	92
Transportation	—	27	70	70	77
Treasury	55	67	79	43	72
Justice	68	65	68	80	38
Defense	48	32	56	52	45
State	64	34	51	31	39
Executive Office	63	43	68	82	60
Misc. Boards and Commissions	61	51	64	59	65

A related and more substantive reason for appointments from the presidential party is the role of party affiliation as an indicator of policy bias. Presidents might reasonably expect to find more agreement on broad questions of policy among fellow party members, other qualifications being equal.

Possible evidence for this point can be found in Table 2, where presidential appointments over the twenty-year period are broken down by department or agency for each of the five administrations. For example, both President Nixon and President Ford appointed their highest percentages of fellow partisans to top-level posts in the Department of the Interior. In contrast, all three Democratic presidents chose a far lower proportion of their Interior nominees from the ranks of their party. This might suggest that there was an increasing need during the period for appointees who would agree with a policy of fewer environmental restrictions in domestic energy development as a response to world oil shortages. Such a policy bias is more commonly associated with the Republican party than with the Democratic party.

Another illustration of the persistent assumption that one's party membership signals his or her policy preferences is the requirement that independent commissions and boards have bipartisan composition. The implication is that, left to his own devices, the president would fill the independent agencies with fellow party members to help insure agreement with his regulatory philosophy.

According to John Macy, chairman of the Civil Service Commission from 1961-1969 and one of the top personnel advisers to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, the requirement for bipartisanship on independent commissions is ineffective.

> I think we'd be better off to forget about it, but I don't think that Congress will ever let

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> us. I think that it's artificial bipartisanship. There's a decided tendency to name friendly Indians from the opposing party, frequently those that have actually been members of Democrats for Nixon or something else. . . . I think it also tends to reinforce the introduction of congressional interference in the appointment process.[20]

Besides the higher overall totals of appointments from the presidential party, data from the past five presidencies contain other significant patterns. For Republican and Democratic presidents alike, the so-called political departments, i.e., those with close ties to outside constituency groups like Agriculture, Labor and Commerce, tended to receive more presidential party appointees. Conversely, those departments which traditionally require leadership with more expertise or specialized backgrounds, like Defense, State, and Energy, were more likely to show a higher percentage of appointees identified as "independent" or of "undesignated" party affiliation.

Table 2 indicates that for all five administrations, Agriculture and Commerce ranked among the top half of departments, in percentage of partisan appointments. Labor was among the top half in all but the Ford Administration. The Departments of State and Defense, on the other hand, consistently received the fewest presidential party appointees. These patterns agree with those for earlier administrations described in a 1967 Brookings Institution Study.[21] They are also consistent with Fenno's observation that some agency heads perform a function as "political sounding board to keep him [the president] responsive to the attitudes of various social groups."[22]

Another pattern seems to bear out the predictable phenomenon that presidents are influenced in their appointment decisions by the approach of an election year. Table 3 lists the yearly distribution of party affiliations among appointees to the five administrations. Lyndon Johnson, for example, appointed a larger percentage of Democrats in 1968 than in any of the previous three years. Yet both Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford appointed a smaller proportion of Republicans during the years in which they faced re-election. These figures suggest that while presidents of the majority party were free to use appointments as lures for party support, Republican presidents used an opposite strategy to broaden their bipartisan appeal in an election year.

Without considering the personnel selection styles of the five administrations this survey of patterns among major presidential appointments over the past twenty years tells only a partial story. In fact, the numbers alone would indicate that not much has changed in the influence of the presidential party over the distribution of federal jobs. It is in the selection process itself, however, that one of the many significant changes in the party-bureaucracy nexus has occurred.

[20] Interview with John Macy, conducted by James M. Graham and Victor H. Kramer as part of the U.S. Senate study in *Appointments to the Regulatory Commissions* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976). The interview was used with Mr. Graham's permission.

[21] Stanley, Mann, and Doig, *Men Who Govern*, pp. 24–25.

[22] Fenno, *President's Cabinet*, p. 25.

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TABLE 3
Distribution of Party Affiliation Among Major Presidential Appointees, 1961–1978 (By Year)*

Administration	*Year*	*Number of Appointees*	*Percent from President's Party*	*Percent Party-Affiliated*	*Percent Unaffiliated*
Kennedy	1961	315	77	84	16
	1962	155	70	84	16
	1963	113	51	58	42
Johnson	1964	89	52	56	44
	1965	176	52	65	35
	1966	170	55	62	38
	1967	153	56	68	32
	1968	114	68	77	23
Nixon	1969	298	66	72	28
	1970	141	79	86	14
	1971	157	78	88	12
	1972	97	65	75	25
	1973	198	66	75	25
	1974	85	72	81	19
Ford	1974	61	66	81	19
	1975	167	60	72	28
	1976	133	59	74	26
Carter	1977	323	64	70	30
	1978	156	55	63	37

* Unlike Table 2, Table 3 includes the party affiliation data for persons nominated to federal judgeships during the years 1961–78. These data were included because of the traditional use of such appointments as highly visible opportunities for presidential patronage and therefore as bargaining chips for the support of both congressmen and party organizations.

The White House Bureaucracy versus Party Organization

The choice of the Kennedy administration as the starting point for examining the takeover of party functions by the White House staff is not arbitrary. Trends away from the direct involvement of organized parties with executive branch processes accelerated during the 1960s and included some institutional changes. Some of the functions increasingly entrusted to the president's personal staff were advice on the selection of top political appointees; liason between the White House and the congressional party; and liason between the White House and special interest lobbies.

With respect to the appointment process, James Farley's influence over New Deal personnel selections was typical for the pre-1960s period. A 1953 study centered on the role of the national party chairperson devoted one large section to the dispensing of administration patronage.[23] The influential text on the presidency by Clinton Rossiter states that the importance of "the careful distri-

[23] Marie Chatham, "The Role of the National Party Chairman From Hanna to Farley" (Ph.D. diss., University of Maryland, 1953).

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bution of the loaves and fishes of Federal patronage" is that it "keeps the party a going concern."[24]

As late as the Eisenhower administration, Republican National Chairman Leonard Hall worked closely with senators, representatives, and state party leaders in maintaining a patronage list from which appointees were chosen. The reason for a prominent party role in the appointment process was clearly stated in a 1954 White House memo to the heads of executive agencies: "A government position for a loyal Republican of proven ability . . . will thus earn votes of confidence next November and in 1956."[25] This attitude was held even in the administration of a president commonly identified as highly nonpartisan.

The contrast between Kennedy administration procedures for bureaucratic appointments and those of earlier administrations is striking. Kennedy aide Theodore Sorensen reports that it was White House staffer Larry O'Brien, not Democratic National Chairman John Bailey, who saw to it that patronage appointments were made in the right place and at the right time. The Kennedy system, widely touted for its appearance of systematic efficiency, was virtually free from input by party professionals. Instead, O'Brien was assisted in the massive "talent search" by Robert Kennedy, Sargent Shriver, and Kenneth O'Donnell, along with other personal Kennedy loyalists. The arrangement continued after the initial hiring process, according to Sorensen, as O'Brien skillfully managed the political effect of patronage and "increased the value of personal Presidential appointments for Congressmen by keeping their number low."[26]

A key development in the separation of the party organization from the executive establishment was the move by the Kennedy administration to take politics out of the Post Office. "The postmaster-generalship, in another break with tradition, was turned over, not to a patronage politician or National Committee chairman, but to a skilled administrator, J. Edward Day, a Stevenson supporter whom JFK had met only in passing."[27] Thus, an important bridge between party and bureaucracy was eliminated in the idealistic exuberance of the new administration, and it was not to be rebuilt. As one of the Kennedy holdovers in the Johnson administration, O'Brien formulated a plan which resulted eventually in the removal of the Post Office Department from the cabinet structure altogether.[28] This is not to say that O'Brien regarded patronage as a less important function than before, but he apparently saw little need for restoring the party organization to its formerly central role in the process.

DNC Chairman Bailey's influence during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations remained a shadow of the powerful role enjoyed by many of his predecessors. During the Kennedy years, Bailey remained an outsider, since "family members and the President's friends from Massachusetts had much more to say

[24] Clinton Rossiter, *The American Presidency*, 2d ed. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1960), p. 32.

[25] Quoted in Key, *Politics*, p. 350n.

[26] Theodore C. Sorensen, *Kennedy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 399.

[27] Ibid., pp. 283-4.

[28] Lawrence F. O'Brien, *No Final Victories* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1974).

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about political decisions than did National Chairman Bailey."[29] Despite his reappointment as head of the DNC by President Johnson, Bailey was even more isolated from patronage and other political activities and served more as a symbol of continuity with the previous administration.[30]

Both Sorenson and O'Brien took pride in the distance achieved between old-line party professionals and the Kennedy administration. The benefits of that legacy are debatable, however. W. G. Carleton, an historian who points out that Kennedy was largely responsible for the trend toward personal staffs and direct media exposure of presidential views, has argued that this development "dwarfed politicians, party, and Congress," and "contributed to the personalized and plebiscitic Presidency."[31] This view is supported by the evidence of succeeding administrations, since the party organization's place in the presidential appointment process was never regained.

Lyndon Johnson made use of a staffing system modeled after the Kennedy prototype and headed by adviser John Macy. But Macy reports that Johnson reserved decisions about important political appointments for himself and a select group of his personal staff.[32] Apparently distrustful of overt partisanship in the presidency, Johnson wrote, "I never questioned the capacity, or the sincerity, or the ability of a man because he belonged to a different political party."[33] Accordingly, Table 1 shows that among recent presidents, Johnson appointed the lowest percentage of political executives from his own party.

Appointments in the Nixon administration, like most other domestic political decisions, were the province of the White House staff under H. R. Haldeman and John Ehrlichman. The Republican national chairman was considered a nonentity by Haldeman, who "told fellow Presidential aides that the National Committee was not going to amount to anything, ever."[34] However, as Table 1 indicates, the percentage of political appointees from the president's party during the Nixon administration was higher than those from the Kennedy, Johnson, Ford, or Carter years.

Gerald Ford did not have the clean sweep of an election victory from which to develop a coherent appointment policy. Cronin writes that, seemingly, "Ford just did not know people to recruit and that he was unable to develop a strategy for recruitment."[35] The small total of major Ford appointments listed in Table 2 makes further generalizations difficult.

It was Jimmy Carter who provoked a storm of protest from the Democratic

[29] Cotter and Hennessy, *Politics*, p. 88.

[30] Interview with Vera Murray, confidential assistant to Robert Strauss, 13 February 1981, Washington, D.C.

[31] William G. Carleton, "Kennedy in History: An Early Appraisal," *The Antioch Review* 24 (No. 3, 1964), pp. 277–99.

[32] John Macy interview, op. cit.

[33] Lyndon Baines Johnson, *The Vantage Point* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), pp. 27–8.

[34] Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, *Nixon in the White House* (New York: Random House, 1971), p. 74.

[35] Thomas Cronin, *The State of the Presidency* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1975), p. 61.

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party hierarchy with his apparent mistrust of, and lack of enthusiasm for, patronage appointments. After eight years of Republican rule, leaders of both national and state Democratic organizations clamored for their share of the spoils. The administration responded by saying that very few patronage jobs were available. White House aide Mark Siegel remarked that "the government is not as much of a candy store as we thought," and that Carter's commitment to strong Cabinet government meant that most hiring decisions had been delegated to department and agency heads.[36] As a matter of fact, the overall Carter record on partisan appointments was nearly the same as that of any of the other administrations studied (Table 1). Nevertheless, the administration's defense of its hiring process left Democratic leaders unconvinced. State party chairmen, for example, suggested that the real reasons for their lack of influence in the appointments process was the administration's penchant for rewarding personal loyalists and fellow Georgians. Even party regulars from Georgia were unhappy. One objected that "the people around him are concerned with one individual [Carter], not the party organization."[37] Iowa Democratic chairman Ed Campbell noted that in the Iowa offices of the Housing and Urban Development and Commerce Departments as well as in the Small Business Administration, Republican appointees held positions while " . . . administering in the same old Nixon-Ford fashion."[38]

At the national level, the DNC passed a resolution of protest in April 1977 demanding more consultation on presidential appointments.[39] After continuing expression of displeasure from DNC officials about White House neglect of party affairs, Chairman Kenneth Curtis resigned at the end of his first year in the job.

Thus the trend away from reliance on the party structure for personnel advice persisted throughout the two decades from Kennedy to Carter. Whether the result has been a more highly qualified cadre of political executives is open to debate. What seems certain, though, is that the relationship between presidents and party organizations has been severely strained in the process.

White House Liaison with Congress and the Public

Another patronage-related function which has been shifted from the control of the national party organization to the White House bureaucracy is congressional liaison. Tentatively institutionalized during the Eisenhower administration, the Office of Congressional Relations (OCR) reached its full potential under the leadership of Larry O'Brien during the Kennedy and Johnson years. Once

[36] *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports*, 14 January 1978, p. 59.

[37] Ibid., p. 60.

[38] Ibid. Table 1 shows that many more Carter appointees were actually of undesignated party affiliation than were Republican identifiers.

[39] Ibid.

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again, the institutional loser in the development was the national party chairperson.

As previously noted, national chairmen like Farley and Hall were political advisers to the president as well as managers of the party's business and organizational concerns. One particularly important assignment was keeping tabs on the administration's relations with particular congressmen. This included not only monitoring requests for patronage appointments but also providing to congressmen information on administration-sponsored bills, construction projects, and presidential trips which would affect the legislator's state or congressional district.[40]

The presidents since Kennedy have depended less on the national party organizations for such support, however. With larger and larger personal staffs, television exposure, and electronic information storage and retrieval technology, presidents could manage quite well without the national party's card files. President Kennedy was personally wary of working through party professionals, many of whom he viewed as collections of "tired or tarnished holdovers from another era," and believed that "the Democratic party was something to win through, not to govern through."[41]

This is not to say that O'Brien's OCR operation excluded the national party entirely. In fact, a recent study indicates that O'Brien chose to use the DNC as a front to help insulate his White House operation from an image as an open dispensary for political favors.[42] Manley argues, however, that the funneling of appointments through the DNC was actually

> an effort to enjoy the benefits of patronage without paying all the costs. By channeling patronage requests to the DNC O'Brien protected the OCR from being overwhelmed by hundreds of specific demands and placed the bargaining position of the OCR on a somewhat higher level than the ratio of requests met to requests received.[43]

In addition, O'Brien's legislative liaison operation enabled the administration to attempt bipartisan bargaining, a tactic which would have been less than believable in the hands of the DNC. Although employed very sparingly, the strategy allowed the Office of Congressional Relations to "use friendly Republicans like Frank Horton to intercede and gather information on Republican plans, and they even elicited the cooperation of the ranking Republican on Education and Labor," in one instance.[44]

It should be noted that some congressional relations functions remained with the national committee staffs. For example, Clifton Carter, one of Lyndon

[40] Key, *Politics*, p. 664.

[41] James MacGregor Burns, *The Deadlock of Democracy: Four-Party Politics in America* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), pp. 308–9.

[42] John F. Manley, "Presidential Power and White House Lobbying," *Political Science Quarterly* 93 (Summer 1978), p. 261.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Ibid., p. 269.

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Johnson's Texas associates, served as executive director of the DNC from 1964 to 1966. While there, Carter directed an orientation program for 46 new Democratic members of Congress elected in 1964. In a series of follow-up contacts with the freshman legislators, the committee assisted them with letters to constituents and news releases for hometown media, and also provided access to DNC mailing lists.[45] Clifton Carter's presence at the national party headquarters is another indication that recent presidents have preferred to rely on personal loyalists rather than party professionals for basic operations even in the realm of domestic politics.

Finally, the enlarged White House establishment has assumed many of the party organizations' liaison activities with respect to interest groups across the whole spectrum of American society. The extent to which this function was formerly performed by the national party committees can be seen from a 1957 report on staff activities at the RNC. Among the divisions in operation at the time were those dealing with the following groups: women, nationalities, racial and ethnic minorities, labor, and agriculture.[46] By the end of the Carter administration, however, White House staff had taken over liaison duties with a more inclusive assortment of special interests that embraced consumers, environmentalists, labor, cultural groups, the aged, intellectuals, as well as youth, women, minorities, and labor organizations.

Ironically, the beginnings of institutionalization for public liaison took place, not in the administration of an activist Democrat, but during the tenure of Richard Nixon. The decline of party cohesion, the recent emergence of more than 2,000 new lobbying groups, and the necessity for issue-by-issue coalitions of support, as political analyst Dom Bonafede has observed, led to the emergence of the function in the White House.[47]

The operation began with the formal title of White House Office of Public Liaison under Nixon aide Charles Colson. It grew to a size of about 30 staffers under William Baroody, Jr., during the Ford administration and was then inherited by Carter assistant Midge Costanza. Following Costanza's resignation in 1978, the office was turned over to Anne Wexler, a former protege of DNC chairman John Bailey.[48] The Wexler operation was smaller and more loosely organized than Baroody's, but it has been praised as one of the most effective of the Carter administration's political undertakings.

Instead of serving only as a sympathetic ear for the complaints of various interests, Wexler used the opportunity to

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[45] Clifton C. Carter Oral History, LBJ Library. The transcript was used with permission from Mrs. Clifton C. Carter.

[46] Memo to Chairman Meade Alcorn from Robert Humphreys, et. al., June 12, 1957, quoted in Cornelius P. Cotter and John F. Bibby, "The Impact of Reform on the National Party Organizations," paper delivered at the American Political Science Association annual meeting (September 1979), p. 15.

[47] Dom Bonafede, "To Anne Wexler, All the World Is a Potential Lobbyist," *National Journal*, 8 September 1979, pp. 1476–79.

[48] Ibid.

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> reach out to interest groups and use them to gain support for the President's program . . . "We never ask a person to call a Congressman," Wexler said, "but we will tell him when a vote is coming up . . . We can say, 'This is the program and the President would like your help and these are the committee members involved.' Most of our work falls under the rubric of education."[49]

Among the successful mobilization efforts in which the Wexler office took part were those supporting the creation of a Department of Education and the ratification of the Panama Canal treaties.

Two observations can be made concerning the development of this office in the White House. First, the public liaison function calls into question one of the long-held beliefs about the presidency as an institution, namely, that it is the best guarantor of representation for the wider national interest. How can the White House be the depository of hopes for the people as a whole and, at the same time, act as broker amid special interest demands?[50] Second, a description of the activity of the public liaison office as developed by Wexler—aggregation of diverse interests, mobilization of grass roots support, dissemination of information to voting groups—bears a striking resemblance to textbook descriptions of another institution, the political party.

Conclusion

This overview of the contemporary relationship between organized parties and the executive establishment presents an anomalous picture. On the one hand, presidents have staffed and managed the bureaucracy over the last two decades with little institutional recognition of the party structure. At the same time, the result of the appointment process has been a continuing reliance on members of the president's party to occupy the political executive positions so important for bringing a measure of coherence to administration programs.

The idea of a bureaucracy managed without party control is certainly not new to the American political process. As Rourke has observed,

> The political neutralization of bureaucracy is impossible in a country in which the political parties are incapable of performing the functions expected of them in the governmental structure of which they are a part. When the parties do not provide for program development and the mobilization of political support, executive agencies must perform these tasks for themselves, or seek support from outside groups which will help them to do so.[51]

What is new, or at least has become increasingly more pronounced over the last quarter century, is the trend toward assumption of traditional party functions by the capstone of the bureaucracy, the White House–Executive Office

[49] Ibid., p. 1478.

[50] For a fuller discussion of this point, see Francis E. Rourke, *Presidential Leadership and Bureaucratic Autonomy* (unpublished manuscript).

[51] Francis E. Rourke, *Bureaucracy, Politics, and Public Policy*, 2d ed. (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1976), p. 43.

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complex. Whether the development can be traced to the necessity for presidents to fill the vacuum left by declining parties, or whether the encroachment has been a cause rather than an effect of further weakness in the party structure is a matter of debate. What does seem clear is that the presidency has lost a source of reliable, outlying support which formerly could be, and was, taken for granted. As Jimmy Carter learned, when the party organization is ignored in its accustomed roles of campaign and staffing consultant, it is reluctant to provide assistance when its support is needed to help solve the problems of governance.

Despite their loss of organizational influence, the parties continue to receive the president's important symbolic recognition when government posts are filled. Whether or not the national chairman sits at the president's right hand in the appointment process, the results in terms of aggregate numbers of partisan appointees is not very different from the days of master politicos like Jim Farley.

This may be so because of the ideological mistrust recent presidents have exhibited toward bureaucrats from the opposing party. The secular trends may be away from the long-held maxim that American political parties are pragmatic organizations of campaign and patronage professionals and are nearly devoid of any identifiable ideological content.

Indeed, the early experiences of the Reagan administration point to an increased sense of ideological continuity between the president and his executive establishment, for which the Republican party's highly organized and affluent right wing is the chief impetus. If this pattern were to persist beyond the tenure of Ronald Reagan, the party organizations may find the key to revival, not in computerized mailing lists, but in their opportunity to form a philosophical core and policy framework around which the president and federal bureaucracy may coalesce.

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Urban Theorists, Urban Reform, and American Political Culture in the Progressive Period

MICHAEL H. FRISCH

Three problems in urban history can be better understood when viewed as interrelated parts of the political and intellectual climate of the Progressive age. These problems involve the development of academic urban theory during the Progressive period, the emergence at the same time of urban reform movements, and finally, concomitant changes in American political culture.

Around the turn of the century, in almost every variety of writing about American cities and their governments, from popular tracts to academic tomes, one can detect a dramatic change: the metaphorical mode of urban pathology—Jefferson's sores on the body politic becoming Josiah Strong's cancer—is suddenly replaced by another. In the new framework, the city itself is seen as the political and cultural cure for its own cancer. It is presented as the hope of a broader troubled society, as the crux of civilization where modern problems must be engaged and where, through triumphant engagement, American Democracy would be redeemed. This change in viewing urbanism seems to presume important shifts in ideas, values, and assumptions. Yet it has gone relatively unexplained, unless one accepts an explanation of transition from negative to positive, or pessimism to optimism, as sufficient.[1]

[1] The theme of the city as moral threat has been much discussed, but a recent study is definitive, both in terms of scope and depth of insight. See Paul Boyer, *Urban Masses and Moral Order in America, 1820–1920* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 125–29, 170–74, 176–79.

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The second problem is locating the familiar urban reform movements of the 1890s in the broader context of what has been called a "seismic crisis" in American society.[2] The recent academic isolation of "urban history" from other areas of study has been one of the serious prices paid for the dubious benefits of specialization. This isolation has been especially excessive in discussions concerning the 1890s. There are simply too many discussions of the 1894 founding of the National Municipal League, for instance, that leave readers with the sense that strikes, unemployment, depression, and radicalism had no place in the consciousness of those who assembled to address the need for a municipal reform organization. These dimensions merit closer scrutiny than they have received.[3]

This leads to the third problem: the relationship between urban political reform, in theory and practice, and the changing nature of American political culture through what is still usefully thought of as the Progressive Period. Here the problem is not neglect but the opposite: urban reform has been studied not too little but perhaps too well. Scholars in recent years have accordingly turned away from the actual content and implications of reform theory and ideology and have focused instead on the linking of reform and its opposition to various constituencies in the urban social and economic structure. Moderately successful in itself, this approach has tended to remain narrowly urban, however, and indifferent to the more general issues of politics, government, and ideology that had figured so centrally in older historiography although never fully understood.[4]

All three of these problems suggest the value of taking a fresh look at both the texts and the contexts of Progressive Era political theory. Historiographical developments make the time seem especially propitious for this undertaking. The present inquiry was, in fact, stimulated by the recent outpouring of work exploring the history of academic professionalization in this same period. This literature has generated lively debate about the complex links between ideas, the institutions that shaped those who generated them, and the larger political and cultural context in which both intellectuals and institutions functioned. Since so

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Pathological approaches in political science are discussed in Don Martindale, "The Theory of the City," in Max Weber, *The City* (New York: Free Press, 1959), pp. 16–20.

[2] In addition to the standard interpretive surveys of this period, the following are particularly relevant to this article: Thomas Haskell, *The Emergence of Professional Social Science: The American Social Science Association and the Nineteenth Century Crisis of Authority* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1977), especially pp. 1–20; Morton Keller, *Affairs of State: Public Life in the Late Nineteenth Century America* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1977); and Jean Quandt, *From the Small Town to the Great Community: The Social Thought of Progressive Intellectuals* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1970).

[3] The most recent texts and general studies in urban history all share this trait to some extent. The more old-fashioned and narrow surveys tend to be the least erroneous on these grounds. See, for example, Ernest S. Griffith, *A History of American City Government: The Conspicuous Failure, 1870–1900* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), pp. 120–25.

[4] The most well-known and influential interpretation relating municipal reform to a broader political context is Samuel Hays, "The Politics of Reform in Municipal Government in the Progressive Period," *Pacific Northwest Quarterly* 55 (1964): 157–69.

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much of the Progressive literature was written by a first generation of academic urban specialists, in what was beginning to be known as political science, it seemed reasonable to expect that a new avenue of inquiry would assist the investigation of the questions posed above.[5]

A closer examination confirmed this, but with a curious twist which only made the problems more intriguing: it is immediately apparent that professionalization in the study of politics and government is, to date, a highly problematic missing link in the energetic recent literature. Almost all scholarly attention has been given to the professionalization of the field of economics that preceded the development of political science, and to the "golden age" of sociology that followed it. Thomas Haskell's influential book, for example, which presumes to explain how and why social scientists explained the world of the 1890s as they did, virtually ignores that emerging discipline whose special concern was precisely those political institutions which were the focus of much public discussion during the decade, a discipline, moreover, which expressed this concern through unprecedented interest in the nature of urban government.[6]

This omission provides a final reason for returning to the basic sources for a needed reexamination. This article will focus somewhat narrowly on the development of urban theory and will attempt to explain how and why academic political scientists came to be at the center of urban reform theory. It will be argued that understanding this clarifies the broader ideological significance of the Progressive concerns with urban government.

It is hoped that this brief exploration will make the methodological point that intellectual history, closely studied but broadly defined, can help recover the meaning of words, values, and categories in a context other than our own—something especially difficult when so many of the same terms and structures remain in current usage. That this reconstruction does not come easily suggests how far our contemporary culture has moved—academically and politically—in the interval between that first self-conscious urban crisis and the one that lingers to-

[5] In addition to Haskell, *Professional Social Science*, see Burton Bledstein, *The Culture of Professionalism: The Middle Class and the Development of Higher Education in America* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1976); Mary Furner, *Advocacy and Objectivity* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1975); and Dorothy Ross, "Socialism and American Liberalism: Academic Social Thought in the 1880's," *Perspectives in American History*, 11 (1977-78): 5-79, and "The Development of the Social Sciences," in A. Oleson and J. Voss, eds., *The Organization in Modern America, 1860-1920* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), 107-30. See also the excellent review essay by Henrika Kuklick, "The Organization of Social Science in the United States," *American Quarterly* 28 (1976): 124-41. Hamilton Cravens, "The Abandonment of Evolutionary Social Theory in America: The Impact of Academic Professionalism Upon American Sociological Theory, 1890-1920," *American Studies* 12 (1971): 5-20, and Al Gedicks, "American Social Scientists and the Emerging Corporate Economy, 1885-1915," *The Insurgent Sociologists* 5 (1975): 25-47, are also useful.

[6] Haskell, *Professional Social Science*, pp. 190-91, 215 for a generally sketchy treatment of political science. Furner, *Advocacy and Objectivity*, pp. 278-91 is quite good, but her treatment of political science is somewhat peripheral to the main conceptual framework of her study. Kenneth Fox, *Better City Government: Innovation in American Urban Politics, 1850-1937* (Philadelphia, Pa.: Temple University Press, 1977), pp. 33-41, is good on this point.

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day, unfashionable and unsolved. This exercise may contribute to measuring that distance, throwing on less narrowly theoretical questions the light necessary to apprehend, understand, and redirect the complex process of change.

JOHN W. BURGESS AND THE CONTEXT OF URBAN POLITICAL THEORY

Because the particular context of urban political theory is less familiar than the broader reform context, it is best to begin by correcting this deficiency. To look at the late nineteenth century is necessarily to examine the role of academic political science, which was emerging as a recognizable and professionalized discipline at this time. To understand how it became a source of particularly urban theory, we must begin by working out of the enormous if ambiguous shadow of John W. Burgess.

Burgess is probably most familiar as a source of anti-immigrant propaganda, one of the chief intellectual spokesmen for the "Teutonic Hypothesis" of racial superiority.[7] His role as an academic innovator, however, though not unconnected to this, was probably far more significant. Burgess, at Columbia University, was to political science what Herbert Baxter Adams at Johns Hopkins was to history—the virtual creator in the American university of the research-oriented, graduate seminar-focused, professional discipline.[8] After several frustrating years at Amherst College, Burgess was invited to put into practice at Columbia the model he had been thinking about since his formative studies in Berlin and Göttingen. He established the School of Political Science in 1880 and staffed it with former students from Amherst such as Richmond Mayo-Smith, Frank Goodnow, and Munroe Smith. He persuaded another student to publish the new *Political Science Quarterly*, and in the early 1890s masterminded the overall transformation of Columbia into a modern structured university. For over thirty years, Burgess' school, his journal, his students, and their students dominated the study of American government and politics.[9]

[7] See Burgess's public address, "Uncle Sam," included as an appendix to his very useful autobiography, *Reminiscences of an American Scholar* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1934), pp. 380–401. See also Edward Saveth, *American Historians and European Immigrants* (New York: Russell & Russell, 1965, 1948 ed.), pp. 32–64, and Barbara Miller Solomon, *Ancestors and Immigrants: A Changing New England Tradition* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956), especially pp. 59–81.

[8] See Jurgen Herbst, *The German Historical School in American Scholarship* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1965), pp. 169–75, 177, on Burgess's role in these developments. Also, Albert Somit and Joseph Tanenhaus, *The Development of American Political Science*, (Boston, Mass.: Allyn and Bacon, 1967), pp. 16–17, 23–25; and Richard Hofstadter and Walter Metzger, *The Development of Academic Freedom in the United States* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955), pp. 367–82. Bernard Crick, *The American Science of Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959), pp. 27–29, is especially good, as is William R. Shepherd, "John W. Burgess," in Howard Odum, ed., *American Masters of Social Science* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1927), pp. 23–57.

[9] See Burgess, *Remiscences*, pp. 139–49, and 188–244; Somit and Tanenhaus, *American Political Science*, pp. 21–23; and Munroe Smith, "The University and the Non-Professional Graduate

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Burgess himself, however, managed to dominate the field while, paradoxically, having almost no real intellectual influence and few dedicated disciples. In fact, his own work served more as a negative reference, an idea that is central to the present investigation.

Like Adams, Burgess was deeply committed to the method of historical and comparative study, to the searching out of documents, and to the study of institutional evolution. His goal was to discover how the forms of political and institutional development expressed national spirit, which Burgess took to be essentially racial in character. While allowing that other races had their own spiritual strengths, he argued that the special gift of the Teutonic/Aryan tradition was a capacity for civil government. This made the detailed tracing of western institutions and constitutional history the appropriate concern of political science.[10] The germ theory of historical process, to which Burgess and Adams subscribed, directed researchers back to the study of local institutions, in which, it was believed, the emergent spirit of a nation could best be observed.

For all his scientific methodology, Burgess was an almost purely Hegelian idealist. For him the State—as the spirit of a People—was an *a priori* idea, preceding, separable from, and frequently in conflict with the particular forms and structures of tangible government. The test of the latter's legitimacy, accordingly, was the degree to which it embodied and expressed the former.[11] This philosophy grew from Burgess's life and politics. Traumatized by his personal experience of the Civil War in the divided upper South, he emerged a passionate nationalist. He had nothing but contempt for the elegant balances of eighteenth-century political theory, especially the fiction of Locke's notion of contract and the states' rights doctrine he held responsible for the War. The nation he envisioned embodied a transcendant unitary spirit based on individual rights and freedoms. This led him to distinguish between the desirability of a strong na-

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Schools," in Book II of Brander Matthews, et al., eds., *History of Columbia University* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1904), especially pp. 223–28. Exhaustive, of course, is the school's own history by R. Gordon Hoxie, ed., *A History of the Faculty of Political Science in Columbia University* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955), especially John D. Millett, "The Department of Public Law and Government," pp. 256–83.

[10] See Bernard E. Brown, *American Conservatives: The Political Thought of Francis Lieber and John W. Burgess* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951), pp. 131–33; Herbst, *German Historical School*, pp. 116–17, 120–27; Saveth, *Historians and Immigrants,* pp. 15–21; and Solomon, *Ancestors and Immigrants,* pp. 59–81.

[11] Burgess's major work is *Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law* (Boston, Mass.: Ginn and Company, 1890–91). See also a concise application of his overall views to the American constitutional system, in Burgess, "The American Commonwealth: Changes in its Relation to the Nation," *Political Science Quarterly* 1 (1886): 9–35. He defends his general position in *Reminiscences*, pp. 250–53. In addition to Brown, *American Conservatives*, pp. 113–19, 172–73, see Bert James Loewenberg, "John William Burgess, The Scientific Method, and the Hegelian Philosophy of History," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 42 (1955): 490–509; and Charles Gilbert, "Operative Doctrines of Representation," *American Political Science Review* 57 (1963): 604–18.

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tional state and the undesirability of a strong, active national government. He was, in short, a laissez-faire nationalist.[12]

The important point here is not to trace how this position combined with racism to make him a notorious reactionary, ultimately disgraced by his "Teutonophilia" during the next major war. More pertinent is to note at what an early stage, and on grounds as much intellectual as political, he became an embattled conservative within his own profession.

Burgess himself was quick to detect a growing revolt against his philosophy. Given his role as a conduit for German educational models, it is ironic that he blamed this revolt on the ideas his successors were picking up in their studies abroad, especially in Germany. In a remarkable speech at the 1893 Columbian Exposition, for instance, he identified several major threats to American civilization, among them immigration, which by "polluting it with non-Aryan elements" subverted America's mission to uphold an "Aryan genius for political civilization upon the basis of a predominantly Teutonic nationality." He reserved his major fury in this speech for what he held to be a less well-understood threat: the "occult and corrupting influences" of the "young professors filled with European culture," especially filled with one part of that culture, the "vicious nonsense" of socialism.[13]

This was not hyperbole for the public. In arguing within a university committee in 1889 for the restructuring of Columbia, Burgess had based his position on the premise that "nearly all the Americans who have studied abroad during the last decade have returned to this country with a more or less pronounced leaning towards state socialism." The issue, he claimed, was "whether the American point of view, now practically nonexistent, shall be supplied." To supply this point of view he held as the "paramount duty which Columbia College owes the American people."[14]

The threat of socialism, state or otherwise, was not really the source of Burgess's discomfort nor was Columbia University part of the solution. As Burgess must have already sensed from the work of his proteges there, it was part of the problem. This is because by the late 1880s the first generation to come through American graduate training was already turning the comparative method against the idealism of Burgess and Adams.[15] Nothing was more central

[12] On the impact of the Civil War on Burgess's generation, see Barry Karl, *Charles E. Merriam and the Study of Politics* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago, 1974), pp. 32–33; see also Loewenberg, "Burgess, Scientific Method, and Hegel," pp. 501–5; Crick, *American Science of Politics*, pp. 97–99; Brown, *American Conservatives*, pp. 120–31, 174–75; and Herbst, *German Historical School*, pp. 66–67, 126–27.

[13] The speech was reprinted as "The Ideal of the American Commonwealth," *Political Science Quarterly* 10 (1895): 404–25. Quoted passages are 406–7, 410–12. See also Shepherd, "Burgess," in Odum, *Masters of Social Science*, 54–55.

[14] Burgess, "Report of the Several Faculties to the Special Committee of the Trustees on the Elevation of the Courses of Instruction," (New York, 1889), printed in Hoxie, *Faculty of Political Science*, p. 51.

[15] On the generational conflict, see Crick, *American Science of Politics*, pp. 95–96, 101, and Somit and Tanenhaus, *American Political Science*, pp. 61–63. See also Richard Hofstadter, *The*

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to this revolt than the emerging study of public law and administration. At the heart of that study, for reasons which need to be understood, was the problem of the place and meaning of urban government.

Frank Goodnow and Woodrow Wilson

Led by Frank Goodnow, the revolt at Columbia and the form it took will be clearer if we turn for a moment to the parallel developments at Johns Hopkins, where the young Woodrow Wilson was forging an original and widely-noted critique of American politics with administrative theory at its center. As Morton White noted decades ago, Wilson and his generation were almost obsessed with getting at what seemed to them real life—by going beyond the abstract formalism of orthodox thought surrounding them.[16] In politics, this meant going beyond the reification of constitutions and institutions, historically or in the present. It also meant describing how things actually worked or didn't work, and measuring the distance between government on paper and government in action. The term Wilson used to describe government in action—real government—was administration.[17]

Here Burgess and Adams were turned on their heads. To them eighteenth-century theory inhibited the expression of the state-as-spirit; to Wilson it represented an anachronism in the modern world and, more importantly, an im-

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Progressive Historians: Turner, Beard, Parrington (New York: Knopf, 1968), pp. 179–81, and Max Lerner, "Charles Beard's Political Theory," in Howard K. Beale, ed., *Charles A. Beard: An Appraisal* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1954), pp. 28–32 on Burgess as negative reference. A scathing review of Burgess's magnum opus by Woodrow Wilson can be found in *Atlantic Monthly* 67 (1891): 694–99, reprinted in Arthur S. Link et al., *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, 37 vols. to date (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1966-) vol. 7, 195–203. Finally, for a sense of the changing of the guard, see Goodnow's address as the first president of the new American Political Science Association, "The Work of the American Political Science Association," *Proceedings of the American Political Science Association,* (1904): 35–46. For a portrait of Burgess as a genial colleague and successful teacher, see Nicholas Murray Butler, *Across the Busy Years: Recollections and Reflections* (New York: Scribners, 1939), pp. 68–69.

[16] Morton White, *Social Thought in America: The Revolt Against Formalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976, of 1949 ed.), pp. 3–7. See also Cushing Strout, *The Pragmatic Revolt in American History: Carl Becker and Charles Beard* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1958), p. 90; Edward Purcell, *The Crisis of Democratic Theory: Scientific Naturalism and the Problem of Value* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1973), pp. 5–10, 17. For a sensitive discussion placing Burgess in context, see Martin Landau, "The Myth of Hyperfactualism in the Study of American Politics," *Political Science Quarterly* 83 (1968): 378–99.

[17] See, of course, Wilson's classic essay, "The Study of Administration," *Political Science Quarterly* 2 (1887):197–222. Reprinted in vol. 56 (1941). See also Henry Wilkinson Bragdon, *Woodrow Wilson: The Academic Years* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 101–6. On the particular point of reaching a "real" level, see Crick, *American Science of Politics*, p. 106, and Dwight Waldo, *The Administrative State: A Study of the Political Theory of American Public Administration* (New York: Ronald Press, 1948), pp. 3–7. See Frederic C. Howe, *Confessions of a Reformer* (New York: Scribner's, 1925), for the famous first page paean to Wilson and the others at Hopkins where, Howe says, "my life really began."

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pediment to the development of the more positive governmental role he believed was necessary for dealing with a transformed social and economic order. Nowhere was this transformed order more dramatic than in modern cities and nowhere was the gap between the forms and realities of power more incapacitating. Given the silence of the Constitution on urban government, cities were by definition invisible in orthodox theory. Their palpable reality and their highly problematic politics stood for Wilson as a proof of the need for a reformulated theory capable of recognizing and dealing with them.[18] This theory shall be considered in detail shortly; here it is important to appreciate how municipal affairs functioned as the focus of the assault on the idealist orthodoxy, an assault Wilson and others mounted with the very weapons of historical and comparative analysis Burgess and Adams had provided them.

Although Wilson himself never published most of the writings and notes on administrative law and history which fill the volumes of his collected papers for these years, such studies were his major intellectual preoccupation throughout the early 1890s. As the decade's tempo of political and social strife quickened, Wilson interrupted his own speedy climb up the academic ladder—from Bryn Mawr to Wesleyan to Princeton—to return for six weeks every winter to Johns Hopkins where he delivered a lecture series on public law and administration, culminating in an elaborate comparative study of municipal governments in the United States, England, France and Germany.[19] As it happened, the 1896 lectures coincided with an intense political standoff between Baltimore's new reform mayor and its unreconstructed city council. Wilson, already widely known as a public speaker, found his Hopkins lectures suddenly a public sensation. Shortly thereafter, he made his maiden political speech at a giant municipal reform rally where he shared the platform with Teddy Roosevelt.[20]

It is hard to say which was a more significant development in the 1890s, the centrality of municipal questions to the emerging discipline of political science, or the authority of academic social scientists, as Wilson's debut suggests, in urban reform movements. With respect to the first, it is interesting to note that the earlier American Social Science Association, the subject of Haskell's work, divided its labors into categories which allowed no room for a particular focus on urban concerns, especially governmental. By the 1890s, however, municipal government dominated the quasi-academic, quasi-professional periodical press that reached the same audience. This was especially true in academic political

[18] See Fox, *Better City Government*, pp. 33–39, 42–62, and see Bragdon, *Wilson: Academic Years*, pp. 196–98. Also useful is Keller, *Affairs of State*, pp. 289–97.

[19] See, for example, Wilson's notes in *Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, vol. 6, pp. 484–521, and a helpful editorial note on the lectures, pp. 482–84. See also Bragdon, *Wilson: The Academic Years*, pp. 183–201 on these lectures. Wilson made the same points repeatedly in public lectures through the period. "I am loaded to the muzzle on municipal reform" he noted (vol. 6, p. 675).

[20] See Wilson's notes and newspaper accounts in *Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, vol. 9, pp. 411–14, 437, 449–54, 461–65, 468–73, 477–80, 482–83. The 4 March 1896 rally is discussed and reported, pp. 483–84.

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science: by mid-decade, over 20 percent of the articles in Columbia's *Political Science Quarterly* were on municipal themes.[21]

As to the second point—reform activism—there is little need for extensive demonstration. Goodnow and most of his younger Columbia colleagues worked hard in the mayoral campaigns of their president, Seth Low. Far more important was their very influential role in shaping the agenda of the national reform movement. Present at the creation of the National Muncipal League in 1894, these academics succeeded in gradually shifting its focus from reportage to prescriptive analysis. When the League's *Muncipal Program* was unveiled in 1899, it bore the clear stamp of the new political science. Its drafting had been dominated by Goodnow, his students John Fairlie and Delos Wilcox, Wilson's classmate Albert Shaw, and Leo Rowe of the University of Pennsylvania. Lawyer Horace Deming, who chaired the committee, was the exception, since his contribution reflected academic theory far more than it did the tradition of mugwump moralism from which he came.[22]

This activism was integral to the intellectual assumptions of the new discipline and an urban focus was its logical consequence. In fact, activism lay close to the heart of what these scholars understood by the very term "science." To them, as Dwight Waldo noted, "one became scientific by studying 'nature not books;' the scientific method was thought of as the natural partner of a practical reformism." They would have agreed with Marx who was expressing a broader assumption in social science when he declared that "the point is to change the world."[23] They had a rather narrower sense than he of what kind of change that world needed, and their activism was restricted to the "practical," reflecting an already advanced retreat in American academia from more fundamental questionings of the assumptions of capitalism that marked social thought in the 1880s.[24] Burgess' fear of socialism was not something his students discarded

[21] Haskell, *Professional Social Science*, pp. 104–6. See also Dan F. White, "The Self-Conscious City: A Survey and Bibliographic Summary of Periodical Literature on American Urban Themes, 1865–1900," (Ph.D. diss., George Washington University, 1969), pp. 606–7.

[22] *A Municipal Program, Report of the Committee of the National Municipal League, adopted by the League, November 17, 1899, together with Explanatory and other Papers* (New York: MacMillan Co., 1900). This included the program itself, and articles by Goodnow, Shaw, Fairlie, Wilcox, and Deming. See also Goodnow's Presidential Address, "Work of the American Political Science Association," for an explicit argument that activism was the heart of the new group's mission, pp. 43–45. For background, see Frank Mann Stewart, *A Half-Century of Municipal Reform: The History of the National Municipal League* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1950), pp. 23–30, 40–49.

[23] Dwight Waldo, "Political Science in the United States of America," (Paris: A UNESCO Booklet, 1956), p. 12. Karl Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," in Robert C. Tucker, *The Marx-Engels Reader* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1972), pp. 107–9. On the general "scientific" justification for activism, see Crick, *American Science of Politics*, p. 107; Somit and Tannenhaus, *American Political Science*, pp. 42–47; Haskell, *Professional Social Science*, p. 73.

[24] On the academic retreat from socialism, see Ross, "Socialism and American Liberalism"; Bledstein, *Culture of Professionalism*, p. 372; and the debate between Mary Furner, *Advocacy and Objectivity*, pp. 41, 98, 106–17, 143–62, and Thomas Haskell, *Professional Social Science*, pp. 154, 163, 175–87, over whether this is to be understood in socio-political or intellectual terms.

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with his Hegelianism. Nevertheless, active engagement in the broader context of politics was a central dimension of the newer urban theory fashioned by political scientists, and it was seen as appropriately so. With this in mind, it is possible to see how and why they made the city "the hope of democracy" and what this meant at the time, both in terms of municipal government and in terms of the broader political concerns to which urban theory was essentially addressed.

The Two Poles of Urban Theory

To try to understand this theory by reading what has been written about it recently is a little like trying to navigate a tricky channel by relying on a map rather than a nautical chart: we can see the major outlines, but the underlying defining configurations remain hidden. Many of the vessels of recent scholarship accordingly end up on the rocks of confusion and contradiction. In them, reform theory is misjudged in a variety of ways: usually it is wrapped in one blanket and labelled a theory of "administrative efficiency." Sometimes there is a conservative/progressive dichotomy, like Holli's structural versus social reform. Sometimes there is a spectrum. But whatever the typology, the literature rarely gets much beyond labelling because it rarely pays serious attention to the political theory itself, a failure which the current interest in social history has unfortunately and unnecessarily reinforced.[25] Once the ideas are studied closely, however, it is possible to make more sense out of them and to see how they illumine the surrounding context.

In terms of theoretical assumptions, it may be seen that the turn-of-the-century writings cluster around two distinct poles, one of which stands closer to the new academic political science than the other. Each group sprawls across any left/right political distinctions one could draw, whether these concern assumptions about the need for radical reform or the nature of the emerging capitalist order.

To borrow a phrase Morton White used in a somewhat different context, the first of these poles could be called "cultural organicist." This approach assumes that the American city variously was, is, or ought to be a corporate organism, a cultural core of civic spirit. Drawing heavily on aspects of the Burgess/Adams germanic tradition, writers taking this position adopted the distinction between polity and government and located the germ of the nation in an organic, local civic community distinguishable from its governmental institutions. This ap-

[25] See, for example, Melvin Holli, *Reform in Detroit, Hazen Pingree and Urban Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), particularly pp. 157–78. John Buenker, *Urban Liberalism and Progressive Reform* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1973), pp. 119–20, 211, 221, tries to escape, but is trapped by "two strains" of reform, both mislabelled. The only recent works which show real clarity and depth in dealing with reform thought are unfortunately limited by discussing only the urban dimension of its applicability. See Fox, *Better City Government*, pp. 42–48, and Martin Schiesl, *The Politics of Efficiency, Municipal Administration and Reform in America,* 1830–1920 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 169–70.

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proach presumed autonomous local communities, and accordingly prescribed virtually autonomous local governments as best suited to them. Its architects turned to comparative study to demonstrate the value of the autonomy seemingly found in European cities, past and present.[26]

Albert Shaw best illustrates this approach. Very much in the modern idiom, he professed to care little about issues of form and structure in contrast to functions. He saw his encyclopedic study of English and continental muncipalities as simply detailing, for instructive purposes, a governmental approach that seemed effective and popular in actual practice. His thick volumes also projected a consistent if somewhat implicit theory: the ability to make expedient choices proceeds only from practical self-government. In turn, he justified this less by an appeal to necessity than by a claim that the city existed as a free-standing political community, morally if not quite legally prior to the claims of the State.[27]

In content, Shaw's vision was modern-dress mugwumpery. He dreamed of what might be called dairy democracy—one that was pasteurized, freed from racial and ethnic civic impurities, yet not homogenized, in that the cream would still rise to the top. He held immigrants primarily responsible for the mess of urban affairs, and he felt that only accountable, service-efficient government on the business-corporation model would succeed in facilitating the larger civic mission of the urban community.[28]

Shaw's reformism, however, is far less central to the concerns of this paper than the fact that these assumptions—the moral autonomy of the urban community, the utility of the business analogy, and the sense of an immigrant threat to the polity—are detectable at the base of a substantial and diverse group of theoretical studies in this period. This is true, in many works raising more fundamental questions about the larger capitalist system in which American cities existed. Here the best example is Frank Parsons and his book *The City for the People*. Parsons was an idiosyncratic, free-lance intellectual who never quite fit in the academic mold, except for a few years when he joined Edward Bemis and other radical refugees at the then Populist-controlled Kansas State University. His book was an ungainly but passionately powerful appeal for municipal socialism, one that began on the title page by defiantly renouncing bourgeois copyright privileges. Behind the passion was exhaustive study and documenta-

[26] Morton White, *Social Thought in America*, pp. 11–15; see also Dana White, "Self-Conscious City," pp. 98–101 on this group and its approach. There is sensitive discussion in Boyer, *Urban Masses and Moral Order*, pp. 252–56; Waldo, *Administrative State*, p. 73; and Fox, *Better City Government*, pp. 42–62.

[27] See Shaw's major works, *Muncipal Government in Great Britain* (New York: Century Co., 1895) and *Muncipal Government in Continental Europe* (New York: Century Co., 1895). See also useful reviews by Frank Goodnow, in *Political Science Quarterly* 10 (1895): 171–75, and 11(1896): 158–62. There is a solid recent biography by Lloyd Graybar, *Albert Shaw of the Rèview of Reviews: An Intellectual Biography* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1974). See Howe, *Confessions*, p. 556, for an eloquent testimonial to Shaw's personal impact.

[28] Graybar, *Shaw*, pp. 64–66, 70–90, and especially pp. 81–86 on immigrants.

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tion, a definitive case against the private mismanagement of utilities, and a careful case for both public ownership and complete home rule.[29]

The theoretical ground for these claims was a tenuously defined cooperativism that lay closer to Albert Shaw than to socialism. For Parsons, the "People's City" would be morally sovereign, representing as it did "the condensation of the ages." He argued that it would be protected against the state only insofar as it claimed the same autonomy in government that corporations claimed in private business. Within this autonomy, civic patriotism would raise the best people to power on the one hand while on the other, protect the city from the polluting effect of "that foul admixture of serfhood pouring in from Europe."[30]

In these terms then, the range of "organicist" theorists defined an approach to regenerated municipal government that was far more consistent than their politics might indicate. The writers who embraced it, as a group, were also politically eclectic, and all stood at a distance from the emerging academic study of municipal political science. Some, like Frank Parsons, were tangential to the circle of orthodox academia. Some, like Albert Shaw, who had been trained in the newer studies, were no longer active in the universities. Those organicists who were both academic and new-model social scientists tended to be sociologists, like Edward Ross, or economists, like Ely and Bemis or Columbia's Richmond Mayo-Smith, who carried the racism of Burgess and Francis Amasa Walker to new heights of social pseudo-science.[31] But as a group, they were not close to the new political science. In the mainstream of that emerging discipline at Johns Hopkins and Columbia a very different theoretical position emerged. And this brings us back to Woodrow Wilson and especially to Frank Johnson Goodnow.

"At the present moment," Goodnow wrote in an 1895 review of Albert Shaw, "we are probably more at sea, so far as the municipal problem is concerned, than at any other time in our history."[32] Given what has already been examined concerning the point of view at Columbia and Johns Hopkins, this assessment of the largely "organicist" literature comes as no surprise. Beyond the fact that it was heavily descriptive and comparative, it failed to engage two dimensions that

[29] On Parsons, see Arthur Mann, "Frank Parsons, The Professor as Radical," in *Yankee Reformers in the Urban Age* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), pp. 126–44. Frank Parsons, *The City for the People* (Philadelphia, n.d., but ca. 1900), title page, pp. 5, 9–13. The book is really three book-length chapters, one on public ownership, pp. 17–254; one on direct legislation, pp. 255–386; and one on home rule, pp. 387–469.

[30] Parsons, *City for the People*, pp. 5–7, 9, 156, 321–57, 405, 411, 391–92. Mann, *Yankee Reformers*, pp. 9, 137, 141. Mann is unsure how to deal with Parsons' combination of radicalism and racism, so he mistakenly attributes the racial ideas to his roots in "social engineering."

[31] See, for instance, Barbara Solomon, *Ancestors and Immigrants*, pp. 77–81, on Mayo-Smith, and Dana White, "Self-Conscious City," pp. 394–99. Many critics have noted the organicist dimension, but have been unclear about its relation to other dimensions of political thought and theory. See, for example, Roy Lubove, "Frederick C. Howe and the Quest for Community," *The Historian* 39 (1977): 270–91.

[32] Goodnow, "Review" of Albert Shaw, *Municipal Government in Continental Europe*, in *Political Science Quarterly* 11 (1896): 160.

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Goodnow, Wilson, and their colleagues held to be central requirements of their political science: the recent literature failed to locate cities in a larger legal and constitutional framework, and it consequently failed to approach an adequate description of the real forces at work in and on municipal government. On each level, Goodnow, Wilson, and the others argued repeatedly that there was a cardinal error in isolating city government and the notion of the city itself from the political society in which both were inevitably imbedded, and which was just as inevitably imbedded in them. This error the newer political scientists labored mightily to correct.[33]

From their viewpoint, at least the dilemma, if not the solution, was easily stated. Modern cities were by definition "organizations for the satisfaction of local needs." At the same time, cities were also agents of the state, responsible for those interests its citizens held as participants in a larger civic society. This dual character meant that cities were in some respects independent, yet had no real claim to more formal sovereignty, since this could and did attach only to the state. Goodnow observed that this was clear enough in theory, but it had become even more compelling in point of historical fact: the accelerating interdependence of a nationalizing industrial economy made the claims of the larger system even stronger and rendered the dubious claim of local sovereignty anachronistic.[34]

In this context, the political scientists held that the almost medieval impulses for home rule were self-indulgent fantasies, pernicious because of their capacity to absorb energies needed for dealing with the real questions of the real political world.[35] Wilson was very forceful on this point. Delusions of autonomy, he argued, could only produce a net loss in civic capacity, putting effective power into the hands of a local business elite or the state legislature, and most likely both in corrupt tandem. In opposition to this, he argued the need to see the city as neither "an economic corporation" nor as "a political unit, or society, or state on a small scale." Rather, the city must be seen as the unique combination of these aspects, requiring a unique approach as a "humane economic society"

[33] Frank Goodnow, *City Government in the United States* (New York: Century Co., 1904), pp. 302–4, for a good statement of this point. See also Goodnow, "Powers of the Municipal Corporation," in *Proceedings of the Louisville Conference for Good City Government and of the Third Annual Meeting of the National Municipal League* (Philadelphia, 1897), pp. 63–66. For background on Goodnow, see Millett, "Department of Public Law and Government," in Hoxie, *Faculty of Political Science*, pp. 256–83; Crick, *American Science of Politics*, p. 107; Gilbert, "Doctrines of Representation," pp. 609–11.

[34] Frank Goodnow, *Politics and Administration* (New York: Russell & Russell, 1967, of 1900 ed.), pp. 47–52; "Powers of Municipal Corporation," pp. 67–71; *City Government in the United States*, pp. 69–88. This theme is well discussed by Fox, *Better City Government*, pp. 42–62, 80–89; and especially by Anwar Syed, *The Political Theory of American Local Government* (New York: Random House, 1966), pp. 95–99, 155–56. See also, Keller, *Affairs of State*, pp. 332–36.

[35] Syed, *Political Theory of Local Government*, pp. 87–95, 96–99. Howe, who was generally for home rule in a less careful sense of the term, came closer to this position in his more theoretical writing, as in *The Modern City and Its Problems* (New York: Scribner's, 1915), pp. 73–75, 85.

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which would not "create checks and balances," but rather generate "communal feeling and energy."[36]

As this unhelpful phrase suggests, Wilson had only worked out the notion of "the humane economic society" in vague terms by the time he turned to the Princeton presidency. Nevertheless, his analysis of existing municipal law and administration—a direct extension of his earlier approach to government-in-action—was clear and thorough. In the hands of Frank Goodnow, almost identical insights were fashioned into a far more complete and coherent theory.

The Politics-Administration Dichotomy

Most modern readers associate Goodnow with the famous politics/administration dichotomy, and the consensus of opinion seems to be that he offered the latter as a substitute for the former, seeking to isolate a value-free sphere of efficient government from the turmoil of politics. He is often considered to have been the leader of a conservative revolution in democratic theory, one who, to the extent his impulses were other than narrowly elitist, was misled through a naive concentration on legal form and structure.[37]

This image suggests we should say about Goodnow what a recent student observed about Burgess—that he is generally discussed "with the respectful vagueness . . . that well demonstrates his unshakeable position in pre-history."[38] The arguments developed in this article should help to retrieve the contextual meaning of his work.

For Goodnow the distinction between politics and administration has meaning *only* in the context of the state-city relationship. Far from being a linear either/or between two abstract qualities, the distinction Goodnow offers is a way of mapping the different possibilities of distributing real and formal power in a complex constitutional system. The dichtomy functions as a descriptive rather than a normative tool in this context, and it is applied primarily to explicating the state-city relationship. This produced an argument along the following lines:

Given the fact of state law and the circumstance of interdependence between city and state, it is not surprising that in the United States real political power had gravitated to the legislatures. Since the cities were increasingly active as agents of increasingly active state governments, they retained an authority which was only superficially their own. Actually, they enjoyed real latitude only in carrying out the instructions of the detailed legislation issued from the

[36] See, for a good statement, his lecture notes in *Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, vol. 6, pp. 484–92. Other related arguments (from 1889) are in 6, ibid., pp. 52–57.

[37] Holli, *Reform in Detroit*, argues the "conservative revolution," pp. 171–79. See Landau, "Myth of Hyperfactualism," for a perceptive discussion of why it has proven so easy to miss the point in such writings, pp. 384–87, 398–99. Also helpful is Gilbert, "Doctrines of Representation," pp. 609–14.

[38] Crick, *American Science of Politics*, p. 97.

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legislatures. The situation was thus one of centralized legislative authority and decentralized administrative authority.[39]

The dominance of the legislatures and the party machines running them had been faulted by just about everybody. Where Goodnow was different and influential was in criticizing in similarly functional terms the mechanical, formal solutions others found so attractive. The hold of eighteenth-century formalism, he argued, offered reformers only two ways to combat excessive legislative power: they could limit it by constitutional change in the balance and separation of powers, or they could rely on judicial interpretation. History made the first approach hopeless, and the power of the reigning "Dillon Rule" in jurisprudence—which strictly denied any local claims to sovereignty—foreclosed the second.[40]

Goodnow offered administration as a practical way out of this formal cul-de-sac. Neither constitutional nor judicial, administrative changes could redefine the nature of legislative power in the interest of more meaningful local autonomy, while at the same time refining state powers for broader public interest responsibilities. Since the state had to have some control of its agents, Goodnow said, let it be through centralization of overall administrative authority, which could be flexibly defined and distributed for action, rather than through detailed special legislation. Instead of the legislature telling the cities what to do (since it could not really delegate to them law-making power), a central administration could more simply insure that the general mandate of the legislature was met by supervising the actions the cities themselves devised in meeting it. This would be, in other words, administrative centralization, and decentralized local decisionmaking, if not quite law-making. Rather than the state gathering power, as it had done, and parcelling out responsibility, Goodnow demanded that the state gather the responsibility also so that real, effective power could legally and practically be given to the municipalities to handle their own affairs more flexibly. This was the model Goodnow and others thought they saw in the much-admired and generally popular governments of European cities.[41]

It is almost impossible to understand what the politics/administration dichotomy means in Goodnow's work without understanding his central/local distinction. This is even more apparent when considering the application of the

[39] Probably the clearest and most concise statement is in Goodnow, "Powers of the Municipal Corporation," pp. 67–71.

[40] Goodnow, *City Government in the United States*, pp. 90–96, 102–3. On the legal tradition and the impact of the Dillon Rule, see Syed, *Political Theory*, pp. 53–56; Keller, *Affairs of State*, pp. 346–47; and Fox, *Better City Government*, p. 23. An important contemporary exploration of this dilemma is Gerald E. Frug, "The City as a Legal Concept," *Harvard Law Review* 93 (April, 1980): 1059–154.

[41] Goodnow, *Politics and Administration*, pp. 47–54. See also Waldo, *Administrative State*, pp. 108–10. A useful but uninspired study of Goodnow, helpful nevertheless on this point, is Lurton W. Blassingame, "Frank J. Goodnow: Progressive Urban Reformer," *North Dakota Quarterly* 40 (1972): 22–30, esp. pp. 28–30.

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terms to municipal government itself. Goodnow held that local government was essentially administrative in nature, and this has commonly been taken to mean that he sought to turn power over to administrators while denying it to politicians. Further, this has often been taken to mean that he wanted to divide executive from legislative power, allowing the former to run the city with the aid of an efficiency-minded bureaucracy on the business-corporation model. By this point it will come as less of a surprise to discover that he meant precisely the opposite and endorsed, in fact, an opposite solution.[42]

Here is a perfect illustration of the need to understand the terms of the anti-formalist critique in their own context, not in their later interpretation. Where orthodox classical theory divided powers formally to inhibit action, Goodnow and his colleagues sought to combine powers in real terms in order to liberate the capacity for action. Politics and administration, Goodnow argued again and again, were not forms to be separated by levels of government and certainly not by branches. Rather, they were functional distinctions visible in different proportions throughout government. In fact, it was precisely the capacity of these functions to join levels, and to help merge formally separated legislative and executive powers, that appealed to Goodnow. He hoped that clearer distinction—not literal separation—would make possible the necessary consolidation for generating new civic capacity. It would lead to cooperation between state and local governments and a consolidated, effective government in the city itself.[43]

This point, finally, helps to explain why Goodnow argued that in the constitutional sense cities must be thought of as administrative in character. By this, he sought to claim for municipal government a more realistic autonomy and power. By accepting this definition, one gave up only what was indefensible anyway—politics in the sense of sovereignty. Since ordinances and other city actions were technically regulations, not laws, this sacrificed nothing in effective terms. What was retained was a broad area granted by the state administrative authority within which a consolidated polity—Goodnow, despite his image, favored an all-powerful council, elected in large cities on a ward basis—could function in an uninhibited way.[44] The administrative definition, in other words,

[42] See Lawrence J. R. Herson, "The Lost World of Municipal Government," *American Political Science Review* 51 (1957): 330-45, especially 333, on how Goodnow's terms have been read. Goodnow himself left little room for confusion, especially as regards the "business model." See "Powers of the Municipal Corporation," where he said "It has become the fashion in this country of late years to speak of the city as a business corporation, and to regard the work of the city as rather business than governmental in character. This view of the city's position is, however, an incorrect one, and if followed it is believed, it will lead to disastrous results" (p. 66).

[43] Goodnow, *Politics and Administration*, pp. 23-25, 38, 44, 87-90, 148-49, 158. Wilson made a similar point in his Hopkins Lectures, *Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, vol. 8, pp. 86 (1893). Robert T. Daland is clear on the point that Goodnow *never* sought a rigid separation, nor was he as naive about the nature of politics as many have assumed. See his article, "Political Science and the Study of Urbanism," *American Political Science Review* 51 (1957): 491-509.

[44] Goodnow, *City Government in the U.S.*, pp. 156-60, 189-94, 200-202. Wilson also made a similar argument about the need to generate civic capacity, and he offered this as the main goal of

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was functionally political in the sense commonly understood: its aim was to invigorate, enlarge, and liberate the local decisionmaking process, and it saw this as something attainable through structural change, rather than through the mystical, idealistic, and commonly racist notions relied upon by the organicists.

Goodnow worked hard to distinguish his theory from the conservative business-corporation model to which it was almost immediately connected by many observers. The distortion came up so often, he joked in his inaugural address as the first president of the new American Political Science Association in 1904, that he had "come to regard its use as evidence of an absolutely hopeless condition of mind in the one who uses it."[45] The misunderstanding was understandable, especially once his finely argued ideas left the texts and entered the lists, where a theorist could not control how they were appropriated and applied.

Urban Theory and the Reform Movement

Given this, it is impressive testimony to the vigor and effectiveness with which Goodnow and his followers advanced their new framework that by the turn of the century, and through the new century's first decade, it was their assumptions that dominated not only reform thought, but the reform movement itself. This can be seen in almost every provision of the Municipal Program of the National Municipal League and in most of the major books that brought municipal thought to a wide and attentive audience, books by Goodnow's students Wilcox and Fairlie and later Charles Beard; by the Chicago sociologist Charles Zueblin; and of course by Frederick C. Howe, especially his classic *The City: The Hope of Democracy*.[46]

These books do not fit neatly under the organcist and academic headings used here. In part, this is because labels represent emergent positions not always consistently held, and in part, because the more popular literature was addressed to a wider audience for a wider range of purposes than Goodnow and other scholars needed to engage. These works thus tend towards the mode of urban evangelism, with civic revival painted in the familiar colors of home rule and localized spirtual rebirth. Nevertheless, the popularized works show how the new municipal theory was beginning to transform the old. They concede the impossibility of autonomous community, and they seek to construct through ad-

administrative approaches. See *Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, vol. 6, pp. 52–7; vol. 7, pp. 344–68; and vol. 11, pp. 74–84 for a sense of the consistency with which he advanced this theme throughout the 1890s.

[45] Goodnow, "The Work of the American Political Science Association," p. 43.

[46] *Municipal Program,* passim. See Howe, *The City: The Hope of Democracy* (New York: Scribner's, 1905); Delos Wilcox, *The American City: A Problem in Democracy* (New York: Century Co., 1904), for example; also Charles Beard, *American City Government* (New York: MacMillan Co., 1912); and Charles Zeublin, *American Municipal Progress* (New York: MacMillan Co., 1902, revised 1916).

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ministrative autonomy a definition of the city as an effective, pluralistic polity, one that is effective in serving its own needs, but also, by virtue of integration in a larger political and administrative system, capable of providing a modern democratic example of wider applicability.[47]

This redemptive mission, in fact, is perhaps the most distinctive characteristic of the newer model texts in comparison with the older organicist treatments. This suggests the significance of Howe's revealing title. It is not so much that progressive democracy will help to solve city problems efficiently that is the point; he did not call his book "Democracy: The Hope of the City." Rather, the emphasis is on how a new approach to government can be a means to generating, by political involvement, a new, unmystical civic capacity, which could meet the general challenge to democracy posed by industrialization, immigration, and class division.[48]

Such a theory could easily be embraced at various points of the political spectrum, and so it was. Left progressives like Howe and Beard saw it as a chance to restructure a faltering society overwhelmed by the contradictions of change. Those more in the center were also hopeful, though they identified the threat with society's severest critics, and their optimism was tinged with the anxiety of this political conflict. Reform theorists regularly acknowledged the validity of the broader socialist indictment of capitalist democracy, especially at the municipal level where defense of the actual record was impossible. If socialist solutions were not to become more attractive and even legitimate, then the radical critique would have to be answered where it was most telling, and this became the burden of the revived cities. As Charles Merriam suggested, they had a vital "Androclean function" to perform in addressing the thorny contradictions of capitalism so evident in municipal affairs.[49]

Nobody expressed more eloquently than Jane Addams the tension between an admissible critique and inadmissible socialist consequences. Her speech before

[47] See, for example, Howe, *Hope of Democracy*, pp. 1-7, and 24-28; *Modern City*, pp. 61-75. For a misleading vision of Howe, and the others, as "nostalgia-seeking romantics" fixed on small town values, see Quandt, *Small Town to Great Community*, pp. 24-25, 148-50; and Lubove, "Howe," pp. 270-75.

[48] Howe, *Hope of Democracy*, pp. 24-28. See *Confessions of a Reformer*, pp. 236-37, where Howe indicates the City book was but the first of a series on the various levels of government, all devoted to a general democratic revival.

[49] See Beard, *American City Government*, p. 386. Howe, *Hope of Democracy*, pp. 9-23, repeatedly offers the city as a way to deal with the acknowledged social problem, by generating class harmony, rather than class conflict. This awareness of the socialist critique, and a similar contrast of class harmony vs. class conflict approaches, can be found widely in the literature. Wilson lectured frequently on "Democracy," contrasting it with socialism and using administration and municipal government as his focal points. See *Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, vol. 7, pp. 80-1, 344-68, for example, and vol. 11, pp. 74-84 a few years later. See also Boyer, *Moral Order*, pp. 279-80, and Gilbert, "Doctrines of Representation," pp. 611-12. The Merriam quote is from Karl, *Merriam*, p. 54. Actually, Merriam mentions Androcles in relation to university and business cooperation, but as he saw a reformed municipal context as the form and ground for that cooperation, the usage here seems supportable.

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the congress of the 1904 St. Louis World's Fair shows how directly this fear involved municipal theory. It suggests also how thoroughly the framework discussed above become assimilated within the general progressive reform outlook.[50]

Most city governments, Addams charged, were hopelessly out of touch with the spiritual and material needs of modern society. They were blind to the ways in which those needs were better understood by some—by bosses, machines, ethnic organizations, and radical movements in particular. She saw reformers as befuddled by the appeal of all these, and she likened the helpless mugwump governments to the "religious revivalist [who] looks with longing on the fervor of a single-tax meeting, or the orthodox Jew who sees his son ignoring Yom Kippur and pouring all his religious fervor . . . into the Socialist Labor Party." She went on more seriously:

> There is no doubt that the rapid growth of the socialist party in all crowded cities is largely due to the recognition of those primary human needs which the well established governments so stupidly ignore . . . They are practicing industrial government for an industrial age . . . All that devotion, all of that speculative philosophy . . . concerning the real issues of life could, of course, easily be turned into a passion for self-government and the development of a natural life, if we were truly democratic from the modern evolutionary standpoint.[51]

That standpoint, she went on to outline in great detail, was precisely the one whose assumptions have been reconstructed herein. She looked to a government on the Goodnow model to help cast off those eighteenth-century notions "that repress rather than release the power of the people." She sought a new force in the largest cities, wellsprings of "the human dynamic character of progress."[52] She looked as well to the practical dynamics of political involvement, released into action by structural reforms "from the modern evolutionary standpoint," as the agent that would regenerate the city and save democracy from all that threatened it. The city was not simply democracy's hope—it was perhaps American democracy's last hope.

Urban Reform Theory and the Current "Urban Crisis"

The shift from city as political cancer to city as democratic hope involved fundamental changes in the legal, constitutional, and political understanding of urban government itself. While this transformation had obvious roots and consequences within the urban context, with real responses to real and proximate

[50] Jane Addams, "Problems of Municipal Administration," *American Journal of Sociology*, 10 (1905): 425–44. This paper is also printed in the publications of the International Congress of Arts and Sciences of the Fair. This elaborate Congress is discussed by Quandt, *Small Town to Great Community*, pp. 102–3, and is mentioned by Herbst, *German Historical School*, p. 203, as marking one of the high points, in terms of visibility and legitimacy, of the new social science.

[51] Addams, "Municipal Administration," pp. 437–38.

[52] Ibid., p. 444.

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urban problems, it can only be understood by moving outside that and examining its sources in the institutional and intellectual emergence of academic political science. We have seen how that functioned as a link to the broader concerns about societal changes and conflict.

As for the third problem, the relevance of this to interpretations of American political culture is less definitive. The traditional approach has been to see urban reform theory and practice as a major factor in the development of American liberalism, helping reorient this approach to government activism and public administration in a way that would later culminate in the New Deal, the Great Society, and so on. Both left and right, the one seeing reform apotheosis, the other seeing business manipulation and triumphant co-optation, agree that the new municipal theory became effectively absorbed in these broader movements, thus accounting for its relative invisibility today.

This article suggests the story is one of failure rather than success, with the theory running into a dead end which has cut off from our general political culture much of the insight that made these theories so vital in their time. Goodnow's theory was, in terms of cities, almost self-destructive in its logic of national consolidation. Charles Beard, a loyal disciple of Goodnow who remained interested in municipal questions in practical terms for many years, conceded in his 1912 text on municipal government that "strictly speaking there can be no such thing as muncipal science, because the most fundamental concerns of the cities, the underlying economic foundations, are primarily matters of state and national control."[53] Goodnow's effort to retain for local government a genuinely democratic dimension, in terms of political process, was thus ultimately doomed. Its demise immobilized much of the progressive left, caught as it was between a municipal socialism that had nowhere to go and a nationwide radicalism that inevitably lost touch with the concrete communities so important, as Jane Addams saw, to its appeal and integrity. As the democratic content drained out of municipal governmental reform, the shell of bureaucratic structure and functional administration was left behind. This perhaps explains why administrative reform became so sterile, why municipal radicalism disappeared so quickly, and why the corporate liberalism described by James Weinstein was so successful in obliterating our images of what both had meant.[54]

In the curtain of invisibility that has fallen on the political thought of that earlier era, there is a significance beyond ordinary obscurity or obsolescence. As was suggested at the beginning of this article, the problems of historiography hint at the distance our political culture has travelled between the Progressive era and our own. Formerly it was deemed the province of politics and political

[53] Beard, *American City Government*, pp. ix and 386. Beard remained a disciple of Goodnow and a loyal friend. He later traced his 1917 resignation from Columbia, over a famous academic freedom case, to an earlier, less well-known incident: the University's caving in when an aging John Burgess sought to veto Goodnow as the successor to Burgess' about-to-be-vacated Chair. See Hoxie, *Faculty of Political Science*, pp. 104–8, 264–66, Hofstadter, *Progressive Historians*, pp. 170–85 on Beard more generally.

[54] James Weinstein, *The Corporate Ideal and the Liberal State*, (Boston, Mass.: Beacon, 1968).

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science to engage the most fundamental questions about the nature and legitimacy of political institutions. The literature of urbanism centered on the relation of formal government—politics and administration—to the real structures of power and class throughout American society. These questions animated the generation of Wilson and Goodnow, whatever may be thought of its formulaic answers or larger ideological intent. Such cannot be claimed for the present day, whose own "urban crisis" has routinely been conceived of in terms of "problems" needing largely administrative "solutions," rather than as rumblings along the lines of race and class that run beneath our entire society. The distinction between a society and its political institutions, a distinction made by Burgess and one that his successors sought to retain while redefining, can barely be expressed, much less engaged, in our current political language.

It is beyond the power of a brief article to explore this subsequent narrowing of our poltical culture, our ability to perceive the reality around us and express it in political terms. There is value at least in illustrating how it has taken place and in suggesting that closer attention to our history, on its own terms, may sensitize us to what has been lost. If scholars are to help in remedying this loss, then the story traced here has a corollary lesson as well: in contrast to the emergent professionalism of the 1880s and 1890s, American academic culture is substantially without the sense of obligation to engage and transform the political reality it studies. Yet this is an obligation, Frank Goodnow would be quick to point out, that he and his generation held central to the very nature and mission of social science.

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Book Reviews

MX: Prescription for Disaster *by Herbert Scoville, Jr. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1981. 231 pp. $6.95.*

Herbert Scoville, Jr., has written a persuasive brief against the MX Missile System and, in particular, against the racetrack basing mode designed for it under the Carter administration. Scoville charts in considerable detail the attempt both to hide such a system and to maintain its verifiability under arms control. He is convinced that this search is fraught with overwhelming, if not impossible, technical problems.

In light of the Reagan administration's decision to discard any deceptive basing mode for MX, are not much of Scoville's arguments and the book itself outdated? Not quite—for the bulk of Scoville's argument is against any MX system and, by implication, any countersilo or counterforce weapon system.

The case for our retaining a countersilo capacity is now familiar. An American president faced with a Soviet attack on United States ICBM sites should have the flexibility to disarm remaining Soviet ICBMs, thereby limiting the effect of any Soviet second strike on our population centers and paving the way for a negotiated solution. Scoville finds that scenario fanciful. He points out that if the Soviets have gone so far as to coordinate an attack on U.S. ICBMs, certainly their remaining force would be placed on a launch-on-warning status. Thus, immediately upon gaining evidence that our countersilo missiles were on their way, the Soviets would launch the rest of their ICBM force. Our missiles would, consequently, hit only empty silos, while the American people would have suffered the brunt of a complete Soviet ICBM attack.

Given the compelling nature of this dismal scenario, why then would military planners want to build any kind of countersilo system? While Scoville is careful not to point an accusing finger, he makes the logic of a countersilo force clear: "a countersilo capability is effective only if it is used in a first strike" (p. 140).

Is this, then, the reason MX has been pushed this far—to gain a first strike capability? Such a decision would have been quite out of character for the arms control-minded Carter administration. Scoville does devote a substantial portion of the book to the 1979

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Carter decision to build MX. With a keen sense of political irony, Scoville argues that, in large part, the 1979 decision was a product of the dreary politics of SALT II—a down payment for the cost of its ratification. "The large MX," Scoville asserts, "was one of the many weapons used as bargaining chips to attempt to buy Senate votes for SALT—not to obtain Soviet concessions" (p. 104). With the SALT II limits on Soviet warheads (6,500) in place, the 200 Carter MXs shuttled among 4,600 hardened shelters seemed reasonably safe from Soviet attack.

Yet the bizarre relationship between MX and SALT II has proven to be unfortunate for both policies. Rather than gain significant support for SALT II, MX became a burden to the treaty. Scoville argues that MX made SALT II appear to be a cover for new arms programs. Scoville asserts that in the process of linking MX to SALT II "President Carter undercut a basic argument for the treaty: that by reducing the threat, it [SALT II] would supplant the need for new military programs" (p. 111).

With SALT II and its attendant limits on warheads a dead issue, the Carter MX system became a dead issue as well. Yet the search continues for an invulnerable basing system for this countersilo weapon. Scoville suggests an alternative in the last section of the book. He feels the government should investigate a minisubmarine system consisting of 50 boats each carrying two ballistic missiles. He states that such a system could well meet the criteria for a sensible strategic deterrent. It would be survivable; it could be verified by national technical means; it would be subject to tight command and control; and it would not have a first strike capability.

Regardless of the eventual fate of MX, this book will remain relevant. Scoville has written a classic critique of a new nuclear weapons system. It is devoid of technical jargon and political cant and is complete with common sense. Those who are familiar with Scoville's work have come to expect no less.

ROBERT J. BRESLER
Pennsylvania State University

Defense in the 1980s *by William W. Kaufmann. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1981. 51 pp. $3.95.*

This is a short and pithy analysis of United States military needs and budgets by one of the most distinguished military analysts in the country. Its brevity is attributable to the separate printing of one of the chapters of the Brookings study entitled *Setting National Priorities: The 1982 Budget.*

The book consists of a brief survey of the strategic political situation, an evaluation of present U.S. defense capabilities, and an examination of the proposed Carter five year plan to increase military preparedness in the light of improved Soviet military capability. It also includes a passing reference to the Reagan proposals and ten pages of suggestions for building American strength. All of this is very impressively done in limited space and is extremely useful not only for the specialist but for the general reader as well.

Kaufmann's suggestions are arranged in order of priority and include the author's estimates of how much additional spending each increment would require over the next

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ten years. His recommendations are all reasonable given his assumptions, and perhaps the only surprise is that he assigns last priority to improvements in our nuclear forces. The top three priorities all focus on improved conventional capabilities with some emphasis on upgrading Reserve and National Guard forces. He recommends fast sealift rather than airlift; redeploying existing forces, especially the Marines, in the Arabian Sea area; prepositioning supplies in various areas; and the introduction of major field fortifications in Europe comparable to what has been done in Korea. His proposals would add over $200 billion to Carter's one trillion dollar total over the next five years and should certainly not cause much dismay in the Department of Defense.

While there is nothing outrageous or ridiculous in any of his suggestions, this reviewer was left with the vaguely uneasy feeling that the whole exercise was only another attempt to rearrange the deck chairs on the *Titanic*. The major source of the unreality embodied in this exercise is undoubtedly his assumptions. Kaufmann argues, probably correctly, that the Carter budgets would produce a military establishment unequal to the task of reinforcing "more or less simultaneously" (p. 37) the American presence in Europe, the Persian Gulf, and Korea. However, I am sure it would be possible to show how his proposals in turn would produce a military unable to meet those three contingencies in addition to problems in Latin America, Southeast Asia, and Africa "more or less simultaneously." In short, any set of scenarios could be constructed to show that even if we spent every last nickel we had, we would still end up with a military unable to meet all possible contingencies simultaneously. What is there about the nature of the world and American military power to suggest that it is at all realistic to plan to meet three major contingencies all at the same time? Why not two or four, one or five? Why these three?

The only hint as to the nature of the threat is quite modest in comparison with what is being asked of the military of this country. Kaufmann suggests that the USSR has shown its ability to "sustain modest military operations in Afghanistan, hold its other forward deployments more or less in place (whatever that means), and still put together a threat of major proportions to Poland" (p. 36). If this is all our foe can do, maybe we do not even need the Carter trillion dollars much less the additional $200 billion. Surely our adversary may not be much of a threat after all if the best it can do is fight in Afghanistan and prepare to invade an ally at the same time. It is hard to see who will be generating all of the threats and why we must expect them simultaneously.

If Kaufmann's assumptions are questionable, then the rigor and precision of the analysis that rests on those assumptions may be beside the point. However, if one finds the assumptions reasonable, as apparently many people in Washington do, then this analysis is a very useful contribution to the ongoing debate on America's preparedness.

PHILIP W. DYER
University of Nebraska, Lincoln

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The Western Alliance: European-American Relations Since 1945 *by Alfred Grosser. New York, Continuum Books, 1980. 375 pp. $19.50.*

Alfred Grosser is a prodigious writer. The volume, range and quality of his output has always been impressive: from French foreign policy to German politics, from books aimed at specialists to textbooks, from scholarly journals to the pages of *Le Monde*, from French to German to English. *The Western Alliance* is the kind of book only someone with the diverse skills and experience of Alfred Grosser would have written, and there are precious few with such talents. It is a history of the set of relationships described by the title, built around the notion of rise and demise, from the origins to the flowering of the Alliance, then to the controversy and crisis of new circumstances; another appropriate metaphor might be psychological—birth, growth, maturation, senescence.

The virtues of the book have much to do with Grosser's astonishing familiarity with the domestic politics of each country involved. As his earlier books on foreign policy showed, particularly *La Quatrième république et sa politique extérieure* (sadly never translated) and *The Foreign Policy of the Fifth Republique*, Grosser has always had a keen sense of the interaction of domestic politics and international relations. The international system represents in some way the interaction of autonomous, albeit interrelated, internal systems. The success or failure of politicians in one country can sharply affect the success or failure of politicians in another. The interlinked fates of two opposites—Reagan and his Republicans, Mitterrand and his Socialists—are but the most contemporary obvious examples of this. Unfortunately, writers on the international system rarely have the command of multiple situations to show how these interactions work.

Grosser does. The book is a detailed history of the Alliance covering all the issues and decisions which the countries and the Alliance as a collectivity had to treat: post-war reconstruction, Indochina, Suez, Algeria, the Cold War, German rearmament, the Common Market, Vietnam again, OPEC, the strains of economic competition, and so on. Throughout, Grosser excels at sketching personalities, events, and situations. For important developments, the reader gets a fine and very valuable summary of the current state of interpretation in the specialized literature.

The Western Alliance is not the sort of book an American political scientist specializing in international politics would produce: it does not present theories of international relations or foreign policy, models of decision-making, propositions, or carefully specified tests. Those who seek work of that kind for their students should look elsewhere. Grosser set out to write quite a different work and should be judged accordingly. Contemporary history is important and quite difficult to do. While Grosser has certainly done it well, he might have done more with the theory implicit in his selection of facts. There are, after all, themes which develop over time: changes in economic conditions, military relations, the third world, institutions, and political parties. These are certainly discussed but are not used as organizing principles. Theory and availability are not necessarily in conflict: readability requires a framework of ideas. The short "Introductions" at the beginning of various sections are useful, but not enough.

The Western Alliance was brought out simultaneously in both French and German. The translation by Michael Shaw is respectable though not outstanding. There are too many overly long sentences with a gallico-germanic tinge to their structure. For English-

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speaking readers, particularly Americans, the main advantage of the book is the availability of another point of view, in this case a European one. The European experience of events, the European sense of proportions, or scale, of importance or triviality are here. Grosser knows the United States well, which makes him a particularly effective communicator among the frequently hard of hearing. Grosser and the publishers have provided a service to the general public and to academe.

PETER GOUREVITCH
University of California, San Diego

Freedom of Expression *by Archibald Cox. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1981. 89 pp. Cloth, $6.95; paper, $2.95.*

This small book by Archibald Cox should provide wider coverage for an interesting discussion of the Burger Court's First Amendment decisions originally published in the *Harvard Law Review* for November 1980 and here reprinted verbatim. The author groups the Court's decisions under five headings: regulation of content; regulation by time, place, and manner of expression; expressive conduct; regulation of conduct affecting publication; and financing political campaigns.

Contrary to the expectations of some, the Burger Court has been by no means unfriendly to First Amendment freedoms. The Warren Court's expansion of First Amendment guarantees against direct governmental interference with publications or speakers in conventional forums has generally continued. Exceptions are harder attitudes against pornography and greater chance of success in libel suits brought by persons who are not "public figures."

The Burger Court has indeed created new protections for "commercial speech" and political campaign expenditures. After first seeming to threaten public access to criminal trials, it reversed itself and made such access a First Amendment right. The concept of protected speech was expanded to include crude, shocking, and perhaps personally insulting epithets. However, the press was unsuccessful in efforts to obtain recognition of its special status or immunities incident to the administration of criminal justice.

The most striking aspect of the Burger Court's record, Cox concludes, has been the insistence of the justices upon presenting their individual views and their persistence in maintaining them after rejection by the majority. He speculates that this may result from "the breaking down of an older body of law under the pressure of legal positivism and legal realism" or perhaps from "the increasing use of law clerks" (p. 88). He also finds that "the opinions often lack the full exposition necessary to fit the decisions into a coherent body of law" (p. 89). Cox is somewhat concerned by these trends, for he believes that the value and success of judicial review depend upon reducing so far as humanly possible "the subjectivity of judicial rulings."

C. HERMAN PRITCHETT
University of California, Santa Barbara

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The Administrative Behavior of Federal Bureau Chiefs *by Herbert Kaufman. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1981. 220 pp. Cloth, $22.95; paper, $8.95.*

Herbert Kaufman has made an important contribution to the literature in public administration. While reputed to be the power centers within the federal structure, the bureaus have received minimal scholarly attention. Generalizations about the iron triangles of bureau chiefs, congressional committees, and clienteles and their immunity to direction by the president and his department heads have been based more on intuition than on solid empirical evidence. Kaufman is one of the few to attempt to explore the unfamiliar terrain inhabited by the federal bureaus and bureau chiefs and to analyze their role and behavior.

Except for an occasional J. Edgar Hoover, bureau chiefs tend to share a passion for anonymity. The successful chiefs are by nature organization men and women who shun publicity and rarely seek personal aggrandizement. It is a tribute to Kaufman's persuasive powers that six bureau chiefs (Internal Revenue; Customs; Food and Drug; Animal and Plant Health Inspection; Forest Service; and Social Security) provided access to the inner workings of their agencies and permitted Kaufman to scan the materials crossing their desks, to listen to telephone calls, and to sit in on most meetings. The research extended over some fourteen months.

Kaufman is well aware of the limitations of his methodology. While an effort was made to select a balanced sample, the six are not necessarily typical of all bureau chiefs. Kaufman cautions that much of his information is impressionistic and much of the evidence is anecdotal. Nonetheless, I doubt that any knowledgeable insider would seriously question the validity of his observations.

The picture that emerges hardly fits the stereotype of the powerful feudal chief operating independently of direction by the Congress. On the contrary, the chiefs are unusually sensitive to congressional interests and concerns. According to Kaufman, "the chiefs were constantly looking over their shoulders, as it were, at the elements of the legislative establishment relevant to their agencies" (p. 47). He speculates that congressional strictures about unelected bureaucrats defying the congressional will are aimed by members at bureaus not subject to their committee's jurisdiction.

It is this subservience to Congress that creates within the executive branch the bureaus' appearance of autonomy and independence. Presidents and cabinet officers complain about unresponsive bureaucrats, but there is little evidence of deliberate recalcitrance or disobedience to orders. One of Kaufman's most striking findings is the meagerness of direction given bureau chiefs by their political superiors within the executive branch. Congress has achieved dominance partly through default.

The relationship between the bureau chiefs and cabinet officers merits more in-depth analysis that it receives in this book. What readers are given is the interpretation from the chief's perspective. It would be helpful to have that of the secretary as well.

Kaufman sums up the activities of bureau chiefs as falling in four categories: deciding things; receiving and reviewing intelligence about the state of their organization and of the external environment; representing their bureaus to the external environment; and motivating their work forces. Surprisingly, decision making absorbs less of a chief's time

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than the other activities. Few of the matters coming before them raised significant policy issues. Kaufman reports that "the Hollywood image of executives firing off critical decisions in machine gun fashion is far removed from the reality of executive life" (p. 19). Most decisions are programmed.

While the book, in part, confirms traditional concepts, it provides further evidence that few managers command their organizations. The hierarchical ideal of an administrative pyramid controlled by the president cannot be reconciled with the realities of bureaucratic life. Those, such as President Jimmy Carter and the advocates of a new Hoover commission, who aim to influence bureaucratic behavior through structural reorganization are certain to be disappointed with the results.

Kaufman's book belongs on the same shelf with Hugh Heclo's *A Government of Strangers*. It sheds further light on the relationships between the permanent and temporary governments. It makes no pretense of providing all of the answers. I share the author's hope that it will stimulate further research in this important field.

HAROLD SEIDMAN
University of Connecticut

The Reluctant Ally: France and Atlantic Security *by Michael M. Harrison. Baltimore, Md., Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981. 304 pp. $24.00.*

The central premise of the book is that during the postwar period France has attempted to replace a Western security system based on what it saw as U.S. hegemony with a pluralist security system based on "great leeway and independence for all its members" (p. 4). Although French security policy during the de Gaulle period is used as the clearest and most consistent depiction of postwar French goals, the author includes the Fourth Republic and the Pompidou and Giscard d'Estaing presidencies in his study.

During the Fourth Republic, the goal of French independence from the Atlantic Alliance first evolved as a way of resisting U.S. pressure for decolonialization and for the rearmament of West Germany. Harrison argues that by further asserting French independence, de Gaulle, rather than working for an exaggerated and unsustainable position for France in the Western alliance, worked for the realistic goal of securing France's ability to protect its national interests while maintaining some form of attachment to the alliance. Harrison describes in some detail de Gaulle's attempt to end U.S. domination of NATO by insisting that France, Britain, and the United States be given equal stature in the NATO command structure. When he was unsuccessful, in part because of attempts by the Kennedy administration to create its ill-defined "Atlantic Community," de Gaulle withdrew France from NATO, though he maintained that France was still theoretically part of the Atlantic Alliance.

Harrison argues that France's status as a "partial ally" (p. 164) between 1966 and 1968 actually improved the long-term stability of the alliance by forcing the United States to accept greater flexibility for France within the alliance. Paradoxically, once this flexibility was accepted, France's gradual though incomplete reconciliation with the alliance became possible. The reconciliation began in the final months of de Gaulle's presidency and con-

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tinued under two of his successors, Georges Pompidou and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, though each, as well as most leftist politicians, accepted the basic Gaullist security principles. In effect, de Gaulle's main goal had been achieved—French participation in the Atlantic Alliance as a partner rather than as a dependent—though not in the institutionalized manner that de Gaulle would have preferred. The informal arrangement between France and the alliance, Harrison suggests, is inherently more stable than the present structure of the alliance itself, in which the United States attempts to force its own defense policies on its relatively weak but recalicitrant allies.

The most important contribution of Harrison's book is that he avoids both the anti-Gaullist diatribes that characterize much of the existing work on French security policies and the temptation merely to rationalize these policies according to Gaullist rhetoric. His attempt to give French security policies a theoretical basis beyond personal and national arrogance makes this study a useful and long-overdue reexamination of the subject. Although Harrison's model of a flexible alliance system fails to explain fully de Gaulle's goal of *grandeur*—at least as important as his goal of French independence—his book provides the basis for further work on one of the most influential yet misunderstood statesmen of the postwar period. The detail with which Harrison supports his conclusions gives his book immense informational value, although it remains dense reading for nonspecialists. Harrison generally avoids excessive use of strategic policy jargon. Occasionally, however, terms appear that are more complex than meaningful, as when he refers to "French Eurafrican geostrategic views" (p. 94).

The most significant flaw in Harrison's book is his failure to consider the historical reasons behind de Gaulle's pursuit of French independence and *grandeur*. The collapse of France in 1940 and the experience under the Vichy regime are scarcely touched upon, even though de Gaulle's insistence that the repetition of such a disaster be prevented at any cost was probably an even more important factor in his defense policies than a desire for flexible alliances. As a political scientist, Harrison can be excused from providing a detailed historical analysis. Yet considering the degree to which de Gaulle saw himself as influenced by history, an attempt by Harrison to connect the model of flexible alliances to the historical experience upon which it was based would have made his study more complete.

LEONARD V. SMITH
Columbia University

Human Rights and State Sovereignty *by Richard Falk. New York, Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1981. 251 pp. Cloth, $28.50; paper, $15.75.*

Richard Falk's writings have the quality of dependability: whether one agrees or disagrees with his premises or his judgments, he may be counted on to provide a comprehensive treatment of his subject as well as a strongly reasoned argument for his conclusions. It is to Falk's advantage—and that of the field of international relations as well—that he has clearly, if polemically, stalked out the ground on which his analyses rest, and that the values undergirding his interpretive judgments are by now unambiguously clear.

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This book begins with a chapter on the development of American foreign policy concerning human rights, proceeds to a theoretical, normative typology of the foundations of human rights, and follows this with a historical and typological discussion of the growth of various types of authoritarian governments in the world. Next, Falk undertakes a comparison of capitalist and socialist Third World countries in terms of the protection of human rights and then, in the remaining chapters, takes up four more specific matters: the problem of response to severe human rights violations, the Algiers Declaration of the Rights of People, the Nuremberg tradition, and human rights after the Iranian Revolution. The meat of the book is in the first chapters; the last four represent applications of the position worked out in the preceeding analyses.

The early chapters are a blend of history and typology, overlaid with a normative concern. Falk recognizes the pluralism that has characterized approaches to the human rights question and meets it head-on in categorizing the various major positions and pointing out their biases. Thus in Chapter 3 he identifies six different "logics" relating to human rights: the "Statist," the "Hegemonial," the "Naturalist," the "Supranationalist," the "Transnational," and the "Populist."

Intrinsic to his own approach to a solution of the human rights problem is his argument against authoritarianism and for socialism. In Chapter 4 he develops a schema for understanding the types of authoritarianism that exist, and all the nations of the world may be seen to fall into one of his five categories. It is, he argues, the global growth of authoritarianism that threatens human rights, and a new world order must be created that is not authoritarian and militaristic if human rights are to be served. This typology of regimes is useful, but unfortunately, Falk's arguments for the increase of authoritarianism, for the utter incompatibility of human rights with authoritarianism, and for the realism of his hoped-for world order solution are insufficient.

In Chapter 5 the subject is the arguable preferability of socialism over capitalism for the promotion of human rights in the Third World. Though originally written and published elsewhere, this discussion depends upon the preceding chapter and shares its weaknesses as well as its strengths. Moreover, this chapter has an added difficulty: Falk attempts to make the argument for socialism in general, and thus necessarily abstract, terms. In defining different types of capitalist and socialist governments in the world in Chapter 4, Falk undermines the generalizations with which both economic systems are discussed in Chapter 5. On the level of individual governments, this variation in treatment is even more pronounced. While Falk's argument points toward a neater solution to the problem of protection of human rights in the Third World, its superiority to a more pragmatic, case-by-case approach is not demonstrated.

Nevertheless, this is a substantial book, and Falk's perspective on the nature of the human rights problem and its solution deserves serious attention by students of international relations and of human rights.

JAMES T. JOHNSON
Rutgers University

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Paths to Peace: The UN Security Council and Its Presidency *edited by Davidson Nicol. Elmsford, N.Y., Pergamon Press, 1981. 401 pp. $42.50.*

The United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), of which Davidson Nicol is executive director, produced this book in the hope that the reflections of diplomats who have presided over the Security Council would suggest effective techniques "to future Presidents, to representatives of states who are or will become members of the Security Council, and to international officials" (p. xvi). The three general essays discussing aspects of the Security Council's evolution since 1945 and the twenty-five recollections dealing with events of the decade 1967–77 assume that the reader knows a good deal about the Security Council already. Anyone who does not will miss the significance of many fleeting references and be left somewhat confused. The political significance or tactical implications of the various rules and practices are seldom discussed; again, only a knowledgeable reader will profit from the discussion.

The fragmentary nature and unsystematic arrangement of the recollections will also confuse all but the specialist. The presidency of the Security Council rotates monthly, each member serving in turns determined by the English alphabetical order of his or her state's name. Thus, even with the recollections of diplomats who served as president more than once, accounts of particular crises are fragmentary. This problem is compounded by the arrangement of the recollections by alphabetical order of authors' names rather than chronologically or according to crisis or region discussed. When recollections discuss general lessons to be drawn, the arrangement poses no particular difficulties; those wishing to see what happened in a particular crisis or whether those serving early in the decade have different perceptions than those serving later must skim the essays first or consult the appendix listing when each president served.

Despite these problems, the book deserves close attention from scholars interested in the workings of international institutions generally or of the Security Council in particular. Though the recollections vary greatly in length and quality, many add important detail to the history of various crises or UN initiatives. As a group, they strongly confirm the general diplomatic and scholarly view that the multilateral diplomacy practiced at the UN requires the patience to carry out extensive preliminary consultations and the ability to work with others of differing personalities, beliefs, and opinions if an agreed action is to be taken. The essays reveal differences in approach not only between Western and Third World diplomats, but within those broad groups among inhabitants of different continents.

Though scholars are not the main audience, UNITAR has done them a service by encouraging and helping twenty-five experienced diplomats set out their views. Such recollections often get lost, and with them the sort of fine detail unavailable from written records that makes it possible to understand what actually occurred is also lost. The details and ideas presented here do not by themselves give a full account of the Security Council's workings, but will assist efforts to understand and explain the workings, limits, and potentials of international institutions.

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The Politics of Mistrust: Estimating American Oil and Gas Resources *by Aaron Wildavsky and Ellen Tenenbaum. Beverly Hills, Calif., Sage Publications, Inc., 1981. 363 pp. Cloth, $22.50; paper $9.95.*

This is an odd book. It is supposedly about the political problems surrounding the estimation of this country's reserves and ultimate resources of petroleum and natural gas. The authors' two major points with respect to this theme are surely correct: First, despite the political system's demand for "better" reserves estimates so that the "truth" can be known and "correct" energy policy implemented, "better" estimates in fact are unlikely to lead to the resolution of policy differences, because the conflicting policy perspectives of the interested parties determine their views as to what are "better" estimates. Second, the policy need for reserves estimates arises from a "quantity theory," quite popular in the political process, which chooses to ignore the role that prices can play in equilibrating supply and demand, encouraging exploration, and inducing conservation and substitution.

Yet this is a muddled book. A good deal of the book is not about reserves estimates but about American oil and gas policy in general. The authors reach the correct conclusions—that U.S. energy policy, for example, has been badly mismanaged since the 1930s because our political system has had a set of conflicting goals with respect to prices to consumers, profits to producers, incentives for domestic discovery, avoidance of domestic depletion, and dependence on imports. The proper points of reference are also cited: the oil prorationing of the 1930s through the 1960s, the oil import quotas of 1959 through 1973, the oil price controls of 1971 through 1980, the implicit subsidies for imports from 1973 through 1980, the natural gas price controls of 1954 through the present day. Nevertheless, the evidence and the arguments are simply not marshalled in an effective manner.

Further, the authors want to show that the distrust of estimates by interested parties is one that has persisted since the turn of the century and that the positions by these parties have been consistent and predictable. The former point is valid, but the evidence to support the latter point is weak. Additionally, the evidence to support their claim that the nationwide agreement on policy goals during the two world wars led to agreement on reserves estimates is even weaker. Also, the authors claim that "consumerists" want low reserves estimates when prices are high to justify the argument that high prices do not bring forth new reserves and hence prices should be lowered, and high reserves when prices are low to justify the argument that price increases are not necessary. Producers, they say, want just the opposite. Yet, surely, it is the rates of change that are important, for consumerists want estimates which indicate that reserves have not increased after prices have increased and producers want estimates which indicate that reserves have fallen after prices have remained low.

The book is over-written, badly organized, and repetitious. We are reminded far too many times of the authors' main point concerning the connection, or lack of it, between energy policy and reserves determination. Curiously, they wait until the last quarter of the book to explain the difficulties and uncertainities of the estimates: reserves estimates depend on assumptions about recovery, which in turn depend on assumptions about price and technology; resources estimates involve guesses about oil reserves beneath land that

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has not even been explored yet. One wishes they had had a better editor and/or a better outline before writing.

Still, there are a number of good stories and good insights in this book. It is a pity that the authors did not write a shorter, tighter version.

LAWRENCE J. WHITE
New York University

The Politics of Presidential Appointments *by G. Calvin Mackenzie. New York, Free Press, 1981. 298 pp. $19.95.*

The proliferation of general and specialized studies on the presidency is testimony to the enduring interest in and fascination of scholars and journalists with the presidency. Mackenzie describes the procedures in making executive appointments by the president and Senate from 1945 to 1978. The study is thorough in its details and is copiously documented from Senate committee hearings, interviews with participants, and news reports. The volume's title is somewhat misleading in that the book deals more with procedures than politics and gives more attention to Senate confirmations than presidential nominations. The author's literary style is less than elegant and far less than sprightly.

The first part of the book is a review of presidential selection procedures with short sketches of methods employed by presidents from Harry Truman to the end of Jimmy Carter's first year. The contrasts among the procedures used by these seven presidents is informative. Truman followed traditional policies, although he did designate an aide as personnel officer. Like Lyndon Johnson, he tendered nominations in person. Eisenhower delegated appointments of all except the top persons to his cabinet officers and the Republican National Committee. He initiated the practice of requiring background checks by the FBI. Kennedy created the so-called Talent Hunt during the transition and later created a central office of personnel. Johnson relied heavily upon John W. Macy and was much involved in the whole process. Nixon delegated all but the top nominations to cabinet officers and relied upon Frederick Malek during much of his tenure after some false starts by Harry Flemming. Ford did not have a very good chance because of his lack of an electoral base and increased public scrutiny of appointments. Carter interviewed prospects for the cabinet and delegated the appointment of subordinates to its members in perhaps the greatest decentralization of nominating procedures.

The best part of this book is that dealing with the role of the Senate in making appointments. The author at times gives the Senate more credit than it deserves, because all too often it approves nominees as though it were putting foxes in charge of the chicken coop. Altogether the Senate has been generous in confirming nominations, 97 percent of the total (p. 174). The Senate seldom rejects a nominee to the Cabinet: only seven throughout the country's history and only two, according to my count, in the twentieth century.

Confirmation hearings are the heart of the Senate's action on nominations. Committees use hearings for a variety of purposes. Senators are properly concerned with the character, integrity and competence of the nominee and with such matters as constituency representation and the impact of an appointment upon public policy. Conflicts of interest

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are of increasing concern to senators in ascertaining a nominee's fitness. In applying these elusive criteria, the Senate is consistent for the most part in inconsistency (p. 274). Confirmation hearings go far beyond inquiries into fitness for the position and are used to notify nominees of senators' parochial or regional interests, to exact pledges on certain matters, to criticize the past administration of the department or agency, and simply to exchange views. Inherent also in the making of appointments is the influence of various participants. These include the departments and agencies of government, political parties whose influence is declining, the familiar pressure groups, and members of Congress who are not members of the relevant committees.

Despite some flaws in style and organization, the author has written a book which should be useful to students of government, journalists, and that omnipresent but fictitious person, the general reader.

ROBERT J. HARRIS
University of Virginia

The Supreme Court *by Lawrence Baum. Washington, D.C., Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1981. 248 pp. $7.50.*

This is a well-conceived handbook on the Supreme Court, designed for beginning students in American government or constitutional law courses. Such students would be well advised to read it with care, for it presents an informed, balanced account of the nature of the country's highest and most prestigious appellate court.

After an introductory chapter that presents a general picture of the place of the Court in American government, the second chapter describes the process of selection of justices, including an analysis of the sort of people who ultimately get to the Court. The third chapter discusses the types of cases that reach the Court, particularly how they get there. The next chapter seeks to analyze the processes of decision making. The fifth chapter describes the areas of Court activity, that is to say, the Court's policy outputs. An excellent concluding chapter comes to grips with the complex problem of the impact of its decisions. Throughout, the supportive footnotes are excellent.

One great merit of this book is that while the author is duly impressed by the influence of the Supreme Court in the American scheme of things, he does not claim too much. On the contrary, he frequently reminds the reader of the limitations on the scope of judicial power. Thus, Baum concludes his book with this general observation: "The Supreme Court, then, is neither all-powerful nor insignificant. It is one of the many public and private institutions that shape American society in significant ways. That is a smaller role than some have claimed for the Court. But the role that the Court does play is an extraordinary one for a group of nine people" (p. 220).

That the Court is not all-powerful—it exercises a limited role in the general governmental picture of the nation and runs into many difficulties in securing compliance with its decisions— is one of the general themes of his book. Another is that the most important factor that determines the voting behavior of a justice is his or her system of policy preferences. Judges are, after all, human beings who live in society, are aware of what is

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going on, and have their own ideas of what is right and what is wrong. Indeed, if anything, I think Baum repeats a bit too often an aspect of the judicial process now widely accepted as fitting and proper. In addition, the author repeats over and over that in construing the Constitution and statutes, the justices are involved in the political life of the nation, albeit in a rather special way peculiar to lawyers.

Baum makes it clear that the Supreme Court is deeply involved not only in the interpretation of the Constitution, but also with the construction of statutes. If he ever prepares a revised edition, I suggest that the author give specific examples of statutory interpretation, so that the process of statutory construction is explained to the reader. To say repeatedly that the Court performs an important function in construing statutes, which is undoubtedly correct, without giving concrete examples of how the process works, leaves the reader with a barebones idea without much flesh on it. But I do not wish to carp; Baum has written a fine introduction to the Supreme Court that should find a large body of readers among students of constitutional law and American government.

DAVID FELLMAN
University of Wisconsin-Madison

The Election of 1980: Reports and Interpretations *by Gerald M. Pomper, et al. Chatham, N.J., Chatham House, 1981. 208 pp. Cloth, $15.00; paper, $7.95.*

The successor to a similar report on the 1976 election, this book represents the challenge that Gerald Pomper and his associates at Rutgers University have accepted to examine an election from the Iowa caucuses to the inauguration while working under a publication deadline of April, 1981. It is a challenge successfully joined. This book will provide future students of the 1980 election with an analysis that is not less informed and thorough for being rapid.

Carey McWilliams argues (p. 170) that the 1980 election should teach us three lessons: First, "the primary-dominated system of nomination is an unqualified disaster." Second, "the old Roosevelt coalition is yielding to something we can call the Kennedy coalition." Third, "conservative Republicanism is experiencing its own, analogous change, and conservatism may find victory more painful than defeat." The elaboration of these themes runs through many of the arguments of the book.

Criticizing a nomination process that has produced the presidential candidates of 1972, 1976, and 1980 would appear as easy as taking candy from babies. Yet, Pomper's and McWilliams's briefs against the nomination process are not wholly persuasive. Indeed, they themselves, as realists and as democrats, are somewhat ambivalent in their criticisms. In Pomper's judgment the process failed because each party nominated candidates who reversed established party positions and who ran nomination campaigns insulated from other party leaders. Moreover, the nomination battles were effectively aborted early in the process, leaving no opportunity for either "the party or the electorate to give serious thought to nominees who were not open, active, and long-standing possibilities" (p. 33). Yet Pomper acknowledges that both nominations were fitting in the sense that

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Carter and Reagan were the most popular candidates from the beginning to the end of the formal nominating process.

Complaints about the process aside, the outcomes were not the product of the post-1968 nomination rules that make the succession of primaries so dominant. As Pomper notes, Carter won a higher percentage of the delegates of caucus states than he won in primary states. Reagan similarly "embodied the conservative ideology that was dominant among both party leaders and members" (p. 33). Both candidates would have been nominated under either the old or the new rules, and this is almost surely true of all the post-1968 nominations with the possible exceptions of McGovern in 1972 and Carter in 1976. McWilliams states a communitarian preference for Iowa-style open caucuses, but, of course, Carter won in the Iowa caucuses in 1976 and 1980.

McWilliams's second lesson from 1980 is the evidence it reveals of shifting alignments within both parties. Henry Plotkin's good chapter on issues in the campaign emphasizes the division in Republican ranks between its two traditions of conservatism—traditionalism and libertarianism—the former seeking a government that will enforce its conception of public and private morality and the latter resisting the legislation of morality. The Democratic party is similarly riven on both social and foreign policy issues. The consistent theme of all the contributors is that there is no ascendant public philosophy in the contemporary period, no necessary mandate for conservatism. Pomper, Frankovic, and McWilliams all argue that Reagan won in a choice between, Pomper jokes, "the evil of two lessers." The interpretation of the 1980 election as essentially a plebiscite on the Carter administration is supported by the initial analyses of the University of Michigan's surveys as well as the CBS/New York Times surveys that provide the data for this book.

Thus, McWilliams's third lesson: governing on the Reagan platform will be considerably more difficult than mouthing the slogans on TV cameras. The division within the country on governmental enforcement of social values such as anti-abortion legislation is only one such example. Public subsidies to declining, private industrial sectors is another. The Reagan policy of military superiority and increased defense spending will perhaps be the most politically damaging of all, since it alarms much of the public on its own terms and necessitates compensating reductions in domestic programs. The anti-incumbent tide will almost surely engulf Reagan, just as it did Carter before him.

RICHARD W. BOYD
Wesleyan University

Radioactive Waste From Nuclear Power Plants *by Thomas B. Johansson and Peter Steen. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1981. 197 pp. $15.95.*

The title of this brief and informative volume does not clue the potential reader to the fact that the book is essentially a translation of a Swedish government report on nuclear waste. Under the 1977 Nuclear Waste Stipulation Act, Swedish operators of new nuclear power plants must demonstrate that: there is an acceptable nuclear waste reprocessing contract; it can be shown how the highly radioactive waste resulting from reprocessing

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can be finally stored; the waste will be handled in a way that is absolutely safe; and it can be shown where the radioactive waste for reprocessing will be placed for final storage (p. 19).

In December 1977, Sweden's nuclear industry introduced a plan for reprocessing radioactive waste created during spent fuel reprocessing. The plan was submitted to the Swedish government with a request for permission to operate a new reactor. The volume under review is based on the government report commissioned to aid the decision process mandated by this first test of the 1977 Stipulation Act.

Following a concise executive summary, the authors provide background on the Nuclear Stipulation Act and an easily understood description of the nuclear fuel cycle. The report explores the issues raised by the Stipulation Act; its chapter titles ask basic questions such as: "When can a technology be considered as 'having been shown'?" What constitutes 'highly radioactive wastes resulting from reprocessing'?" (p. 62); and "What is 'absolute safety'?" (p. 67). The authors then describe the technologies currently available for storing nuclear wastes. They present an account of the limitations of these technologies in a language that can be easily understood by social scientists and decision-makers.

To the student of American environmental politics, it is most instructive to contrast the deliberative decision-making process undertaken by the Swedes with our own politics of inertia. The Johansson–Steen volume provides evidence of a nation engaging in an open, sophisticated debate on the issue of nuclear waste. The report provides an indication of the Swedish government's willingness to tackle a very complex issue. Meanwhile, in the United States, nuclear waste piles up in "spent fuel pools" located adjacent to nuclear reactors. These pools were designed to serve as short-term "resting" spots for spent fuel rods before transport to reprocessing and/or final waste repositories. The United States has been unable to decide where or how to construct reprocessing and waste storage facilities, and, in fact, the technologies required to build these facilities have not been perfected.

Our political system's response to this dilemma has been an inconclusive and less than honest debate between the nuclear industry and environmentalists. The Reagan administration's attempt to end this debate by declaring the nuclear industry's position correct can only be contrasted to the Swedish government's more careful, analytic review.

The contrast between the Swedish decision-making process and our own provides further evidence for the contention that "interest group liberal" or pluralist political processes cannot make the tough decisions required to manage and control new technologies. Unquestionably, our ability to develop innovative technology far exceeds our ability to develop the innovations in governance required to control technology in the public interest. Though Johansson and Steen's excellent description of the Swedish example provides some cause for hope in this regard, our own policy paralysis can only serve to temper any optimism.

STEVEN COHEN
Columbia University

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Energy, Economic Growth, and Regionalism in the West *by Lynton R. Hayes. Albuquerque, University of New Mexico Press, 1980. 238 pp. $15.95.*

Lynton Hayes attempts to expand our knowledge about regional politics in the United States by examining recent institutional responses in the Rocky Mountain and Northern Great Plains states to problems associated with energy and economic developments. Through two extensive case studies and selected interviews, his aim is "to discover the principle motivations [and] regional consciousness" (p. 8) in the development of the Western Governors' Regional Energy Policy Office (WGREPO) and its successor, the Western Governors' Policy Office (WESTPO). The effort is at once instructive and somewhat disappointing.

This brief volume contains a wealth of information about the energy resources of the West (chap. 2), the West as a region (chap. 3), and the creation and development of WGREPO (chap. 4) and WESTPO (chap. 5). In the two case studies, readers learn how regional institutions are formed, why, and with what results. Hayes finds, for example, that a regional response was evolutionary: WESTPO was a refinement of WGREPO. Moreover, the development of both organizations depended on the initiatives of the Western governors, particularly Governor Richard D. Lamm of Colorado. They championed a regional response and ushered the organizations through their initial problems. Hayes also found the states to be both a beneficiary and inhibitor of regional organizations. On the one hand, the Western states achieved unity through WGREPO and WESTPO, which enabled their representatives to influence federal legislation and engage in regional posturing. On the other hand, the states inhibited the effectiveness of the organizations. Although the sparsely populated, underrepresented states of the West needed regional unity in the face of federal energy and economic development programs, they exhibited political independence and wanted to operate as separate polities.

The author paints a picture of the West as neglected in Congress and in the federal executive and exploited by Eastern economic interests. Historically, the region has suffered political discrimination and "danced to whatever tune the political, governmental, and financial powers played" (p. 55). Therefore, out of the political experiences of the West, an attitude has emerged of the West against the federal government and the Eastern establishment. The governors' regional initiatives, Hayes argues, were born out of the distrust and suspicion that fermented over the years.

There is a disappointing feature of this analysis. Hayes does not emphasize that the development of WGREPO and WESTPO required national as well as state participation and initiatives or that a regional response was really a cooperative endeavor to design an organization acceptable to national as well as state and regional interests. Although the interviews and case-study data reveal numerous examples of intergovernmental cooperation and dependency, Hayes never directly addresses this dimension of American political behavior. No doubt Hayes is correct in asserting that distrust and suspicion motivated the governors. But their regional initiatives necessitated not only the involvement but also the assistance of national participants.

Hayes nonetheless accomplishes his main objective; he provides insight into institutional responses of the Western states. While the book cannot be considered in the class of those reviewed in the appendix (by V.O. Key, Ira Sharkansky, Daniel J. Elazar, John

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Fenton, and others), it deserves the attention of those scholars and students interested in state and regional politics and intergovernmental relations.

ROBERT D. THOMAS
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What's News: The Media in American Society *edited by Elie Abel. San Francisco, Calif., Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1981. 296 pp. Cloth, $18.95; paper, $7.95.*

This is a collection of new and readable essays about various aspects of the news business. Editor Abel's authors are some of America's best-known scholars and practitioners in the field of mass communications. The essays highlight trends and political controversies; they fit together well and very nearly constitute a textbook on the subject. Little original research is reported in the book. Rather, most of the essays are condensed versions of the authors' perspectives, which can be found in expanded form elsewhere. The volume is for the most part not "factual" enough to stand alone as a text for courses dealing with political communications, but provides an excellent overview of the important questions which a good course should address. It would also be good supplementary reading for general courses in American politics which give extended treatment to mass media.

The collection is particularly strong on the subject of economics and mass media. Theodore Peterson's essay traces the evolution of small-scale media into mass media, linking industrial development both with the form of media (growth of the capacity for wide and cheap dissemination) and the function of it (the use of advertising to stimulate consumption). Two other pieces examine the contemporary economic setting in which the media operate. William E. Porter examines trends in the concentration of the mass media and finds less to be alarmed about than do most observers. Bigness is not necessarily badness, he says; the takeover of a small newspaper by a chain or conglomerate has been as likely as not an improvement. However, he presents the stultifying standardization of local television news, a response to demands of the "bottom line," as an exception to his otherwise cautiously optimistic assessment.

The weightiest and perhaps most unusual essay in the collection is economist James N. Rosse's sophisticated and rather complex treatment of the unique market structure of our contemporary mass media. The behavior of our media can hardly be understood apart from their structure, particularly the economic forces which act upon them. Rosse's essay is too short for the formidable task he undertakes, but his discussion of the inapplicability of most normal economic rules to production and pricing in the mass media helps to illuminate the bases of many familiar problems.

The structure of the mass media promises to change rapidly in the next few years as home computer terminals become more common, and interconnections among existing message producers become more complete. Ithiel de Sola Pool surveys these changes and ruminates about the implications for message content (it will become more diverse, but probably not much better), privacy (not as serious a problem as some suggest), and copyright laws (a mess).

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Another group of essays examine the content of the news and the forces which determine it. Edward Jay Epstein and William A. Henry III each look at news from the perspective of the demands of the news organization. Epstein describes a variety of organizational constraints that determine which of the plethora of potential stories actually become the news. He also condemns American journalism for obscuring "the methods by which they select and process reality" (p. 132). Such a practice, he says, reduces the value of the news to those who would use the information for rational decision-making in a democracy. Henry's essay parallels Epstein's in some ways, but elaborates more on the effect of the news organization's needs on the form of the news, particularly in television. Two other essays in this section are more narrowly focused. Michael Jay Robinson presents evidence from the 1980 election to argue that journalists give presidential candidates favorable coverage as long as they appear to be in no danger of winning nomination or election. He speculates that a "media system geared to covering the dark side of the major candidates" leads in part to a passive and apathetic public (p. 186). Robert L. Bartley wonders why journalists so often focus on the dark side of business. He concludes that much of the problem lies in reporters' vulnerability to easy stereotypes, in part a function of the format of the news, especially on television, as well as the mixed motives of businessmen in reporting summary statements of their businesses' successes and failures.

The volume also contains useful discussions of important First Amendment controversies and current legal interpretations of the amendment, as well as a discussion of nongovernmental methods that have been used to hold the media accountable for the actions they take and the power they wield. George Comstock surveys a variety of research and thought on the social and cultural impact of the media, but the volume lacks a similar piece on the effects of political communication on political behavior. Empirical research in this area seems only to diminish the number of valid generalizations that can be made about the media and mass behavior, and a critical survey of this literature would have been useful. The volume would also have profited by a chapter on the symbiotic relationship between reporters and officials.

Collections of essays such as this always run the risk of failure to cohere, either in conception or in style. While these essays obviously were written by different people, the discontinuities of style and depth are not serious ones. Abel has assembled a felicitous combination of papers in *What's News*.

SCOTT KEETER
Rutgers University

In Quest of Freedom: American Political Thought and Practice by *Alpheus Thomas Mason and Richard H. Leach. Washington, D.C., University Press of America, 1981. 432 pp. $12.00.*

Can American political thought be understood as predominantly Lockean, Puritan, bourgeois, or republican? Largely ignoring these scholarly issues, Mason and Leach in-

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cisively summarize the ideas of a formidable array of political writers and actors. As they apply it, this method revealingly juxtaposes, to cite just a few examples, Locke and the disputants at Putney, Federalists and Jeffersonians, Lincoln, southern apologists and Transcendentalists, and Franklin Roosevelt and John Dewey. It also employs a teleological reading of American history in which, as the title indicates, almost every major episode in more than 300 years of political thought and practice has contributed to a single, shared quest for freedom.

The discussion of the founders typifies the authors' basic approach. Prior to the constitutional convention, "Hamilton, Washington, Jefferson, Madison, and Adams had set the stage for a reexamination of the basis of [American] government. . ." (p. 67). Although economic elites and democratic masses continually opposed each other, by 1787, "a way had been found to weld together into one *consistent* work the seemingly irreconciliable elements of liberty and restraint" (p. 120, my emphasis). Similarly, when comparing Jefferson and Marshall, "Power builders make an indispensable contribution to a nation's greatness. So do those who question power" (p. 146).

Such remarks are plausibly defended, and the work as a whole persuasively emphasizes the cumulative features of American political development. For all the ambiguities and discontinuities inherent in democratic politics, particular generations have indeed built on the work of their predecessors to fashion a richer, more complex, and finally, more refined understanding of political freedom—witness the very disparate phenomena of race relations and academic appointments. Still, the obvious danger here is a "presentism" that tends to read later intentions into earlier beliefs. For instance, although the Declaration did bolster later anti-slavery arguments, Jefferson's own position on the institution was deeply ambivalent, and much more equivocal, than Mason and Leach suggest (p. 238). Equally important, later generations have not simply synthesized earlier political creeds. They have inherited and perpetuated political and philosophical disagreements that reflect, among other issues, the clash between deontological and utilitarian ethics and the differences between idealist and empiricist or materialist epistemologies. Mason and Leach, however, do not systematically or philosophically examine these issues. On the contrary, their thesis amounts to a claim that history synthesizes diverse intellectual perspectives through progressive stages of development. To this extent the authors are neo-Hegelians. Yet theirs is a Hegelianism without real contradictions.

If the authors fail to confront directly the basic tensions in American political culture, their many separate discussions do effectively describe those positions that are fundamentally at odds. In addition to a pervasive concern with freedom and equality, they perceptively identify at least four perspectives, by no means mutually consistent, that make up what is generally thought of as American liberalism. First, a republicanism that emphasizes the role of citizen in a regime limited by fundamental law and divided authority. Second, a "possessive individualism" that links a capitalist, acquisitive view of human motivation to a consequentialist ethics. Third, a belief in the fundamental political, cultural, and economic rights of the individual. Fourth, a universalistic humanitarianism rooted initially in liberal Calvinism, then in Pragmatism and left wing progressivism, that espouses a deontological ethics with an anti-materialist stress on cultural values.

Some readers will understandably find the volume too comfortably content with three

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centuries of intellectual and political progress. Others will reply with equal warrant that it insightfully exhibits the range and complexity of the American political tradition.

J. DAVID GREENSTONE
University of Chicago

Corporations and Their Critics: Issues and Answers on the Problems of Corporate Social Responsibilities *edited by Thornton Bradshaw and David Vogel. New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1980. 285 pp. $14.95.*

The publication of a book on "corporate social responsibility," jointly edited by the president of a major corporation, Atlantic Richfield Co., and a professor from the University of California, Berkeley, is in itself an event, one to which social science should give attention. Noteworthy as well is that more than half of the twenty-four contributors hold major positions in large corporations, including the chairman of du Pont, Irving S. Shapiro; the chairman of Levi Strauss, Walter A. Haas; the chairman of Aetna Life & Casualty, John H. Filer; the president of Dow Chemical, Paul F. Oreffice; and the past president of BankAmerica Corporation, A.W. Clausen. This is an impressive list by any standards. Corporate *social* performance and responsibility in such areas as affirmative action, product safety, training the hard-core unemployed, development of the inner city, and occupational health is as resolutely urged by these business executives as by the social action critics also represented in the book.

There are two broad questions raised by the book. First, what impact will the book have on corporate practice? Second, what can we learn about the emergence, spread, and staying power of practices summarized in the metaphor "corporate social responsibility"? This review, prepared for a social science journal, addresses only the second of these questions.

How did the notion of corporate social responsibility come to be established in American society? On this critical question the essays provide suggestive anecdotes, though not a comprehensive statement. The anecdotes indicate that corporations—at least those used for illustrative purposes in this collection—fashion a social agenda more because of external political pressure than internal preferences. The socially responsible corporations are responding to felt political pressure and perceived changes in public expectations toward the business community. The response is a prudent one, guaranteeing corporate survival; in the words of Coy G. Eklund, "In the future, it will require more than first-rate profits for any business to survive; responsible social conduct has become a sine qua non" (p. 117).

If being socially responsible is a prudent response, why are a few corporations responsive and others, the majority, not? On this question the book is largely silent. It concedes that the businesses represented in the book are atypical and it applauds their leadership. But it offers little to help us understand why a presumably widespread political pressure is felt in some corporate corners but not others.

The difficulty in explaining the uneven emergence of social responsibility among

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American corporations at the present time is largely theoretical in nature. In the first place, there is no ethical theory available to tell us which corporate actions are clearly wrong and which are clearly right. Debates about investment policy in South Africa or political contributions or pollution standards emerge not because some corporate executives are "corrupt" and others "pure," but because well-intentioned persons can see their responsibilities in very different ways. The present collection of essays usefully raises some of the ethical questions, but it does not present a set of ethical standards for sorting out the right and the wrong behavior for corporations. The volume simply takes for granted that the practices therein described are the correct ones for the corporation.

If we lack an ethical theory, we are also stumbling around without much in the way of an economic theory which can handle social as well as economic performance. According to the witnesses collected in this work, it is *not* responsible social conduct to engage in unprofitable business practice. None of the contributors expect the corporation to deny its economic responsibilites to its shareholders or creditors or employees. A central theme in the book is that a corporation cannot be socially responsible unless it first is profitable. The difficult challenge is to offer an economic theory which can justify corporate behavior other than that specifically and exclusively devoted to profit-making. In the absence of such theory, what we have are a few case studies of successful profit-making *and* social performance arrayed against the dominant view in American economic thinking that profit-making is what corporations are established to do.

What the present book makes evident is that corporate practices have begun to outpace an ethical theory which would give guidance to the practices or an economic theory which would make sense of the practices. It is difficult to know whether such practices will extend across corporate America, what new shape and form they will take, and even whether they will last. If the present collection of essays stimulates the necessary theoretical work, its intellectual as well political significance will have been substantial.

KENNETH PREWITT
Social Science Research Council

Politics as Communication *by Robert G. Meadow. Norwood, N.J., Ablex Publishing Corporation, 1980. 269 pp. $24.95.*

This work is an extraordinarily ambitious undertaking. Meadow seeks "to clarify the dimensions of political communication as a subdiscipline." He also "presents a process oriented political communication framework to enable researchers to shed new light on several major political concepts." And he proposes to clarify research needs (p. 8).

Pursuing his laudable objectives, Meadow begins by surveying the history and assumptions of political communication research, each of which he finds wanting. He next considers various theories and models, concluding that the "linguistic, symbolic, and systems approaches" are best. These "form the bases for the treatment of political concepts" (p. 25) composing the next major part of the book. These concepts are power, conflict, integration, development, participation, and socialization, and are followed by a discussion of communication in such political institutions as the presidency, Congress, the

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judiciary, and in elections. Finally, under the rubric of "communication as a political issue," Meadow discusses "language and politics," "popular culture and politics," "regulation," and "the government as communicator."

The result is some 239 pages of encyclopedic text reflecting a wide range of reading. Innumerable books and articles are mentioned, invoked, or summarized. Recapitulations are provided of the findings or conclusions of several long-fugitive studies. This book is a convincing reminder of the uses and gratifications of thinking about the many and various communications aspects of politics, of the necessity for integrating communications research in a political science framework.

The ultimate effect is dismaying, however. Meadow is ambitious, and his readers will suffer grievously for it. Far too often, pedestrian prose and vacuous observations unite to produce such sentences as: "political communication is fluid: differing across social systems and individuals, or across any environment or individual framework in which meaning is attributed to messages and upon which future action is based" (p. 7). Add unconscionable repetition—ten lines on p. xii and p. 12 are virtually identical, for example—and one longs for the days, if they ever existed, when American publishers employed editors who forced clarity upon authors or, at least, insisted on the removal of such words as "interface."

Politics as Communication is flawed in three other important ways. First, communication is defined so broadly that it often becomes virtually synonymous with politics. Thus "as long as other political actors such as decision makers react to these messages, whatever their meaning, citizen participation is communication . . ." (p. 71). Second, Meadow has no overarching theory, no unifying ideas about the politics–communications relationship. Finally, he has devised no systematic way of applying communications to the political concepts and political institutions he addresses in his various chapters. As one example, "a communication view of political power" (p. 104) is rendered as follows: "power and authority can exist only where there is information exchange . . . strategic location in relationships in which an actor is in a position to control the flow of information is essential to understanding power and authority" (p. 105).

It is hard to discern the appropriate audience. The book is too convoluted and diffuse for students. Political scientists will find its brief summaries of research and its conventional recitations of various aspects of their discipline self-evident and predictable, as, for example, on the limits of executive power, pp. 132–33. For researchers interested in political communication, there are very few speculations, suggestions, insights about possible research linking politics and communication. *Politics as Communication* does excel as a reference source of conveniently summarized, diverse literature in social science and communication. Despite some strange omissions—David Apter, David V. J. Bell, Raymond Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool and Lewis Dexter—this is a painstaking accomplishment.

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In Struggle: SNCC and the Black Awakening of the 1960s *by Clayborne Carson. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1981. 359 pp. $22.00.*

Politicization of the Black community during the 1960s and the emergence and development of the civil rights movement are important aspects of American history that have not yet been adequately chronicled and analyzed. Needed are detailed histories of major organizations as well as comprehensive studies examining the interplay among the personalities, groups and ideologies in the civil rights movement. Clayborne Carson's detailed, careful study of SNCC (the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee) is, therefore, a welcome addition to literature on the civil rights movement and on the tumultuous politics of the 1960s.

Carson traces SNCC's development from its emergence as a campus-based organization advocating nonviolent tactics in confronting southern segregation to its rather pitiful demise in the 1970s as seen through FBI records. The history of SNCC contains intrinsically exciting elements when viewed from the sympathetic perspective of people struggling to overcome centuries of degradation. Carson captures this aspect of SNCC with compelling portraits of the various actors in SNCC from top leadership to local project directors and activists. Difficulties encountered by SNCC volunteers are vividly and movingly described, particularly the famous, and tragic, Mississippi summer project.

SNCC's history also tells us a great deal about other important political phenomena such as the origins of the women's liberation movement, ideological cleavages in the Black community, and even the radical political tradition in the United States. SNCC's development sheds light on the outer limits of liberal democracy and, sadly, on the use of the FBI to infiltrate, attack, and destroy an organization perceived to be radical and undesirable. All of these themes are touched on as Carson recounts SNCC's evolution.

If there is any flaw in Carson's work, it involves what is omitted rather than what is included. Absent is a coherent, convincing interpretation of the events described by Carson with such precision. Several enticing themes are discussed in different contexts but their interrelationship, encompassing significance, and meaning in light of the dynamics of other organizations and movements are either ignored or subjected to effete analysis. For example, the centrality of individualism in the world views of many SNCC volunteers is discussed by Carson in the context of debates within SNCC. Yet the contradiction between the individualistic personal ideologies of SNCC volunteers and advocacy of a nationalistic, collective ideology for the Black community is never explored. At a minimum the recurrence of individualism as a topic of SNCC internal debate should have alerted Carson to the irony of seeing these individualistic, ideological perspectives as contributing to low levels of staff discipline in some projects and to extremely innovative and often courageous project results in others. Other themes, also inadequately explored, include the relevance of SNCC's southern base and the timing of SNCC's expansion to northern urban ghettos; the role of the media in defining the organization and its leadership; and the development of SNCC in the context of the rapid, ideological transformation in the Black community during the 1960s. Though Carson alludes to constraints, opportunities, or facilitating aspects of the national political environment, his comments on the impact of external, environmental factors on SNCC's evolution are mainly descriptive rather than analytical.

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Since Carson uses no overarching conceptual framework to organize his thoughts about SNCC, the civil rights movement, and Black politicization in the 1960s, what might have been a powerful final chapter on the decline of radicalism fails and, indeed, the book stumbles to a close—ending with a personal epilogue. Despite these flaws, Carson's work is important. Once one accepts *In Struggle* as a factual account of SNCC's rise, activities, and eclipse, its virtues far outweigh its faults. *In Struggle* is well-written, sympathetic, without the maudlin sentimentality that has marred earlier work on the topic, intelligent and well-researched. To say that additional studies are needed about this period, and indeed even about SNCC, should in no way detract from Carson's achievement. It is he, in fact, who raises many of the issues that should form the agenda for future research.

MARGUERITE ROSS BARNETT
Teachers College, Columbia University

The Value-Added Tax: Lessons from Europe *edited by Henry J. Aaron. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1981. 107 pp. Cloth, $10.95; paper, $4.95.*

The common conception of the value-added tax (VAT) among social scientists is that it is an unduplicated and regressive general sales tax imposed upon sellers with a credit for VAT paid on purchases, that it is largely self-enforcing, and that it is a major source of government revenue in Europe.

This book contains studies commissioned by the Brookings Institution in which public finance experts from France, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and West Germany examine VAT in their own countries. The studies seriously qualify the common conception of the tax.

In Europe, the VAT is far from a general tax. Exports are not subject to VAT, but all VAT on earlier stages in production of exports is rebated to exporters. Imports are taxed without rebates to their foreign suppliers. Small businesses and farmers are typically exempt, although they may elect to be taxed if it is to their advantage, that is, in order to obtain rebates. Investment goods are not taxed, nor are banking and financial services, housing services, and such "social goods" as health services and education. Moreover, VAT rates are far from uniform even within a single country; for example, luxuries are taxed at a higher rate than necessities. Because of exemptions and rate differentials, VAT in some countries is judged to be proportional on consumption, although regressive on income, but in Italy and the United Kingdom it is mildly progressive and in Germany is proportional even on incomes.

The VAT in Europe accounts for a relatively small proportion of government revenues. In twelve selected European countries, including the six in the study, the percentage of total revenues collected from the VAT in 1978 ranged from 9.0 percent (U.K.) to 21.6 percent (France), with most ranging from 14 percent to 20 percent. Despite its high visibility, the VAT has proved to be an easily increased tax. Ten of the twelve selected

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European countries had by 1980 raised general rates since the tax was introduced, two by more than 100 percent.

Self-enforcement of the tax is not guaranteed. In Italy, it is estimated that 40 percent of the tax is evaded; in Belgium, 8 percent.

Henry Aaron, in an admirable summary, distills the learning from the papers and the discussion of them by a conference of forty-five scholars in the field, including the authors. Aaron concludes that a VAT can be progressive with respect to consumption and proportional or slightly progressive with respect to income. But the exemptions, multiple rates, and compliance problems needed to accomplish this result may not be worth the trouble, especially when progressivity can be provided by other taxes in the system.

Aaron stresses that the U.S. political context is very different from that of the countries in the European Economic Community (EEC). They had only to replace indirect taxes of inferior quality with the VAT and were required to adopt it as members of the EEC. In the unitary governments of Europe, local or state governments had not used the same base as the national government. In the United States, forty-five states impose retail sales taxes on much the same base that would be used by a VAT.

The most important choices that the United States must make in considering a shift to a national VAT—which presumably would be integrated at some point with the revenue systems of the states—are the changes in other taxes and expenditures that accompany it. Will it finance expanded health insurance or other welfare programs? Will it replace part of the corporate income tax to encourage investment? Is the value-added tax a better instrument for achieving such objectives than other taxes or changes in those now in place? The United States, unlike Europe, does not face the simpler choice of replacing an existing complicated *national* system of indirect taxes with a better system of the same kind.

ALFRED C. NEAL
Committee for Economic Development

Women, Power, and Politics *by Margaret Stacey and Marion Price. New York, Methuen, Inc., 1981. 216 pp. Cloth, $23.00; paper, $7.95.*

Women and the American City *edited by Catharine R. Stimpson, Elsa Dixler, Martha J. Nelson and Kathryn Yatrakis. Chicago, Ill., University of Chicago Press, 1981. 277 pp. Cloth, $16.00; paper, $5.95.*

The changing role of women in society is the focus of both these volumes. Both address "the dichotomy between private and public spheres under industrial capitalism, the importance of the private world of the family, and the necessity of integrating the private/personal and public/political worlds" (Stimpson, et al., p. 186).

Women, Power, and Politics, written by two British sociologists, is the more theoretical of the two works. Stacey and Price state as their purpose answering the question: "How can it possibly have come about in so short a period of time that so many women have become involved in politics?" (p.1). However, the basic thrust of the book is an at-

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tack of industrial capitalism rather than a discussion of how women have become politically involved. The book is not very well written and tends to read as two books. The portion which attacks capitalism and attempts to trace historically the role of women in society reads like one all-inclusive bibliographic essay with no apparent organizational or temporal framework. It contradicts later chapters which discuss the suffrage movement in Britain and the election of women to political office, and these are the best written, most interesting chapters. For example, in the introductory chapters, the authors attack capitalism but then conclude in later chapters that individualism and dissolution of traditional family roles (which emerged out of capitalism, not feudalism) have been the keys to women gaining access to the public domain.

More defensible is the authors' attack of the family for its failure to adapt to changing times. According to Stacey and Price, women have lost power in the private domain (home) but, as yet, have not achieved parity in the public domain because they have never been fully relieved of home responsibilities. Women still maintain primary responsibility for childcare and housework even when they enter the work force. Numerous articles in *Women and the American City* also discuss this paradox: "Women cannot improve their status in the home unless their overall economic position in society is altered; women cannot improve their status in the paid labor force unless their domestic responsibilities are altered" (Stimpson, et al., p. 173).

The articles in *Women and the American City* originally appeared in *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* (Spring 1980). They were the result of a grant from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's Office of Policy Development and Research. Most of the articles are highly descriptive case studies of problems faced by women living in urban environments where physical and social structures effectively separate the home, workplace, and social services. Consistent with the theory of Stacey and Price, these articles conclude that "the experience of men and women in American cities is quite significantly different" (p.ix) precisely because of women's dual responsibilities—work outside the home and responsibility for childcare and housework.

The review essay by Gerda R. Wekerle entitled "Women in the Urban Environment" (pp. 185–211) is excellent. Wekerle identifies three paradigms in the literature: first, "the segregation of male and female roles and how this is inextricably linked with women's isolation with the private sphere of the family and men's dominance in the public world of work and politics" (pp. 186–7); secondly "the 'fit' between women's activities and the environments of home, neighborhood, and city and how users of environments might participate more fully in their planning and design" (p. 186); and finally, equity in access to public goods and services, such as transportation, housing, and social services (p. 186).

For those interested in public policy, the articles in *Women and the American City* contain numerous examples of how federal policies have contradicted each other over the years. The most frequently cited example is the conflict between federal housing and employment policies: Veteran's Administration (VA) and Federal Housing Administration (FHA) loans stimulate suburbanization, construction of the single family dwelling unit, and separation of the public and private domains while equal opportunity and full employment laws encourage women to enter the labor force. The best discussion of this conflict is found in the article by Susan Saegert entitled "Masculine Cities and Feminine Suburbs: Polarized Ideas, Contradictory Realities" (pp. 93–108).

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The articles in *Women and the American City* are also interesting in that they contain numerous prescriptions as to how urban society should be structured, physically and socially, to promote equality between the sexes in both the public and private domains. The best examples of such articles are: Dolores Hayden, "What Would a Non-Sexist City be Like? Speculations on Housing, Urban Design, and Human Work" (pp. 167–184); Jo Freeman, "Women and Urban Policy" (pp. 1–19); and Ann P. Markusen, "City Spatial Structure, Women's Household Work, and National Urban Policy" (pp. 20–41). Due to the Marxist leanings of many of the authors, most of the proposals call for collective services, spaces, and activities, self-contained communities, and nonhierarchical decision-making structures.

The major shortcoming of *Women, Power, and Politics* and most of the articles in *Women and the American City* is the philosophical bias of the authors which leads them to ignore much of their own data and to assume that eventually all women will want to be "liberated." They ignore the portion of their data which shows that significant numbers of women are happy with their dual careers, or do not want others raising their children and thus prefer to remain out of the work force or to be employed only part-time, and like living in their single-family home in the suburbs. Instead, the authors choose to assume that the day will come when "all homemakers will recognize that they are struggling against both gender stereotypes and wage discrimination [and] will no longer tolerate housing and cities, designed around the principles of another era, that proclaim that 'a woman's place is in the home' " (Hayden in Stimpson, et al., p. 184). Unfortunately, this assumption offers little comfort to the public policy maker who must make decisions for the short term in a world where significant numbers of her/his constituents prefer a capitalist to a socialist society.

SUSAN A. MACMANUS
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The Economics of Sex Differentials *by Cynthia B. Lloyd and Beth J Niemi. New York, Columbia University Press, 1980. 355 pp. Cloth, $16.50; paper, $10.00.*

This book presents a review of the neoclassical economics literature on why women fare less well than men in the labor market. Judged on its own grounds, this book does a good job of presenting fairly difficult material in a clear and understandable way (with a few mistakes). The authors deal with the major statistical problems encountered in measuring female labor supply in a manner accessible to most social scientists. They also present an excellent table (A5.1) that summarizes the empirical work on earnings differentials.

Judged from a broader perspective, this book shows that the neoclassical model does not give an acceptable explanation of sex differentials, because the model assumes away the interesting questions. Accordingly, this book suffers from the same ills as neoclassical literature more generally: being ahistorical and noninstitutional, it depends upon individuals acting rationally in their own best interests in a competitive world filled with free choice. This model puts the authors in a bind, since they believe that women face dif-

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ferent opportunities in the labor market. Yet if they pursued the implications of that single assumption throughout their book, the results would have been different and more interesting. Their dedication both to the neoclassical model, as taught by their teacher Jacob Mincer, and to the cause of improving women's lot leads them to such inconsistencies as seeing on-the-job training as freely chosen and as not available to women.

Alternative explanations are not noticeably absent. Seven pages are devoted to an inadequate description of the literature on segmented labor markets (that is, markets that are structured by noneconomic forces such as social divisions by race or sex). By presenting a neoclassical version that emphasizes technological determinism in which training costs are a crucial variable, the authors try to convince readers that segmented labor markets are a complement to rather than a substitute for neoclassical theory. Their narrow focus on the costs of training required by the available technology allows them to keep their world simple: differences in training between individuals are the key to individual differences in wages and employment.

This theoretical simplicity is maintained throughout the book, but inadequacies become especially apparent in chapter 5 on discrimination. A narrow definition of discrimination is used: "Discrimination in the labor market occurs whenever workers who are equally productive on average are treated differently" (p. 193). Productivity is a characteristic of the worker instead of the job, and women choose less specific training than men. These assumptions within a world of competitive markets "explain" why women receive lower wages than men. The fault lies not with the economy, but rather with the social context in which women make choices that result in their being less productive. Issues such as equal pay for jobs of comparable worth cannot be (and are not) discussed in this context.

The higher unemployment rates for women are seen as a result of their high inter-labor-force turnover. But this relationship between turnover and unemployment assumes a competitive labor market. In a segmented labor market (that is, where women are in "female" jobs), duration and spells of unemployment are connected. If women's turnover decreased, their duration of unemployment could increase without their unemployment rate declining. As is true throughout the book, the analysis holds only in competitive markets at full employment.

Such an idealized world has no place for discrimination or unequal treatment, and analysis of economic and social problems in such a context can result only in rationalizing them away. If the problems involved were trivial, then perhaps we could ignore the ignorance and incorrect analysis perpetuated by these economic parlor games.

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Poverty in America: The Welfare Dilemma *by Ralph Segalman and Asoke Basu. Westport, Conn. Greenwood Press, 1981. 446 pp. $35.00*

Daniel Bell to the contrary, ideology has not left us, although its form may have changed. Indeed, a new ideology of self-determination dominates this book and limits the authors' ambitious attempt to interweave historical and sociological approaches to the critical issues of poverty and welfare in our society. The authors, Ralph Segalman and Asoke Basu, who are both sociologists, claim that American social programs, and particularly Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), have created a growing problem of residual poverty. Unfortunately, they are overzealous in selecting material which conforms to their thesis, and avoid serious consideration of periods of history or social programs which suggest a contrary view about the nature of our socioeconomic system and the causes of poverty. Thus, they pay scant attention to the depression of the 1930s, the War on Poverty in the 1960s, and the political-philosophical view that inequities in the distribution of resources have deep structural causes.

The tone of the argument is established in the first chapter of the book with a discussion of "the parameters of poverty," primarily in the context of a comparison between the immigrant poor in our country and the residual poor. Given the authors' proclivity for a philosophy of individual achievement, there is no contest. Despite passing mention of differing social and economic conditions, the authors clearly perceive the earlier immigrants as the "worthy poor," and the current residual poor whom they assume are largely black, as the "unworthy poor." The comparison then justifies the position that lack of motivation, rather than our social structure, is the fundamental cause of residual poverty.

Following the initial framing of the parameters of poverty, there is a chapter on the history of the poor law, which synthesizes briefly the earlier literature and leaps quickly over the Roosevelt era to consideration of specific aspects of our current welfare programs. From this point on, the book describes specific programmatic attempts to deal with poverty: public assistance and social insurance; medical services and payments; income maintenance proposals; housing assistance; and other work, education and poverty programs. A section on "social interventions against poverty" reviews AFDC and related programs, including the use of social services as a strategy to end dependency. Despite the heading, there is no discussion of that vast intervention, the attempt to change the distribution of resources and power through the War on Poverty. The book ends with a brief postcript, in which a foremost social policy analyst in recent years, Richard Titmuss, is quoted for the first time, out of context and inappropriately (p. 372). The authors repeat their thesis that "social choices are at the heart of individual liberty" (p. 375). In terms of social welfare programs, "our choice is a right to liberty, not a justification of equality" (also p. 375). Not surprisingly, work and education are again proposed as the foundations of liberty.

The authors utilize a variety of conceptual frameworks creatively, including those of Tonnies and Durkheim, but they fail to develop a consistent method for analysis of social policy. The discussion of medical services ends with a brief summary of then current bills before Congress, without drawing real conclusions; while in housing, the authors propose, as in welfare, "a categorical, step-by-step orientation" (p. 304), whose merit cannot be evaluated because it is hardly developed. The authors also let their values interfere

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with their analysis, so that statements like this are presented baldly: "it takes at least two adults who are equipped with the necessary qualifications or potentialities to rear a competent child" (p. 143).

ELEANOR L. BRILLIANT
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The Urban Service Problem: A Study of Housing Inspection *by Pietro S. Nivola. Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1980. 175 pp. $19.95.*

Housing Vouchers for the Poor: Lessons from a National Experiment *edited by Raymond J. Struyk and Marc Bendick, Jr. Washington, D.C., Urban Institute Press, 1981. 424 pp. $25.00.*

Since humans descended from the trees they have had to be concerned with the need for shelter. Starting in the middle of the last century, the housing of the "poor and working classes" in an urban-industrial society slowly emerged as both a public and private concern. Despite an ever-deepening governmental involvement—including the advent of federal interest in the 1930s—the provision of decent housing for lower-income groups has remained an intractable problem. Both of the books under review have housing as their subject, but they are primarily intended as contributions to the theory and methodology of the social sciences and their application to public policy. Clearly, in terms of the Reagan administration and the social scientist housing reform is of diminishing interest.

In general, housing policy has consisted of two different strategies or approaches. The first, and oldest, sought to upgrade existing housing through the enactment and enforcement of codes and regulations. The other, and more ambitious, sought to create more adequate and affordable housing. Pietro Nivola's study, conducted under the sponsorship of the Joint Center for Urban Research of Harvard-MIT, examines an aspect of the first approach.

Nivola scrutinizes the operation of Boston's Housing and Inspection Department (HID) for the year 1973. His conclusion is that this department performed at an adequate level and that all neighborhoods of the city received reasonable service with no significant discriminatory or preferential treatment accorded any of the areas. Yet his findings are of limited interest since the procedures studied in 1973 have been greatly altered. Indeed, as the title of his work suggests, Nivola's real interest was in evaluating HID as a case study of bureaucratic behavior and organization of a municipal service agency. Here he finds an absence of policy and direction from above in the functioning of the agency; instead there is a muddling through approach which is probably necessary and perhaps preferable. This absence of overall policy, Nivola further argues, is typical of city agencies involved in the "daily production of public service." For this reason he offers his study as a challenge to older theories of municipal government with their emphasis on elites or networks of organized interests acting to determine governmental action. To Nivola municipal government functions as the result of the behavior of a civil service trying to cope with a difficult job and without grandiose or conspiratorial design.

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Dissatisfaction with public housing led the Johnson administration to experiment with a number of alternatives, namely Section 8 housing assistance payments. Dissatisfaction with this in turn led Congress and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in 1970 to design and pass the Experimental Housing Allowance Program (EHAP), which was intended to test the feasibility of allocating cash grants to low-income families as a "demand side" approach to housing needs. In all, the test included 30,000 people in twelve cities and cost $160 million; it was to run in part for a decade. *Housing Vouchers for the Poor* is a collection of twelve papers by nine reseachers from the Urban Institute that seek to evaluate this "experiment." Such an evaluation was an integral part of the design of EHAP and the contributions are offered as "an in-depth view of the Experimental Housing Allowance Program including its design, operation, findings, and policy implications" for future housing programs and indeed for further experimental programs along this line (p. 10). The result is a book deadening to read, difficult to summarize, and somewhat vague in its conclusions.

The volume's first chapter, "Policy Questions and Experimental Responses" by Raymond J. Struyk, does try to provide an overview. Among its general remarks are that "most of the allowance payment was typically spent on non-housing items" (p. 13) and the "design of the housing experiments permitted much less information to be generated about community benefits" (p. 19). In other words, the effect of housing vouchers on housing and neighborhoods, if any, is not known. This is important since the whole thrust of Reagan's housing policy is dependence on vouchers, and the critics of this approach argue, I believe, correctly, that it signifies an abandonment of a housing policy. In fairness to the authors of this volume it should be noted that none calls for this, and the introduction states clearly that "neither housing vouchers nor any single, simple program can itself be a panacea" (p. xviii).

It should be noted, moreover, that the Urban Institute served as a technical adviser to HUD on all facets of this program from its inception onward. This report for this reason alone cannot be considered disinterested. Neither, of course, could Jacob Riis's impassioned condemnation of the slums in *How the Other Half Lives*, but Riis presented himself as a journalist and a reformer and not as a social scientist.

STANLEY BUDER
Baruch College, City University of New York

New Tools for Economic Development: The Enterprise Zone, Development Bank, and RFC *edited by George Sternlieb and David Listokin. New Brunswick, N.J., Rutgers University, Center for Urban Policy Research, 1981. 231 pp. $12.50.*

George Sternlieb and David Listokin have assembled a volume of papers dealing with three policy instruments that are intended to foster the economic redevelopment of distressed areas or declining industries. These are the urban enterprise zone, a device to stimulate economic activity in poor urban neighborhoods that has attracted the attention of the Reagan administration; the National Development Bank proposed by President

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Carter in 1978 to marshall investment and to create jobs in distressed urban and rural areas; and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC), the resurrection of which has been suggested to support the revival of declining U.S. industries. At this writing, only the first of these is under serious consideration, but given our national anxiety about economic decline, either of the others might be revived on short notice.

Following a brief introduction by the editors the book offers six papers, all relevant, although none written specifically for the occasion. The first, by Sir Geoffrey Howe, currently Chancellor of the Exchequer under Margaret Thatcher, was written before her government took office. He argues the case for creating inner city "enterprise zones" in which the government could experiment with radical deregulation, freedom from planning controls, and modest limitations on tax burdens in order to encourage private business in the creation of jobs and income. The essence of the idea, first proposed by the British urban geographer Peter Hall, is to recreate the economic vitality of Hong Kong or Singapore in some quarter of Glasgow, London, or Liverpool.

The second paper, by Stuart M. Butler, describes and argues strongly for American versions of the enterprise zone. Since the United States has far fewer planning controls than Britain, it is not surprising that the American proposals stress tax relief more and relief from regulation and planning less than do the British.

In the third paper, George Sternlieb presents an initial evaluation of the Kemp-Garcia Urban Jobs and Enterpise Zone Act of 1980 (H.R. 7563). He discusses its major provisions in some detail, calculates its financial impact on a hypothetical small firm, and evaluates the criteria proposed for the designation of zones. He then compares its logic and structure with that of two existing federal programs having the same general objectives: Urban Development Action Grants and the programs of the Economic Development Agency. Penetrating though his analysis may be, its usefulness is limited because the provisions of Kemp-Garcia were very substantially altered in a later version (H.R. 3824, 3 July 1981).

The fourth paper, by George Richard Meadows and John Mitrisin, systematically reviews the extensive literature on two questions that were crucial to an evaluation of President Carter's proposed National Development Bank: Do significant, definable capital shortages exist in distressed areas? Will financial incentives—cheaper capital, lower taxes—induce firms to locate in such places? The short answers appear to be: maybe for the former; not strongly for the latter. This paper, with its extensive bibliography, may well be the most useful in the book to readers who, at some future date, attempt to analyze area redevelopment policies on their own.

In the fifth paper James M. Bickley examines the proposal that a financial intermediary similar to the old RFC be set up to provide loan guarantees to aid declining U.S. industries such as steel. While this study is indirectly concerned with economic decline and economic development, it seems out of place as the only paper in the volume that does not treat those issues in a spatial setting.

A final chapter by Robert W. Burchell and David Listokin examines the impact on local government budgets of various federal economic development initiatives. The authors systematically analyze the relevant federal programs, explain the theory of fiscal impact analysis, and then apply it to a sample of actual federal programs in New Jersey.

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The paper is a curious but not unrewarding mixture of technical analyses, case studies, and instruction on "how-to-do-it."

This book is a useful combination of papers describing specific proposals, together with others that analyze the problems those proposals are intended to address. Unfortunately, social scientists writing about policies that have been proposed but not adopted are like marksmen firing at moving targets. There is a considerable risk that the proposals they analyze will have vanished into the underbrush of history before their studies are published, or before they are reviewed or, at the latest, before the reviews are published.

JAMES HEILBRUN
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Federal Health Programs: Problems and Prospects *edited by Stuart H. Altman and Harvey M. Sapolsky. Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1981. 248 pp. $24.95.*

The eleven substantive essays in this book, each devoted to a discussion of a different federal health policy, provide an excellent introduction to the health issues faced by federal policymakers, the major policy directions possible in each area, and the constraints on radical change in the near future. Each chapter develops the history of the program it treats before discussing the problems and options associated with each.

I found the strongest and most informative discussions to be the chapters on manpower programs, the health planning system, end-stage renal disease, and national health insurance. The strength of these chapters lies in each author's ability to convey an underlying structure to the issue which shapes policy alternatives. The chapter on health manpower, for example, stresses the joint product of medical schools (trained students, patient care services, and research) and the trade-offs among these outputs, or goals, different federal policies might produce.

Some of the other chapters are narrower in their focus—for example, the chapter on the Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis, and Treatment Program under Medicaid (hereafter EPSDT). The options developed in these chapters are specific to the individual program rather than exploring more widely the trade-offs with other programs and program goals in the same substantive area.

The general themes the editors develop in the introductory chapter and which are illustrated in several of the substantive discussions are the basic stability of the health system; the continued satisfaction of most Americans with its performance despite judgments by others that the system is in "crisis"; and the continued likelihood of incremental rather than fundamental change given the persistence of multiple and conflicting goals for health programs. The current debate between competitive approaches to health system reform as opposed to regulatory approaches is downplayed. Most of the authors analyze and appear to endorse a mixture of market and regulatory techniques to deal with the problems of their particular area. The argument appears to be that ideological alternatives are muted by ambiguous and conflicting policy objectives. Thus, competitive or regulatory approaches cannot offer comprehensive solutions but only

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more or less improvement at the margin of a particular problem depending upon the circumstances of the case.

The organization of the book—federal program by federal program—is both a strength and a weakness. As the editors acknowledge, the chapter organization makes it difficult to address the interrelationship among proposals or to develop common themes. However, the reader has the ability to pick and choose the topics of most immediate interest and to obtain a quick introduction to particular topics. The chapter organization inevitably raises the question why certain programs are included and others are not. Conspicuous by their absence are discussions of the future of both biomedical and health services research, Medicaid (except for the chapter on EPSDT), and child health policy (again except for EPSDT).

Since the book was written and published before the current administration, a few passages already appear dated. The introduction argues that few political candidates will advocate a roll-back in health care benefits; the chapter on EPSDT presents the Child Health Assessment Program (CHAP) proposal of the Carter administration as a viable alternative although it is now dead; and it would be hard to maintain today, as the chapter on health planning concludes, that "the planning program established by P.L. 93-641 remains at the leading edge of the federal government's regulatory initiatives in health" (p. 130). Nevertheless, I found such examples surprisingly few in a book discussing current policy options written before such a major governmental transition. It remains to be seen however, whether Stu Altman's prediction that "we will continue to muddle through with what we have" (p. 222) is accurate or whether the current administration will succeed with its comprehensive plan, now ready for Congressional consideration, to inject competition into the health care sector.

GEORGE D. GREENBERG
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Postal Reorganization: Managing the Public's Business *by John T. Tierney. Boston, Mass., Auburn House Publishing Co., 1981. 191 pp. $19.95.*

The need for reorganization of the postal service is a widely acknowledged problem, one which many of us may have wistfully pondered as we waited, more or less patiently, in line at our local branch offices. Tierney accurately summarizes both the potential and the limitations of the Postal Service as a national communications network connecting rural hamlet to urban center and individual client to corporate organization. In his well-written and carefully researched and documented study, Tierney describes a classic struggle for innovation in a large, complex organization, as the old Post Office Department sought and won legal and administrative authority to place its operation on a more efficient and cost-effective basis.

The lines in the struggle were drawn predictably, with the diverse actors mobilized for or against reorganization of administrative control, mechanization of services, and modernization of equipment and work procedures on the basis of special interests, organized constituencies, and political clout. Prompted by a widely dissatisfied public

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and mounting costs, postal executives sought managerial autonomy from Congress to introduce new methods of cost-saving, effectiveness, and efficiency into the daily operations of the postal service. This goal was largely attained by the passage of the Postal Reorganization Act of 1970, yet the gains in cost-effectiveness achieved by the adoption of new administrative procedures and mechanization of mail handling processes were eroded by spiraling labor costs, technological developments in electronic communications, and escalating inflation. Many of the hard-won innovative practices introduced in 1971 with the reorganization were already outdated by the end of the decade. Instead of gaining organizational strength and stability, the Postal Service continues to falter with conflicting demands from particular interests, increasing costs, and chronic complaints from a dissatisfied public.

Although Tierney has carefully chronicled the sequence of events and the issues and stakes involved for the interested parties in the controversies over postal policy and management, he omits a concise statement of the theoretical problem posed to the American society by the necessary redefinition of the role of the postal service in the midst of cultural change. The problem clearly involves societal response to technological change, spurred by the rapidly developing capacity to communicate information by electronic means both quickly and cheaply. In light of new communications technologies, the maintenance of a widespread, hierarchical, labor-intensive organization such as the U.S. Postal Service, with its traditional constituencies, costs and rate-setting procedures, is simply too expensive to be cost-effective. It is questionable whether this form of organization is the most appropriate for performing the defined function of the Postal Service, maintaining a nearly universal delivery system. The Postal Service finds itself in the midst of a cultural change of epic proportions, as both the form and frequency of communication changes the long-established relationships between consumer and producer, voter and representative, employee and employer. The distribution of power in the decision-making process on postal policy is shifting with the very kinds of innovative technologies which the Postal Service is seeking to adopt.

The central management decisions of what is the business of the Postal Service and what should it be (p. 169) are likely to be made, not in Congress, as Tierney suggests, but waiting in line at the branch offices, as millions of users, impelled by escalating costs and diminished services, seek alternative methods of communication made increasingly available by the electronic technologies. What remains unchanged about the Postal Service is that the consumers of its services are also the producers of the need for the organization. To the degree that the Postal Service defines a clear public purpose for its organization in the rapidly expanding communications network and adapts its technology and personnel practices accordingly, it will continue to play a vital role in the evolving social and economic processes of the nation. To the degree that it fails to establish a distinctive public role, with the competence to fulfill the identified needs, it lessens the rationale for continued public utilization and support.

LOUISE K. COMFORT
San Jose State University

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From Realignment to Reform: Political Change in New York State, 1893–1910 *by Richard L. McCormick. Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1981. 352 pp. $25.00.*

Writing political history—and reviewing it, for that matter—forces one to straddle a fine line between disciplines jealous of their jurisdictional prerogatives. Richard L. McCormick makes it even more challenging by attempting to balance three distinct forms of analysis—political, historical, and biographical—in this comprehensive examination of the transformation of New York State politics from a bulwark of nineteenth-century bossism and high finance to a national leader of political and economic reforms in the early twentieth century.

From its ascent to power in 1894 to its fall in 1910, the Republican party controlled the governorship and both houses of the legislature. Therefore, Republicans had both the authority and incentive to adjust politics and policies to the demands of a changing socioeconomic system. At the start of this period, New York State politics was characterized by a dominant legislature, distributive economic policies catering to business and financial interests, and a highly partisan electoral apparatus. When the Republicans were defeated in 1910, New York had a dominant executive branch staffed largely by impartial experts, broader-based and better-regulated economic policies, and a less active and more independent electorate.

McCormick's purpose in this study is to explain this drastic turnabout. He contends that the two prevailing interpretations of the era, realignment and reform, are inadequate: the former because it places too much emphasis on voter turnout and not enough on other forms of participation that had begun to gain prominence; and the latter because it focuses on social and economic movements and deemphasizes politics. Instead, he posits a third, less explicitly defined interpretation that incorporates the strengths of the first two and compensates for their weaknesses by examining other forms of participation, such as interest-group pressure and public opinion, and by exploring the political responses to reform movements.

On the whole, the book seems to have been thoroughly researched and is written in a cogent style. Each chapter begins with a brief overview followed by an analysis of the political and then policy changes, and ends with a brief cumulative summary. The tripartite methodology, however, is somewhat cumbersome and leads to occasional repetition. The historical analysis is comprehensive but tends to stray from the central thesis. Conversely, the political science and biographical components are more narrowly focused, but the author might have done more with the data available. His political science research concentrates on election returns and does little to illuminate the transition from legislative to executive branch supremacy. Similarly, the biographies are largely subsumed under the political history, and little insight is provided into nonpolitical factors that may have affected political decisions. By the author's admission, limiting the biographical sketches to William Collier Platt, Theodore Roosevelt, Benjamin B. Odell, and Charles Evans Hughes tends to understate the influence of other significant Republican, Democratic, reform, and nongovernmental actors such as S. Fred Nixon, David B. Hill, Seth Low, and William Randolph Hearst.

Finally, although McCormick sets out to evaluate the various theories and interpreta-

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tions of the period, he does so in a cursory fashion. He virtually ignores them throughout most of the text and then races through some of the more complex theoreticians and attacks many of their interpretations in a matter of paragraphs in the final chapter. Walter Dean Burnham is referred to three times in the entire text; E.E. Schattschneider but once.

The above criticisms notwithstanding, *From Realignment to Reform* provides political scientists and historians alike with a comprehensive and provocative study of New York State politics in transition during one of its most turbulent periods.

HOWARD N. APSAN
Columbia University

Washington Despatches, 1941–1945: Weekly Political Reports from the British Embassy *edited by H. G. Nicholas with an introduction by Isaiah Berlin. Chicago, Ill. University of Chicago Press. 700 pp. $40.00*

Although British records for World War II have been open to research for more than a decade, scholars are only now beginning to reexamine the Anglo-American partnership so glowingly described by Winston Churchill in his six volume history of the war. To be sure, memoirists and historians have written passionate accounts of wartime disagreements over strategy and postwar goals, but for thirty years Churchill's magisterial prose has tended to subordinate such disputes to his larger theme of Anglo-American destiny. In the past few years, however, such scholars as Christopher Thorne, W. R. Louis, and David Reynolds, drawing on both British and American archival sources, have published books that emphasize competition as well as cooperation within the alliance; they also show conclusively that the fabled Churchill-Roosevelt friendship contained almost as much conflict as it did camaraderie. Warren Kimball's forthcoming scholarly edition of the Churchill-Roosevelt correspondence will soon make the most important documentary source of the wartime relationship available to scholars and general readers alike.

The volume under review, containing the weekly political reports of the British embassy in Washington during the war, also provides for a much wider audience the evolving British perceptions of American politics from Pearl Harbor to the Japanese surrender. Since the weekly reports circulated widely within the Foreign Office and Churchill's cabinet, the dispatches come close to representing an "official" British commentary on American politics. The view, although friendly, is not always flattering.

The reports are a joy to read. Compiled from press surveys, consular reports, conversations with American journalists and officials, and soundings from within the populous British embassy, the weekly dispatches were not unlike those of a remarkably well informed foreign correspondent. Written in the form of lengthy telegrams over the signature of Lord Halifax, the British ambassador, the reports were usually drafted by Oxford historian Isaiah Berlin, head of the embassy's survey section. The vagaries of Congress, struggles for power among various Washington satraps, rumors about FDR's health, puzzlement over American attitudes toward the Far East and British colonialism, worries about resurgent isolationism, capsule portraits of senators and assistant secretaries,

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judgments on press and public opinion—all receive appropriate pithy comment in the best Oxbridge fashion.

The reports are exceptionally good at instant analysis. Truman's abrupt cutoff of Lend-Lease, for example, is attributed to "the President's well-known tendency to make speedy decisions, which is at once his strength and weakness" (p. 609). The public reaction to Hiroshima and Nagasaki: "The stories of the atomic bomb appealed to everything most typical in the American nature. The lurid fantasies of the comic strips seemed suddenly to have come true. Headlines sagged under the weight of the drama and the superlatives they had to carry" (p. 598). Regarding Senator Vandenberg's famous conversion from isolationism in January 1945, the British note the "spectacle of an ex-isolationist Senator calling for what in effect is a most entangling alliance is surely one to cause wonder and gratification" (p. 499).

A note of caution to the serious scholar. However excellent the weekly reports may be at summing up attitudes and conveying atmosphere, they do not describe high policy. For Lord Halifax's conversations with Hull, Roosevelt, Truman, et al., the historian must research the files of the Public Record Office; fortunately, the most pertinent records of the Foreign Office, cabinet, and prime minister's office are available in the United States on microfilm. It should be noted, moreover, that Halifax, a tall, lugubrious-looking aristocrat who had been viceroy to India and foreign secretary, kept a diary as ambassador to the United States, a country he had visited only once previously. It is a marvelous diary, full of the same observations as the weekly dispatches and more, but available to scholars only in manuscript at York. H. G. Nicholas and Isaiah Berlin, who collaborated in editing the present volume, might well wish to perform another nostalgic labor of scholarship in editing the diary of the diplomat they both served under during World War II.

J. GARRY CLIFFORD
University of Connecticut

Britain's Moment in the Middle East 1914–1971 *by Elizabeth Monroe. Baltimore, Md., Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981. New and revised edition, 254 pp. $20.00.*

"Nightfall," the final chapter and only changed portion of Elizabeth Monroe's masterful history of British involvement in the Middle East, tells the story of Anglo-French-Israeli collaboration against Egypt in the Suez campaign of 1956. It was a story that leaked out slowly around the edges of the mendacious official explanations given to the British by their leaders, and its retelling here is imbued with a sense of outrage at the deception perpetrated by Prime Minister Anthony Eden and unwittingly accepted by the author in the book's first edition. The crucial penultimate chapter of the 1963 edition is retained unchanged to give the reader a chance to compare old and new versions of the tale.

The motivation for a new edition obviously lies in the new chapter, and the timing is similarly explained. Then British Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd's account of the Suez

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adventure was published in 1978 and provides some of the most telling information in Monroe's new version.

There is nothing in the appearance of this revised edition, therefore, to suggest that it was intended to be of relevance to the current stage of evolution of American Middle East policy. Yet it is difficult to read or reread this brief and elegant account without thinking of the cautionary tale it presents for a great power now wading in the quicksand that sucked down some of the finest diplomats and administrators of the British Empire.

Here we see Britain, intent upon bending every effort to defeat a dangerous European foe, making promises and more promises during World War I and then trying to redeem them with honest currency in the aftermath of victory. Ever conscious of the appearance of contradiction in policy and frequently doing their utmost to provide guidance to new monarchies and to protect friends from one another as well as from other European powers, the British became ever more deeply mired in their self-made morass. The flagging of imperial resources and energy after World War II necessitated their withdrawal from Palestine, the results of which the world has been grappling with ever since. The final vindictive and bungled operation against Nasser's Egypt provides a shabby close for a story that had begun on a note of patriotism, unbounded confidence, and high ideals.

Monroe allows readers to draw their own morals, and the story is certainly one that affects the British reader differently from the American. What appears as the sorry past to the former now looms as the ominous specter of the future for the latter. As American efforts to provide a modicum of friendship and good offices to any Middle Eastern state willing to accept them give way progressively to concrete political and military commitments conceived with the objective of fending off a Soviet threat, the stage appears to be set for a new drama of policy contradictions. How this new play will develop is unforeseeable. We can only hope that when America's moment on the Middle East stage is done, it will find as skillful and incisive a chronicler as Elizabeth Monroe.

RICHARD W. BULLIET
Columbia University

Representation and Urban Community *by Andrew D. Glassberg. New York, Crane, Russak and Co., Inc., 1981. 232 pp. $19.50.*

Andrew Glassberg's book is a significant contribution to knowledge about local government in Great Britain and thereby also a contribution to the growing literature on comparative urban politics. The study considers the attitudes and reported behavior of a sample of elected council members from the London boroughs of Tower Hamlets, Islington, and Bromley. Glassberg interviewed a total of 63 councillors including the leaders and two immediate past leaders. The concern throughout is to discover how these politicians cope with the tension between representing the ward (average population 9500) and submitting to political party discipline.

The principal finding of the study is that the literature underestimates the variation in the way councillors resolve this tension. In particular, Glassberg finds that councillors define a "scope of representation" and a "scope of ambition" for themselves that em-

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phasize either the ward or the borough (p. 80), the latter perspective usually being consistent with their party line. The bulk of the book is devoted to an explanation of how council leadership styles, councillors' own attitudes, and borough characteristics give rise to this variation. Representational differences are then found to affect both overall council style, especially its degree of openness, and the policies the council will pursue. Glassberg finds scope of representation and scope of ambition to be more important distinctions than the traditional "delegate–trustee" distinction that everyone mentions but seems to affect no one's behavior.

Glassberg recognizes this problem of "community representation," of how local politicians should balance the interests of "areas of local distinctiveness" (p. 7), a central issue of urban politics. In one of the most useful portions of the book (pp. 155–75), the author spells out how local development policy—the balance between municipal and private construction, housing and business development, and housing for different social classes—derives not only from the obvious ideological and partisan differences but also from individual and council-level differences in approach to community representation (p. 180).

The least convincing parts of the book are Glassberg's attempts to treat the London boroughs as examples of decentralized urban government and thereby to draw lessons for the United States from his study. While the two-tier system of borough and metropolitian government may represent a useful example for large metropolitian areas, the boroughs can hardly be considered examples of a "decentralization/neighborhood government effort" (p. 8) with implications for the United States. The three boroughs range in size from 149,200 to 290,700 (1979 estimates from the *Statesman's Yearbook*—Glassberg unfortunately neglects to include basic demographic and economic data on his boroughs). They could hardly be thought of as neighborhoods by anyone except a former New Yorker.

This discussion and concluding comparisons with U.S. urban politics seem rather strained efforts to make a book about England comparative. Instead of the disappointing sections of "lessons for urban America" (pp. 181ff), the reader would have been better served by a discussion of the implications of the author's findings for British politics. Until the early or mid-1970s, British urban politics was dominated by a "party first" discipline with penalities for rebels resembling those in force in Parliament. The result was remarkable policy-making freedom for council leaders and especially for professional officers. Has urban policy-making become more fragmented with the rise of the "ideology of localism"? Here comparisons with the United States might have illuminated a British future. In addition, Glassberg seems to have uncovered the local roots of recent shifts in power within the Labour Party. Is there a connection between the rise of "ideology of localism" councillors in local politics and the growth of left-wing strength with its resulting shift in power from the parliamentary to the constituency parties? These are questions Glassberg's study approaches but unfortunately does not address. Nor does the text explain how a photo of Golden, Colorado found its way to the book's jacket.

JERRY A. WEBMAN
Princeton University

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Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World *by Edward W. Said. New York, Pantheon Books, 1981. 186 pp. Cloth, $10.95; paper, $3.95.*

It has been said that the press cannot tell people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling them what to think about. However, through its coverage of Islam in general and the Arab world in particular, the American media have not only made Arabs and Muslims a subject for discussion, but have projected certain preconceived images—notable for being one-sided and stereotyped—to their audiences. The potential impact of such biased coverage becomes apparent when one considers that in covering the Middle East, the American media are dealing with an extremely sensitive area of the world, an area faced with regional conflicts which could, under certain circumstances, trigger a confrontation of the superpowers.

The author of *Orientalism* and *The Question of Palestine* turns his attention in the work under review to the American media's reportage of Islam and Islamic culture in general. Said shows how Western reporting in the wake of the 1973 oil crisis and, most recently, the revolution in Iran, has been dominated by superficial analysis and generalizations which tend to obfuscate the issues and cast them in hostile, emotional terms. Such catch-all phrases as "crescent of crisis," "Muslim hatred of this country," "the Shi'ite penchant for martyrdom," and "Islam" itself have entered into conventional parlance as clichéd explanations for the increase in oil prices and upheaval in the Third World. By the use of these volatile formulas, and especially the all-embracing use of religion, "Islam," to describe inclusively the cultures and conditions of the 45 Islamic states and almost one billion people of the Islamic world, whole societies are relegated to artificial categories, thereby appearing mysterious and threatening.

According to Said, this approach to news coverage of the Islamic world and its deleterious effect on Western atitudes towards Muslims and on Muslim self-esteem has the far more serious consequence of promoting policies which threaten the security of the Arab and Muslim worlds with military intervention. In addition to the moral danger of being maligned, Arabs and Muslims now face the real danger of an abusive use of force by foreign powers against their lands. "It is only a slight overstatement to say that Muslims and Arabs are essentially covered, discussed, apprehended, either as oil suppliers or as political terrorists," states Said (p. 26). He analyzes with depth and conviction the Western heritage of Middle East studies which combines a patronizing attitude towards the "Orient" with imperialist scholarship dating back to the work of nineteenth-century Orientalists, and currently embodied in the works of J.B. Kelly, Walter Laqueur, and Robert W. Tucker. The success of their work has an ominous ring to it, argues Said, giving "frightening testimony to what might be lurking in the minds of policymakers, and to what deep needs for aggression and reconquest these 'experts' . . . really serve" (p. 163).

The overall impact of the book is forceful. There are, however, some minor points to which the author has not given adequate attention. In comments on the war in Lebanon, Said overlooks the critically important external dimension to the conflict (pp. 20 and 138). He also mentions that "Sheikh Yamani became a figure of authority for no ascertainable reason, except that he was Muslim and came from oil rich Saudi Arabia" (p. 37),

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without noting that Yamani's rise to prominence may be attributed to his position as the minister of petroleum of Saudi Arabia, the major power within OPEC.

In the chapter "Islam as News," Said writes as though all journalists are guilty of perpetuating biased coverage of the Middle East when some, in fact, are not. His investigation of press coverage of the Iranian revolution analyzes only the influence of culture on reporting without considering such factors as the think-alike attitude permeating the American press, the role of lobby groups, and the attitude of Middle East governments toward journalists, all of which have complicated the task of information gathering and reporting. To have set the coverage of Iran in the broader context of other Middle East and foreign affairs reportage would have revealed that "crisis journalism" carries a certain bias regardless of the culture in question, and that some of the worst excesses have been avoided in reports on the Middle East. Said raises but fails to develop the important question of the influence of the Arab-Israeli conflict on Middle East news as well. Public opinion surveys conducted during the hostage crisis revealed that Americans held Muslims in generally higher esteem than they did Arabs. When Islam is perceived as a deterrent to Communism, as in Afghanistan for instance, it has been very positively portrayed.

Finally, it would have added considerably to his analysis if Said had followed up his study with some suggestions on alternative methods in analyzing and presenting Islam for both journalists and scholars, thereby laying a foundation for change at this critical juncture in determining Middle East policy. All in all, however, Said has produced a timely and powerful critique of the hypocrisy and hidden assumptions of those journalists and scholars whose writings have guided our thinking on the Islamic world down twisted and dangerous paths.

EDMUND GHAREEB
Bethesda, Maryland

Libya: The Experience of Oil *by J.A. Allan. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1981. 328 pp. $35.00.*

This study by a senior lecturer in geography at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, attempts to assess Libya's social, economic, and political development since independence in December 1951. Using socioeconomic and political factors as criteria, three distinct phases are identified in the post-independence period. The first phase covers events from 1951 up to 1961, when oil was first exported from the country. During this initial period there was excessive dependence upon Western nations and little economic development. From 1961 to 1969, Libya's source of income changed gradually as dependence on aid declined with the rapid increase in oil revenues. Yet in both periods, Libya could be described as a neocolonial entity with an aid-dependent economy until the late 1950s, replaced by an oil economy manipulated by the major international oil companies.

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The third phase, following the military *coup d'état* of September 1, 1969, brought Muammar al-Qadhafi to power and constitutes the most recent period of high expectations and accomplishments, at least in the socioeconomic field. Despite the call for a radical structural transformation and the sweeping away of the "false decolonization" of the period of the monarchy, the last decade has witnessed little fundamental or revolutionary change. Instead, ideology has substituted for comprehensive development with enormous sums being wasted by incompetent bureaucrats, corrupt government officials, and a woefully inadequate resource base that has not been able to absorb large-scale capital investment.

Allen is at his best when evaluating Libya's renewable and nonrenewable resources with the purpose of trying to gain some notion of their potential as a basis for the country's overall development. Similarly, his analysis of the impact of oil is clear and to the point and allows the nonspecialist, for example, to understand easily the multidimensional character of social change resulting from the infusion of rapid and enormous wealth.

Chapters three through six assess Libya's performance economically, socially, and politically in the period preceding the 1969 revolution. The reader, learns, for instance, that while the 1960s witnessed a major transformation of the economy as oil revenues increased dramatically, political life remained incongruously underdeveloped.

In the book's last four chapters, Allen evaluates Qadhafi's socialist revolution in its multiple dimensions. In the economic sphere, postrevolutionary policy effectively redistributed wealth, raised the GNP per capita in real terms, and progressively improved the standard of living of individual Libyan citizens. Yet, as Allen's earlier chapters so clearly demonstrate, many of these policies and trends were already evident in the decade prior to the 1969 revolution, with the possible exception of the reorganization of home ownership and the restriction of private sector commercial activity which took shape in the 1970s.

In the political sphere Qadhafi's Libya also underwent significant changes. Yet the discontinuities evident in political life in the 1960s and 1970s were more evident in revolutionary rhetoric than in drastic or profound administrative changes. To be sure, the scope and character of political discourse under Qadhafi's charismatic leadership took a dramatic turn as appeals for mass and participatory democracy through popular committees became the regime's ideological rallying cry. In the final analysis, the regime's political performance remained unimpressive, although in comparison to the period of total stagnation under the monarchy, *any* movement towards political organization and activity could be considered progress.

On balance, the author has presented to the specialist and lay reader alike a fair but not uncritical comparative analysis of Libya's development in its economic, social, and political dimensions during the monarchical and revolutionary periods. Given the fluidity of recent events and the tortuous maneuvering of Libya's unpredictable leader, this is not an insignificant contribution.

JOHN P. ENTELIS
Fordham University

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The Bureaucracy of Truth: How Communist Governments Manage the News *by Paul Lendvai. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1981. 285 pp. $24.75.*

The management of information for both domestic and foreign audiences has been a keystone of Communist rule and a basic element in attempts to export communism since before the Bolshevik revolution. Prior to the publication of Lendvai's book, however, the internal and external information policies of the Soviet bloc states have not been examined comprehensively. Those studies that have been done have looked specifically at one element of information policy or at one particular country, and, in the period after the signing of the Helsinki accords, they have become dated. This narrow approach has been taken in spite of the fact that the Communist media have been our major source of information on events and policies in the Communist bloc and have, themselves, been major political issues both within the Communist states and in their foreign policies.

Lendvai uses his experiences as a journalist in the Hungarian press of the Stalinist period and the information he gathered later as a Western analyst and reporter on events in the Soviet bloc. He unveils the methods by which Communist leaderships control the dissemination of information for domestic consumption and casts a dissenting opinion of such practices. The use of foreign broadcasts and advocacy of the Third World's demands for a "New World Information Order" to strengthen the Communist position abroad is also debunked. In building his case, Lendvai provides previously unavailable data on the variegated systems of media direction and control, thereby providing information on how the media are produced and establishing the limits the leaderships impose on information for domestic and foreign policy. He then provides an even more detailed discussion of Soviet bloc "trade" in information and media training with the Third World as well as of the duality involved in their noncompliance with information access provisions in the Helsinki Final Act when, at the same time, they rely on those same accords to attack Western broadcasting in Communist states.

However, Lendvai's emphasis on the controls and commitments of these leaderships slights the crucial evidence of the failures of their information management. Such evidence is striking. There is, after all, a recurring theme of the need for accurate information and open discussion in the mass media that appears with every "thaw" and crisis in Communist societies. Communist broadcasts abroad lack an audience in comparison to the high level of interest in Western broadcasts among citizens of the Soviet bloc. Then, too, the thousands of journalists from all over the Third World who have been educated in or aided by the Soviet Union and its East European allies have clearly failed to push their nations or their media into the Soviet camp to any significant degree.

For the nonspecialist, the book provides a valuable, if polemical, overview of the various aspects of information policy and its use by the Soviet bloc states. For the specialist, the book has the same failings as the rest of the information available on this subject: too little is known, and the generalizations on the details of the media process are not always totally accurate. In this respect, the book provides not only a sense of the dimensions of the bureaucracy of misinformation, but it also serves as a call for more research to be done.

JANE L. CURRY
Columbia University

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The Political Economy of Income Distribution in Nigeria *edited by Henry Bienen and V. P. Diejomaoh. New York, Holmes and Meier, 1981. 520 pp. $49.50.*

Returning travelers often depict Nigerian society as a maelstrom of ostentation, bombast, and incivility, a Dickensian society unrelieved by Dickensian compassion. This volume, appropriately massive for its subject, provides clues to what makes Nigeria simultaneously uncomfortable and exciting for residents and visitors alike. Its thirteen articles, ably summarized by Henry Bienen, constitute a gold mine of information and hypotheses for anyone pursuing current debates about social stratification and development in Africa—debates that are often longer on theory than on data.

What kind of society emerges from these pages? Broadly, one in which inflation (induced by the oil industry) has magnified social inequality, especially between the urban and rural sectors. Yet inequality, it is argued, has thus far generated neither a broad class consciousness nor a widely felt sense of relative deprivation. Nigerians in general are more concerned with growth than with equity, although in recent years members of the government and the intelligentsia have started worrying about inequalities, and reduction of them has been a formal goal of government policy in certain fields (for example, education). Yet even such concern tends to be focused more on regions or communities than on classes, and political organization and argument still revolve around communal or ethnic loyalties.

Paradoxically, however, communalism has tended to weaken local government by causing a multiplication of its units. With nineteen states, the power of the federal government has persistently grown and with it the acceptance of urban needs as prior to real needs. Central government has grown stronger as Lagos and the other states have absorbed ever more rural migrants. Though the figures on urbanization in this study tend to be drawn from the mid-sixties, the trends are clear and dramatic: for instance, within eleven years, over 644,000 migrants arrived in Lagos alone, and population has grown in many cities at around 10 percent annually. Public investment incorporates a marked "urban bias," with roughly 80 percent of funds directed to the urban sector during the early seventies (when urban population still constituted only about 20 percent of the total population).

Yet Bienen and his associates do not argue from such bias or other evidence for the "labor aristocracy" thesis, that urban workers and the elite are allied in exploitation of the rural population. Organized labor has been fairly, if intermittently, successful in promoting its share of income, and discontinuity of labor markets has enabled it to protect its share against dilution: unionization and the maintenance of educational barriers have prevented the existence of a huge reserve army of labor in the cities from depressing wage levels. Organized labor, however, has not increased its political clout: its position remains tenuous, as it was during the period of military rule.

Even more tenuous, however, is the position of those in the informal sector, which by definition eludes exact analysis. The government and the unions may have achieved some compression of salaries within the public sector, but between a senior civil servant or a university graduate and those scrambling for a living as shoeshines and sellers of single cigarettes the income differential may be as much as twenty-five times. Zoning has begun

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to produce marked spatial segregation in the cities, and even policies designed to produce greater equality of opportunity (for example, the great expansion of education) have sometimes led to a redefinition of strata.

The authors acknowledge that Nigeria has not yet produced a "consistent and well-developed package of policies to deal with income inequalities" (p. 19), though they suggest that the tax system might be used for egalitarian purposes without a sacrifice of growth. Their own analysis suggests, however, that, outside of certain Fabian circles in government and the universities, redistribution is an idea whose time has not yet come and that Nigerians are too busy to notice even if it had. Growth, even when accompanied by inflation and inequality, may just stimulate greed. It is only when the ride gets slower and the going gets rougher that the passengers clinging to the doors may start to wonder how those in first class got to be there.

MARTIN STANILAND
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Organizing Interests in Western Europe: Pluralism, Corporatism and the Transformation of Politics *edited by Suzanne D. Berger. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1981. 426 pp. $37.50.*

This rewarding symposium publishes results of an ongoing investigation by a joint committee on Western Europe sponsored by the Social Sciences Research Council and the American Council of Learned Societies. All of the contributions, authored by American and European social scientists in a variety of fields, address themselves to the question of how socioeconomic, historical, organizational, and political processes in Western Europe have shaped interests and what status interest groups have acquired in various political systems.

Quite elegantly, that is, without annoying polemics, the editor of the volume points to the differences between the papers presented here and an earlier "generation" of interest group studies sponsored in the fifties by the SSRC and by the International Political Science Association. There is now less emphasis on the distinction, which was important to the functionalists, between articulation by the groups and aggregation by the parties. Instead, interest representation is viewed as a frequently changing trade-off among parties, pressure groups, and government. The state reappears, or is rediscovered, as a significant player, while in earlier studies the heritage of pluralism led to its relative neglect, corrected, however, by more searchng studies of bureaucracy-group relationships than are to be found in the present volume. A paramount concern with the history of interest representation has yielded essays excelling not as much in novel data as in original perspective: the studies encompassing long spans of German and Spanish political history are most helpful, even though I might quibble with some of their interpretations.

In many papers a focus on the role played by labor and capital, and its exemplary importance for the place of groups in the politics of industrialized societies, helps greatly to give some coherence to the "sprawl" unavoidable in a volume such as this. Earlier efforts, devoted as they were to an analysis of group operations rather than to a description

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of how interests are transformed in and impinge on the political process, were inclined to view the group universe in general without emphasizing what mattered most, why and how.

To distribute prizes of excellence, or to identify demerit when judging a multi-authored work, reflects usually only the research interest or the bias of the reviewer. All of the studies are solid without being committed to any particular methodology. They all reflect the attempt to answer many factual questions that must have been raised during the committee's deliberations. Their extensive bibliographies testify to the large amount of recent work done in the field of interest representation by European and especially by German scholars.

The studies' range is rewardingly broad. In addition to the historical surveys, there is a discussion of local corporatism, a hitherto neglected field which deserves attention in many countries. The politics of the traditional middle classes, agricultural syndicalism in France, the French events of 1968, and the hot autumn in Italy form the topics of separate essays. The German white-collar classes in the recent past, the public status which the Bonn government has given to interest groups, and the internal politics of trade unions in general, but especially in the German and Italian setting, are also examined.

The common theme is never neglected: all of the authors wish to clarify the changes over time and the differences between systems which the intermediation between civil society and the state has undergone. To categorize situations, to evaluate the contribution of their findings for theories of democratic representation, and to engage in some prognostication, most of the essays have recourse to the concept of corporatism. What results is, however, frequently confusion rather than new light and understanding. Sundry terminologies for the "varieties" of corporatism are introduced. Yet the authors do not confront each others' terms or conclusions. Important problems are raised but sidestepped: Can corporatist arrangements be expected to obliterate the struggle for power and if so, under which conditions? Can the acknowledged class bias of corporatism ever be balanced? Will not its destabilizing effect win out over temporary and precarious stability which, moreover, might be due not to corporatist patterns but to other factors? Why discredit—with partially valid arguments—the assumptions that underlie the "ungovernability" thesis, only to conclude that in democracies existing corporatist practices are indeed likely to fail, unless the regime resorts to coercion?

Maybe the talented and otherwise superbly informed symposium neglects unduly the writings of Kirchheimer, Beer and Lowi that have all addressed these questions. There is also no reference to Max Weber's trenchant remarks of 1917/18 which scotched in a few sentences the hopes that advocates of official interest representation had put forward at that time; his comments (reprinted in the new translation of *Economy and Society*, New York, Bedminster Press, 1968, p. 1453) are still worth pondering.

HENRY W. EHRMANN
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Germany and the Two World Wars *by Andreas Hillgruber. Trans. by William C. Kirby. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1981. 120 pp. $14.50.*

Germany Transformed: Political Culture and the New Politics *by Kendall L. Baker, Russell J. Dalton, and Kai Hildebrandt. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1981. 381 pp. $25.00.*

Whether it be television programs, films, detective stories, novels, or scholarly treatises, popular interest in the Nazi question has not flagged in many countries since 1945. Although the two volumes under review do not touch directly on the question of why the interest has remained at a high pitch—the systematic extermination of the Jews is surely one reason—they provide important tangential insights. Andreas Hillgruber, professor of history at the University of Cologne, deals with one aspect of the Nazi state: its measure of responsibility in launching World War II. Kendall Baker and colleagues deal with an equally relevant contemporary question, namely, the West Germans' measure of support for their democratic regime in the wake of their penchant for authoritarian rule.

Hillgruber's slim book first appeared in 1967, with a 1979 revision on which this translation is based. The author wanted to contribute to the discussion concerning the country's share of responsibility in the outbreak of the two world wars. He was concerned that the controversial books published in the 1960s by Fritz Fischer, David L. Hoggan and A. J. P. Taylor failed to provide the proper perspective to the scholarly debate. Yet his book was designed for the general public, as it eschews all but a few footnotes and does not intend to make scholarly breakthroughs. Rather, he seeks to discuss and analyze "in a comparative fashion" Germany's role in the catastrophes of 1914 and 1939.

Unfortunately, Hillgruber has failed to provide the comparative approach promised in the preface. In the first half of the book he deals with the pre-World War I and war period; in the second half, with Hitler's foreign policy program from 1933 to 1939 and the first two years of the war. The reader looks in vain for a concluding chapter that would have systematically made the comparison. However, the author does present his point of view. First, he rejects the thesis by Fischer that there was an unbroken continuity of imperialistic policy goals from the Wilhelminian to the Nazi eras. Second, he rejects the thesis, widely accepted in West Germany, that there was no continuity of goals from one war to the next one. Hillgruber takes a middle position: there were continuities, but new departures as well, especially in Hitler's policy to exterminate the Jews and his dreams of worldwide conquest.

As to Germany's responsibility for starting the wars, he maintains that the government bore a "moderate" share for the outbreak of the war in 1914 and for escalating its demands during the hostilities, and a "high" share for starting World War II. But if Germany was not fully responsible for starting both world wars, the question must be posed as to which other states shared in the guilt. Hillgruber unfortunately does not provide a satisfactory answer.

The title of the book by Baker, Dalton and Hildebrandt gives the reader a clue that a major transformation from the old Imperial and Nazi orders has taken place in West Germany since 1949. That the new state would embark on expansionist policies abroad is close to being impossible given the legacy of the past, the new political environment in

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Europe, the nonaggression treaties with the East, and its commitment to a democratic order.

The authors were interested in analyzing attitudinal changes among the German electorate about the commitment to such an order. They had access to the rich data banks of the Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) in Ann Arbor, the Zentralarchiv für empirische Sozialforschung (ZA) in Cologne, and the Zentrum für Umfragen, Methoden und Analysen (ZUMA) in Mannheim. Their voting behavior study, covering the German elections from 1953 to 1976, constitutes a secondary analysis of data compiled by the German Electoral Data project. The authors sought to find out whether in such a longitudinal study a significant change among the voters occurred between the initial years when non-democratic attitudes were plentiful and the later period when a seemingly well-established, stable democracy prevailed.

The authors used West Germany also as a test case for a broader analysis of change in a political system standing at the threshold of the postindustrial era, in which "old politics" issues, such as wages and working conditions in the industrial era, will, according to their view, become less relevant. Instead, highly educated voters will be more interested in "new politics" issues, such as the quality of life in a rapidly changing environment, which will bring in its wake a greater support for democratic norms, more political involvement, a changed political agenda, and a weakening of class cleavages.

Although the authors faced problems in the use of the data based on ten national cross-section and panel surveys which did not always deal with the same topics or pose identical questions, the data did support their thesis that changes were bound to occur in West Germany as the political culture, the economic and political environment, and traditional partisan attachments evolved rapidly from 1949 to 1976. Among the many conclusions they reached is that the average German citizen is no longer quiescent and uninvolved; rather the young generation and the growing middle class faces new social and political tasks on the domestic front and has become more interested in foreign policy developments.

While the authors have little difficulty proving their theses from the available data, they have more difficulty making predictions. Quite rightly they hedge about future trends—for example, a possible legitimacy crisis—but in those cases their analysis of data has limitations. Readers who have difficulty understanding multiple classification analyses and beta coefficients are also warned that these are not always safely tucked into the appendices. Despite some weaknesses, however, the book is a valuable addition to the literature of an advanced industrial system.

GERARD BRAUNTHAL
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Germany East and West: Conflicts, Collaboration, and Confrontation *by Lawrence L. Whetten. New York, New York University Press, 1981. 215 pp. $17.50.*

This is a disappointing book from most points of view. The choice of title leads the reader to expect a discussion of domestic German politics, possibly as a basis for exploring the differences and relations between the two German states. The opening section indeed suggests an interpretation of the evolution of the relationship between the Federal Republic and the East German people's republic from the angle of the age-old struggle between the German Social Democrats and the Communists. This promising perspective is soon dropped, though, and never taken up again, however much the *Ostkontakte* of West German politicians such as Herbert Wehner beckon the analyst. The organization of *Germany East and West* is more convincing and clearly leads up to the unfolding of West German *Ostpolitik* under Foreign Minister and then Chancellor Willy Brandt and in the broader context of the relation between the blocs and superpowers. Unless the reader already knows the story, however, much of it literally disappears in the welter of detail.

Whetten's book also has its strong points. Of particular merit, for example, is the material and interpretation of the development of East-West German trade and visitor contacts (pp. 94–118 and appendix). The author demonstrates the steep increase and mid-seventies plateau in both of these curves and concludes that this is a record of stagnation (p. 117), though it is difficult to see any alternative to this leveling-off, considering the nature of the needs and capacities on both sides. The fact obviously remains that the current figures represent a much higher level of economic interdependence despite East German adjustments and political constraints mirroring the defensiveness of the regime. There is also a good discussion of the economic and social problems of Communist Germany in the 1970s, although readers may be puzzled by the repeated and unexplained mention of "class discrimination" (pp. 148–49, 151). Unexplained statements also mar the otherwise illuminating discussion of the broader East-West context, such as the author's crediting the Western countries with a "more reliable economic base . . . [and] compatibility of commercial and fiscal policies" (p. 138). Twenty pages later he cannot but show the economic competition and incompatibility of certain American and West German interests (pp. 159–60). To make up for his overestimation of Western power, furthermore, he frequently underestimates the Soviet appeal to nonaligned and Third World nations (pp. 138, 165–6).

There are other puzzling passages, such as the claim that "there was no comprehensive program behind *Ostpolitik*" (p. 164) or the concluding pages (pp. 167–8) from which one might have expected lucidity. The footnotes, too, testify more to the author's bibliographic knowledge than they enlighten and explain since they generally lack page citations. Finally, the manuscript somehow seems to have escaped entirely the blue pencil of copy editor and proofreader, leaving such obvious mistakes as to inhibit rapid reading. Reading this book is a persuasive argument for taking a lot more trouble with a manuscript before it meets with printer's ink.

PETER H. MERKL
University of California, Santa Barbara

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The Nature of the Italian Party System: A Regional Case Study *by Geoffrey Pridham. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1981. 283 pp. $25.00.*

Readers who wish to know for sure how the puzzle of Italian politics will next unravel should not read this book, or most of what specialists of Italian politics have been publishing recently. But if they will be satisfied with clearheaded answers to why Italian politics is an open-ended puzzle, there are not many works I can recommend more highly. Without achieving conceptual superiority over the best competitors, the book distinguishes itself for a refreshingly British, judicious, and at times sympathetic matter-of-factness. It offers a balanced and richly documented picture of what has and has not changed in Italian party politics in response to the events of the 1970s, with conclusions that are often more persuasive than those of conceptually tighter but possibly one-sided analyses of the issue.

The book focuses on the politics of the two major national parties in one region—heavily leftist Tuscany—an approach that is in itself a way of seeing whether and how the process of regionalization and devolution of the seventies has led to a greater diversification of party life and party strategies at the local level. The analysis—which relies on extensive interviews with local government and party cadres, primary party and government data, as well as the usual scholarly and media sources—is divided into two parts. In the first, Pridham explores the internal politics of Christian Democracy and the Communist party in the region. The focus is on electoral support, membership recruitment and composition, grass-root participation, subcultures, and social and political profiles of party cadres and leaders, party attitudes toward social and interparty alliances, and the evolution of these phenomena in the last decade. The second part looks at how party evolutions have affected actual strategies of governing coalitions in the region, at issue being especially the viability of Communist-inspired strategies of broad convergence among all major parties.

Pridham's running theme, "continuity and change," may strike one as hackneyed, but there is much in his analysis, indeed much more than a short review can encompass, to make the theme quite plausible. The treatment of the Communist party touches no novel chords, mainly because the party has monopolized the attention of so many scholars before Pridham. But the author's long chapter on Tuscan Christian Democracy, a party much vituperated but little studied, is a model of the author's capacity for fresh and balanced insight—the more convincing since the author does not seem to be guided by any empathy toward the party. The endurance of Christian Democracy in an increasingly "red" region, precarious though it is, rests in the author's assessment not only on clientelism— a theme too often abused by too many scholars—but also on the party's complex relations with Catholic *and* secular constituencies, the voluntarism of its open organizational structure, the civic-professional implantation of its middle class nonbureaucratic leaders, and even shifting factionalism. The result is a capacity for rebounding which, though reactive and dispersed, begins to explain why regional convergences with the Communist party, dictated by necessity and still limited, are now at an unfathomable impasse. It is not simply Christian Democracy's lust for undivided power that sets the limit, as much as the party's more competitive conception of government and its self-image as an open nonbureaucratic association. This in fact still leaves open the

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possibility that local coalitions, now controlled by the center, may in more normal times shake loose of the center and convergences may occasionally resume, without necessarily touching national priorities.

Pridham's overriding and unassuming conclusion is that predictions about the Italian party system are characterized by greater uncertainty than ever. But readers will discover that the reasons are not as perverse and idiosyncratic as social scientists tend to make them.

GIUSEPPE DI PALMA
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Class, State and Power in the Third World: With Case Studies on Class Conflict in Latin America *by James Petras et al. Totowa, N.J., Allanheld, Osmun & Co., Inc., 1981. 285 pp. Cloth, $19.95; paper, $8.95.*

"Selected Essays on Contemporary International Political Economy and Revolutionary Politics, with a special focus on Latin America and the United States" would have been a more appropriate (although less elegant) title for this uneven collection of articles that James Petras and his associates have put together in book form. Part one, "The Imperial State and the World Economy," has eight chapters dealing with a variety of international economic and political issues, from U.S. investment in Latin America and the political economy of international debt to what the authors call "the revival of fascism" and the role of the Socialist International in Latin America. Part two, "Class Conflict and Revolution," provides what the title of the book refers to as case studies, analyzing several aspects of working-class and peasant politics in Cuba, Peru, Argentina, and Nicaragua as well as offering some general discussions of the class components of socialist revolutions and the role of political oppositions to the present crop of Latin American dictatorships.

The book represents essentially an effort to reassert radical orthodoxy against the plethora of neo-Marxist and non-Marxist writers on the Left who have grappled with the question of the state and of imperialism in the seventies. Chapter 1, "The U.S. Imperial State," is the theoretically most ambitious part, and it will probably become a mandatory reference in the standard literature on the subject. It straddles a careful middle-ground between "instrumentalists" and "structuralists" by defining the imperial state as one that embodies "the present and future collective interests of the most dynamic sector of capital" (p. 5) while, at the same time, acknowledging that the "give and take of bureaucratic struggle, the interagency rivalries, and personality and opinion clashes between different sets of advisers [although of limited scope] may have significant impact on the existing configuration of forces in any local or regional setting within the imperial system" (p. 10). It is, by and large, a well-argued, empirically grounded, and historically informed piece. Symptomatically, it is also the one article where the authors show their greatest willingness to depart from established Marxist tenets and to learn from and absorb new conceptual approaches to the subject. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said about the rest of the book.

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The first warning to be given to potential readers is that, appearances to the contrary, this is not an integrated volume as is often seen in the social sciences today, with a number of introductory chapters providing the theoretical framework followed by case studies used to illustrate and/or test the broader generalizations. This is, rather, a collection of very different articles of varying length (some as short as six pages, others as long as thirty-six), quality, and substantive focus, which have little in common over and beyond the fact that they were written by the principle author and his associates. The five-page introduction and the four-page conclusion do little to change that. And the fact that four long paragraphs on pages 47 and 48 are repeated almost *verbatim* on pages 125 and 126 only confirms that the collection was rather hastily put together.

A second problem is the disturbing tendency of the authors to dismiss, often in the harshest of terms, some of the most important contributions made to our understanding of Latin American politics and economics, as well as to class relations more generally. Everybody and everything is fair game, but to do away with Gramsci's concept of hegemony and dependency theory in two footnotes and with bureaucratic authoritarianism in a couple of paragraphs in a book that pretends to "reformulate many fundamental issues" is not serious scholarship.

Finally, the book would certainly have benefitted from a good editor. Whoever proofread and edited it, did not do it properly. To give only one example, the names of the presidents of Peru, Chile, and Argentina are all misspelled.

On balance, then, this is a volume with some interesting insights—I found chapter 1 as well as those on the role of the Socialist International in Latin America today and on the Argentine working class to be eminently informative, perceptive, and well argued—but also one that, as a book, simply does not stand up. Why the authors did not publish some of the better chapters as articles and forget about the rest can perhaps only be explained by the curious reward system of the social sciences—as opposed to the natural sciences—that puts a high premium on books, in whatever form, shape, or size.

JORGE HEINE
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China's Intellectuals: Advise and Dissent *by Merle Goldman. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1981. 276 pp. $22.00*

Intellectuals and the State in Modern China: A Narrative History *by Jerome B. Grieder. New York: Free Press, 1981. 395 pp. $22.50.*

These two books on the intellectuals in modern China are very different in historical coverage and style, but raise some intriguing common issues.

Grieder's book is a history of Chinese political thought from the mid-nineteenth century to the late 1940s, with two opening chapters on the Confucian background. It belongs to the "Transformation of Modern China" series of textbooks for advanced classes. Aimed at a general audience, the book contains, as the author says, little to surprise the specialist. Yet for the general reader or specialist alike it has great virtues. With deft sketches of personal and political history, Grieder brings to life the thinkers' per-

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sonalities and the historical situations they faced. Although he mentions many names, he has selected especially influential figures for detailed treatment ranging from a few pages to half a chapter each. Most of these figures have been treated elsewhere, but Grieder's discussions are distinguished. He manages to portray succinctly the central themes of each person's intellectual career as well as its bafflements, contradictions, and development. The collected works of some of his subjects run to the scores of volumes. He has skillfully selected two or three crucial texts for detailed discussion. Among the important figures he treats perceptively are Liang Qichao, the late Qing polymath who probably most influenced modern Chinese thought; Hu Shi, the American-trained liberal on whom Grieder published an excellent book some years ago; and the intellectual founders of Chinese communism, Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao. Grieder never presumes a reader's previous knowledge, yet in scholarly writing of this calibre, every page shows the result of years of reading and reflection.

Goldman picks up the story of Chinese political thought on the eve of the cultural revolution, in the mid-1960s, and carries it through to the end of Mao's life (1976). (The interval of the 1950s and earlier 1960s has been treated in a previous book and series of articles by her.) But the atmosphere she portrays is different from that depicted by Grieder. Intellectual life, at least in public, had lost the vitality of more chaotic but freer times. As she describes it, it consisted of Aesopian political debates in the official media, disguised as academic discussions of historiography, aesthetics, literature, and the philosophy of dialectics. Goldman is expert at deciphering these discussions to discover who supported or attacked whom. She is less successful at conveying what, if anything, of intellectual substance was at stake and what motivated the thinkers—if one can call them thinkers—besides loyalty to one or another political faction. She divides her protagonists into two schools of thought, "liberal" and "radical," and argues that the first group believed in a modicum of "intellectual autonomy," while the second was driven by the desire to realize revolutionary ideals in an imperfect, post-revolutionary society. These are stereotypes; she does not develop them into rounded intellectual portraits of the type Grieder achieves. Instead, when her characters fail to run true to form—such as when the "radicals" publish some statements that fail to differ from the "liberals"—she accuses her subjects of being confused.

Foreign writers studying China are often impressed by the continuity of ideas and styles of thinking through a century of revolution. Professor Goldman presents an interesting and at first seemingly paradoxical schema to deal with this problem. She argues that the "liberal" intellectuals, mainly officials and professors of the ruling cultural establishment, derived their belief in the value of intellectual independence more from their acquaintance with Western thought during the May Fourth period than from the Confucian tradition, whereas the "radicals" were enacting a traditional Chinese role of idealistic ideological protest or "dissent."

This locates intellectual continuity in an unexpected part of the political spectrum, the far left—a good point as far as it goes. Grieder's treatment of the issue is more complex. He sees the introduction of a future-oriented, revolutionary ideological style of thinking in this century as marking a decisive break with the past and notes a number of other important twentieth-century ideas that lacked Confucian precedent. Among the assumptions that survived the revolution, however, were the idea of the state as an end in itself

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and the belief in the state's right to control culture. This suggests that Goldman's liberals and radicals are both playing traditional roles of service to the state, even if wielding some untraditional ideas.

Grieder's conclusions about the survival of liberalism in China are more pessimistic than Goldman's. Liberalism was "not only alien to China, but unassimilable," he says (p. 349), while Goldman, as we have seen, finds liberalism embodied in the commissars and professors allied with the bureaucratic faction now once again in power. One reason for this disagreement is the authors' divergent conceptions of liberalism. Goldman sees it as the belief that a limited amount of autonomy should be allowed to intellectuals as they pursue their service to the state. Grieder's conception is broader and more in accord with what the term has meant historically in the West—belief in the values of the individual, in the guidance of reason, and in limits on the power of the state. Liberalism in Goldman's sense is a position voiced during power struggles in any totalitarian state. The same can be said of the kind of "dissent" she describes, consisting of the use of purist ideas as part of the conflict among political factions. If true liberalism and true dissent exist in China, they do so among the handful of activists of the recently suppressed "democracy movement" and not among feuding groups of top officials.

ANDREW J. NATHAN
Columbia University

The Arab States and the Palestine Conflict *by Barry Rubin. Syracuse, N.Y., Syracuse University Press, 1981. 298 pp. Cloth, $22.00; paper, $10.95.*

This valuable book will be read with interest by both scholars and diplomatic observers concerned with the Arab-Israeli dispute. An ambitious undertaking, it provides a useful perspective on the conflict and is informed by wide-ranging archival research in British, American, and Zionist diplomatic records, as well as published materials in Hebrew and Arabic. The author suggests that the question of Palestine's future in the years after World War I became entangled in the domestic politics of the Arab states and affected the patterns of inter-Arab relations. His account explains why Iraqi politicians adopted an uncompromising Pan-Arab stance which drove them to radical positions on Palestine, why Egypt was less susceptible during the 1930s and 1940s to radical proposals, and why Zionist leaders have consistently sought to deal with the leaders of neighboring Arab states rather than seeking an accommodation with indigenous Palestinian Arab leaders.

Many scholars have acknowledged the role which the fate of the Palestinian Arabs has played in the internal affairs of Arab states, but Rubin has added a new dimension to previous accounts by carefully delineating the differences dictated by divergent political cultures and the surprising effects that these differences have had on inter-Arab diplomacy. His book undermines the conventional judgment that the Arab states expended little effort on the Palestine problem in the inter-war years and offers a powerful explanation of why they nonetheless failed to prevent the establishment of Israel.

Rubin is at his best in describing the Anglo-Arab, Anglo-Zionist, and Arab-Zionist negotiations between 1919 and 1948, but his focus on diplomacy is a source of weakness

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as well as strength. The events in Palestine are not fully sketched in the author's narrative yet, although recounted in detail elsewhere, they provide an important backdrop for the author's fascinating account. The absence of this local context occasionally leads to confusion. Rubin, for example, paints Haj Amin al-Husayni, the Mufti of Jerusalem, as a universally despised figure in the Arab world after World War II, but unaccountably indicates the Mufti's continuing centrality to the events which led to the outbreak of war in 1948.

Rubin's stress on the importance of the Palestine issue in Arab internal politics is not always persuasive. He shows that in their dealings with British and American diplomats, Arab leaders expressed fear of being engulfed in a "tidal wave of public opinion" (p. 164), but it remains unclear to what extent these threats of inflexibility due to domestic exigencies represented negotiating tactics and to what extent they represented reality. Part of the difficulty in demonstrating this is methodological. Although he ably uses Arabic sources, most of his evidence on the domestic role of Palestine comes from British and American diplomatic reporting. Some of the dispatches he cites contain verbatim notes of Arab political meetings which provide valuable evidence that may be used to reconstruct domestic politics in Egypt, Iraq and Syria. Many of the reports, however, are less reliable, and Rubin has compounded the difficulties by not providing representative quotations in many instances. As a result, one is not sure whether the cited report represents British or American speculation, the conjecture of other diplomats, the Arab government's view, or the plaints of opposition leaders.

The final chapter in the book, an examination of U.S.-Egyptian relations during the Eisenhower-Dulles years, is based on recently declassified government documents and suggests the impact of the Cold War on the Arab-Israeli conflict. This chapter would have been more useful as the introduction to a sequel than as the conclusion to the volume under review. Given the value of Rubin's account of the diplomacy accompanying the early years of the Jewish-Arab conflict over Palestine and the continuing importance of the issue, scholars will look forward with anticipation to his subsequent efforts.

ERIC STEVEN EDELMAN
U.S. Department of State

The Emergence of Modern India *by Arthur Lall. New York, Columbia University Press, 1981. 260 pp. $16.95.*

This book belongs to a genre that falls somewhere between history and memoir, and that indefinite location defines both its strengths and weaknesses. It is not, as the dust-jacket blurb claims, a history of modern India, but it is an interpretation of India's internal situation and its relation to the outside world by a participant in many of the important events of our time.

Arthur Lall is one of the last of the generation that served the government of India before independence in 1947 and continued to serve it in the new era. Patriotic Indians like Lall are inclined to make a sharp distinction between the periods. Of course there are differences of great importance, but for an understanding of modern India the continu-

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ities and legacies of the pre-independence period are crucial. Since the understanding of that historical experience has been so deeply colored for both India and the West by the interpretations of modern history subsumed under the headings of "imperialism," "colonialism," and "nationalism," it is imporatant for the West to see how Indians have used their own past, as well as that of the West, as a lens for bringing the present into focus. While other Indian writers, including former officials, have attempted to do this, few have succeeded as well as Lall. It is not enough to be an "insider" or even to have had a guiding role in great events; one has to bring to the task an intelligent perception of the way the world functions, including how small the role of policy-maker often is. It is such a perception that Lall brings to his study, making it of value to anyone who is concerned with India and its role in the world.

Lall begins his study with a brief historical summary which asserts that the central theme of five thousand years of India's history "is the patient endeavor to integrate a variety of ethnic and cultural streams" (p. 1). This personification of the past, and the identification of the ancient, indeed, the prehistoric, period with the modern nation-state will make historians uneasy, but it sets the tone for Lall's later chapters on the rise of Indian nationalism, contemporary domestic politics, and India's activity as an actor on the international scene.

Lall's analysis of the years of nationalist struggle is handled well, and he shows considerable understanding of the attitudes of the Muslim leaders to the growing success of the Indian National Congress under the leadership of Gandhi and Nehru. In the end, however, he sees the British as the prime actors in the great struggle, not the Indian nationalists or the followers of Jinnah. Like almost all Indian commentators on the period, he is convinced that, "the stage had been set" and "the players had been cast under British direction" (p. 93). This tendency to give credit to the ruling power for controlling the destiny of a people is surely one of the most lasting legacies of imperialism.

In his characterization of the Indian government under Nehru, Lall makes the interesting point that Nehru's senior political colleagues—the cabinet ministers and members of parliament—coming from more indigenous backgrounds than he did, were less sophisticated, less at home in the westernized Delhi world, whereas the senior civil servants came from backgrounds similar to Nehru's own. This made the latter more at ease and gave them much more access to the levers of power at the center. To a considerable degree this probably still remains true thirty-five years after independence.

Lall's analysis of the importance of the war between India and China is especially interesting, for he sees this period as the great watershed for India's position in the world. Before this, India had played a significant role in international affairs, but, Lall argues, the exposure of India's weakness by her inability to throw back the Chinese reduced her to the status of a "small" country. He insists that India still pursues a foreign policy based on the idea of "non-power," a rejection of relationships based upon power alliances, military strength, and political hegemony.

In regard to India's domestic situation, Lall expresses a kind of qualified optimism. He believes that India will not achieve the material standard of living of the advanced countries, but that it is possible to provide the citizens enough to eat and wear, with tolerable standards of health care and sanitation. This, he argues, will be in keeping with India's

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traditional values and ethos, and this kind of domestic economy will march with the country's ambitions as a "non-power" in international affairs.

It is by no means certain that Indira Gandhi and the ruling elite share Lall's irenic vision of India's place in the world, but it is an attractive statement of the ideology that dominated Indian nationalist political consciousness from the end of the nineteenth century through the Nehru era.

AINSLIE T. EMBREE
Columbia University

Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development *by Lawrence Ziring. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1981. 294 pp. $29.75.*

While this book does not systematically explore the concept of political development raised in its subtitle, it is a consistently interesting as well as a comprehensive study of the politics of a major West Asian state. Pakistan is the only post-colonial nation to have undergone partition, namely, the 1971 loss of East Pakistan, subsequently Bangladesh. It has been ruled by the military for most of its history, yet its politics have been characterized by an active—if not always successful—search for constitutional order. Even the present government, headed by President (and General) Zia ul-Haq has not rejected the idea of constitutionalism, and Ziring retains some hope that Zia will return to a form of democratic government.

While marred by a number of technical and historical errors, this volume does have the virtue of taking the reader back in time to the 1950s and 1960s and even earlier when discussing the role of the bureaucracy, political parties, Pakistan's incipient sub-nationalities, and the role of religion in one of the few states—Israel being the other— explicitly created as a homeland for co-religionists. Separate chapters deal with each of these groups or issues. Ziring is not reluctant to offer his own views on "what went wrong" at various stages of Pakistan's history, although it is to his credit that even an uninformed reader might come to a different conclusion on the basis of the evidence he supplies.

One difficulty in this approach is that each successive chapter necessarily repeats certain historical information. Throughout this volume, Ziring summarizes the past and speculates about the future; this creates an air of indecisiveness in the analysis, an indecisiveness not attenuated by the absence of any overall conceptual framework. As noted, the concept of political development is nowhere discussed at length, nor is Pakistan placed in a comparative context which would allow the lay reader to fix it in time and structure. Yet, as Ziring emphasizes, Pakistan is "worthy of our concern [as] noble intentions breathed life into the Pakistan dream," although the country has been "stalked by tragedy from its inception" (p. 9).

The regional specialist will appreciate this volume even though it does contain a number of irritating mistakes and some repetitive writing that should have been caught by the editors. It is not true, for example, that Bengali is written in the Devanagri script (p. 48), or that the Indian military is somehow pro-socialist (p. 255). Ziring's generaliza-

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tion that European nationalists were interested in democratizing their societies while non-European nationalists were "devoted to the recreation of their past and the salvaging of their lost pride" (p. 58) does injustice to the Nehrus of Asia and Africa.

On the whole, however, Ziring is a sound guide to the labyrinthian and occasionally bloody politics of Pakistan. That Pakistan has now entered into a new strategic relationship with the United States and is embarking on the development of a nuclear weapon enhances the timeliness of this already substantial work.

STEPHEN PHILIP COHEN
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Representation and Presidential Primaries: The Democratic Party in the Post-Reform Era *by James I. Lengle. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1981. 131 pp. $27.50.*

As a reform vehicle, presidential primaries have encountered sharp swings in popularity. Pushed by Progressive forces during the first two decades of this century, presidential primaries spread to more than half the states by 1916. But as Progressives grew disenchanted with their brainchild, some states began to repeal laws for primaries. There has been a revival since World War II, particularly in the last decade, and presidential primaries now enjoy a dominant position in the nomination process for both parties.

Primaries were originally created as an alternative to boss rule in the states and cities. It is therefore important that James Lengle looks at the representativeness of presidential primaries and finds them wanting. He focuses on the results from the 1968 and 1972 California primaries, which he considers nearly ideal for studying the representative quality of Democratic presidential primaries. Underrepresented in those elections were voters who were black, Asian, or Spanish, who had a high school education or less, who had an income under $10,000, and were employed in blue-collar occupations. Overrepresented were Democrats who were white, college-educated, salaried above $10,000, and in white-collar professions. For a party that prides itself on its broad appeal to the "underclass," it is ironic that its nucleus is consistently underrepresented.

Of course, other studies have demonstrated that voter turnout depends on socioeconomic status. For example, it becomes more likely that an individual will vote at each higher level of education. Lengle goes farther by analyzing the relationship between education and ideology. He finds a "sharp, linear drop in the percentage of conservative and middle-of-the-road Democrats as education increases" (p. 34). Liberal groups are overrepresented; conservative, middle-of-the-road elements are underrepresented. The candidates who win primaries may lack the qualities needed to appeal to the interests they must represent in the general election. Lengle also suggests that in other states with turnouts lower than California's, the degree of demographic unrepresentativeness may be even greater. Less educated, lower-income, and lower-class Democrats elsewhere are likely to be more underrepresented than those in California. This result is especially troublesome when other mediating organizations—political parties and labor unions—are losing their effectiveness.

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Lengle comes to two broad conclusions: primary electorates have political orientations "far different from the party membership as a whole," and primary voters, unlike professional politicians in old-fashioned party caucuses, place "ideological interests above party interests when choosing their presidential nominee" (p. 110). As one implication, the traditional supporters of the Democratic party may opt for the Republican candidate.

Representativeness, as Lengle points out, is not the same as responsiveness. Even if primary election voters are probably more demographically representative of the party membership than either activists in participatory conventions or party professionals in old-fashioned party caucuses, primary election voters may be less effective in sensing the qualities needed for the general election. Parties seem too weak now to expect a return to old-fashioned party caucuses, but Lengle believes that marginal adjustments can be made to strengthen the responsiveness of the nominating process. One suggestion he offers is to reserve a substantial share of each state's delegation for groups that are "underrepresented in primary electorates and for party-related figures, both party officeholders and the party's elected public officials" (p. 114).

Lengle has produced a book that effectively integrates the history of primary reforms, statistics from voter surveys, and the politics of the electoral process. The writing is terse, well-argued, and systematic. While his prescriptions are modest, they are probably less vulnerable to the embarrassments that have consistently accompanied more ambitious schemes.

LOUIS FISHER
Congressional Research Service

Canada Since 1945: Power, Politics and Provincialism *by Robert Bothwell, Ian Drummond, and John English. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1981. 489 pp. $19.95*

During the thirty-five years since World War II, Canada has been a stable but rapidly changing society. Its population has doubled, and its "mosaic" now includes a much more heterogeneous ethnic and racial mixture. Per capita income has doubled, economic growth has been widely shared, and a welfare state has been installed, providing a measure of security that would have been unthinkable in 1945. A larger proportion of Canadians live in urban settlements and work in service occupations. They are much better schooled, culturally more sophisticated, and far more "liberated" in their beliefs and lifestyles. By most measures of social, cultural, and material well being, Canada indeed merits the enviable title of "peaceable kingdom." Affluence, urbanization, and complex organizations have brought personal problems of alienation, group conflict, and inflated claims on the state as universal problem solver that have become familiar in all the liberal welfare states. In Canada these have been accentuated by renewed tensions between assertive provincial governments and a cautious, defensive federal center, the unresolved claims of the French-speaking minority, especially in Quebec, and uncertainty about Canada's appropriate position and responsibilities in world affairs, including relations with her powerful southern neighbor.

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The authors present an optimistic assessment of Canada's recent performance as a polity, economy and society. For convenience of presentation, the book is divided chronologically according to the term of each prime minister. For each period there are chapters containing what the authors consider the significant political, international, economic, and cultural events and developments. Fortunately for the reader, the authors seldom equivocate about their orientation to events and their interpretations are remarkably consistent. They are committed to a strong, active central state; they are therefore contemptuous of what they consider the fractious, parochial, and self-serving demands of provincial governments. They believe in an open economy and thus are impatient with economic nationalism, neo-Marxism, and trendy, doctrinaire anti-Americanism. Since they prefer an internationally active and outward-looking Canada, they deplore Canada's retreat from an important role in the Atlantic Alliance and its moralistic criticisms of U.S. foreign policy, while Canada benefits from an international order for which the United States pays a disproportionate share of the economic and moral costs. As advocates of political liberalism, the authors have as little patience with ethnic nationalism in Quebec as with anti-French chauvinism elsewhere in Canada. The reader is never in doubt about where the authors stand. Their heros are the men—no women included—who exemplify their ideas—C.D. Howe, Louis St. Laurent, Pierre Trudeau,—but their admiration is never uncritical either of personality or performance. The anti-heros are, not surprisingly, John George Diefenbaker, Joe Clark, such economic nationalists as Walter Gordon and ethnic nationalists as Maurice Duplessis and René Lévesque.

Since the authors take positive positions, some readers will surely quarrel with their interpretations of such events as the October crisis of 1970, the vigorous defense of foreign investment, criticism of Trudeau for cutting back Canada's participation in NATO, or the lack of sympathy for the distinctive needs of Canada's economic regions as articulated by provincial governments and their intellectual apologists. Theirs is the perspective of central Canada, its Ontario heartland, and its cosmopolitan, English-speaking academics. Those who sympathize with the aspirations of the Quiet Revolution generation in Quebec are likely to find the treatment of their claims for special status, if not for independence, inadequate and insensitive, despite mastery of the raw facts. Aside from this deficiency, this reviewer found little to criticize in the interpretation of events, no doubt because the views presented are generally compatible with his own. Those who disagree will find the authors' views not merely asserted, but richly substantiated with data and with observations that are carefully documented and skillfully argued.

This book is fun to read. Except for some of the economic analysis which is sometimes too technical for the nonspecialist, its style is lively and engaging. It is rare that a multi-authored work manages so coherent and readable a survey and assessment of complex events as these three authors have achieved. This book is an excellent introduction to contemporary Canada. It will be useful for courses in Canadian civilization, history, and political economy both for Canadians and foreign students.

MILTON J. ESMAN
Cornell University

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

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

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

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